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In this dissertation I argue that artworks that mimic scientific experiments can 
transform our philosophical understanding of scientific experiment itself. The collection 
of artworks that form the basis of my case studies includes artificial weather systems, 
imaginary scientific instruments, responsive sound environments, genetic portraits and 
live scientific demonstrations. Despite their heterogeneity, each of these artworks 
embodies a certain idea of experiment through its physical form. I read these artworks as 
material representations of the logics and practices described by philosophers and 
historians of scientific experimentation. Much as scientific models mediate between 
theories and the real world, artworks, in my analysis, mediate between the philosophical 
descriptions of science and its material instantiations. Like models, artworks are not 
merely illustrations of preconceived ideas but also have lives of their own. The very idea 
of using artworks to explore the nature of experiment has its roots in Kant’s theory of 
exemplarity, developed in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Artworks are considered 
exemplary when they give sensuous embodiment to an idea that has not yet been fully 
formed in thought. To regard artworks as exemplary for the philosophy of science and 
technology is to regard them as generative of new ways of thinking about 
experimentation as a mode of material and conceptual practice that art and science share. 
My dissertation opens up a new archive for the philosophy of scientific experimentation 
in the form of what I call performative experiments—a term that I reserve for artworks 
that at once enact and query the logic of scientific experimentation.   
  
 
The dissertation is comprised of four chapters, each of which places one or more 
artworks into conversation with a set of philosophical questions that arise at the 
intersection of aesthetic theory, philosophy of science and philosophy of technology. 
Philosophers of technology have observed that tools, by their very nature, tend to recede 
into their context of use and in doing so become transparent and invisible to their users. 
My first chapter aims to recover the role of instruments in the epistemology of scientific 
experimentation through a close reading of Eve André Laramée’s Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions (1994-98), a glass sculpture installation that embeds 
within itself a virtual archeological record of continuity in instrumentation from alchemy 
to modern chemistry. The second chapter examines the methodology of so-called “natural 
experiments,” in which investigators treat occurrent situations as if they were 
intentionally created for the purposes of controlled experimentation. Through my 
analyses of Natalie Jeremijenko's work Tree Logic (1999-present) and Stacey Levy’s 
Seeing the Path of the Wind (1991), I argue that performative experiments dramatize how 
we export habits of seeing and patterns of inference from the carefully shielded 
conditions of the laboratory to the unruly world outside its walls. My third chapter 
investigates the use of molecular genetics as a new medium of portraiture and shows how 
the specific aesthetic possibilities and constraints of this medium transform the genre of 
portraiture so as to capture changing conceptions of personal identity, kinship and 
subjective temporality in the genetic age. Finally, the fourth chapter explores the ethical, 
political and institutional limits governing the transformation of experiences into the 
  
basis of experimental knowledge as these limits become sites of contest in IRB# G10-02-
066-01 (2010), an artwork qua social psychology experiment for the artist Jennifer
Gradecki failed to win approval from her university’s ethics review board. Drawing, in 
part, on the primary data of my own repeated trials as a subject in this illicit experiment, 
titled “Social Interaction as a Function of Voluntary Engagement With a Shock 
Machine,” I reflect on how the epistemic and social value of experiences are mediated by 
the institutional context in which research is regulated and legitimated. 
Throughout the dissertation, I demonstrate that artworks transform material and 
epistemological practices derived from the sciences into formal devices for directing 
perceptual attention and imaginative reflection. When practices of experiment are used to 
organize aesthetic responses in the context of the art museum or gallery, they draw 
attention to aesthetic and phenomenological dimensions of scientific practice that tend to 
escape notice in the context of science itself, and therefore to remain under-theorized 
within the history and philosophy of science. The emerging genre of performative 
experiments opens up a site of critical self-reflexivity within the methods and material of 
scientific practice itself, a site in which it is possible both to explore the cultural 
significance of scientific knowledge and to critique the empirical methods that are used to 
produce the scientific image of the world. Performative experiments are exemplary, in 
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In this dissertation, I identify a new archive of examples from which to develop a 
philosophy of scientific experimentation. My focus is a collection of artworks that 
resemble scientific experiments in virtue of their formal structures, the content that they 
thematize, and the materials and techniques that constitute their mediums. To propose 
that these artworks can serve as examples in such an inquiry, however, is to invoke a 
conception of exemplarity that derives from Kantian aesthetic theory rather than from the 
use of examples typically made in the philosophy of science. The artworks that I attend to 
are marked as much by their resemblances to as by their departures from the actual 
historical examples that philosophers typically dignify as paradigmatic experiments. They 
are not theoretically precise like the mathematical models privileged by physicists, nor 
are they standardized and well characterized like the model organisms favored by 
biologists. Instead, this is collection of unruly examples.1 In their irreducible particularity 
as artworks, they resist extrapolation. Yet they are exemplary insofar as they materially 
instantiate ideas or concepts not yet formed in thought. I call these artworks performative 
experiments. I argue that by exhibiting aspects of scientific experimentation in heterodox 
ways these works tell us much about experiment as an epistemological activity that is 
central to the natural and social sciences. At the same time, they embody a new 
experimental aesthetic that is explicitly conversant with contemporary scientific methods 
and materials. Performative experiments, as I read them, are the aesthetic distillates of the 
increasingly experimentalized conditions of contemporary life. 
                                                
1 Alexander Gelley, Unruly Examples: On the Rhetoric of Exemplarity (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 1995). 
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Performative experiments can be situated within the long history of experimental 
visual and performance art that stretches from early twentieth-century modernism to the 
proliferation, since the 1960’s, of art forms that defy the traditional division of artistic 
media and the rigid norms governing artistic production and reception therein. In this 
tradition, the term ‘experimental’ is associated with openness, indeterminacy, and risk, 
often in the service of an emancipatory politics.2 These connotations are important for my 
project, yet what I emphasize more is the affinities that certain contemporary artworks 
have with the forms of experimentation practiced in the natural sciences. Here, it would 
seem, the epistemic aims of controlling variables and testing theories lend themselves to 
an austere aesthetics of elegance and simplicity.3 A closer inspection reveals that the 
spirit of uncertainty associated with experimental art is essential to science as well; as the 
historian and philosopher of science Hans Jörg-Rheinberger has shown, this is precisely 
what is required in order for unexpected phenomena, new questions, and therefore new 
answers to emerge in the course of experimental work.4 And as Lydia Goehr has argued, 
it is likewise possible to locate in artworks the controlling character associated with 
scientific experiments. My purpose in holding these competing tendencies apart is not to 
point to any essential kinship or difference between experimental art and experimental 
science. Rather, it is to indicate how performative experiments deploy the playful and 
                                                
2 Lydia Goehr, Elective Affinities: Musical Essays on the History of Aesthetic Theory (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), chap. x “Explosive Experiments.” 
3 Parsons and Rueger, “The Epistemic Significance of Appreciating Experiments Aesthetically,” British 
Journal of Aesthetics 40, no. 4 (2000): 407–423. 
4 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test Tube, 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997). 
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disruptive tendencies of experimental art to explore the formal contours of scientific 
experiment by operating within its epistemic structures and material media.  
As a site of thematic engagement and a source for the development of new visual 
modes, the sciences have long been productive for the arts. Throughout the twentieth 
century (and long before) artists have expressed their fascination with novel scientific 
concepts, images and techniques. Exemplary precedents for the works that I focus on 
range from Marcel Duchamp’s “playful physics” to Edward Steichen’s delphinium 
breeding project, an exercise in unnatural selection that itself prefigures contemporary 
work at the intersection of art and genetics.5 What is distinctive about contemporary 
artistic engagements with the sciences, I want to suggest, is their focus on the methods 
through which scientific knowledge is produced. In this project, the idea that artworks 
may take the form of scientific experiments is distinct, however, from the condition 
described by Edgar Wind in 1965, when he complained that, “…today artistic 
inventiveness is an end in itself. Art had become ‘experimental’.”6 Wind considered 
experimentalization as symptomatic of the arts’ retreat from social engagement into 
hermetic self-reference. In his view, the scientific pursuit of knowledge as an end in itself 
offers an attractive ideal for the pursuit of art for its own sake, and the experiment serves 
as the authorized methodological bearer of this aim. In order to distinguish performative 
experiments from experimental art, so construed, I want to consider carefully Wind’s 
account of artworks that seem at first blush to be very like the ones I study.  
 
                                                
5 George Gessert, Green Light: Toward an Art of Evolution (MIT Press, 2010); Linda Dalrymple 
Henderson, Duchamp in Context: Science and Technology in the Large Glass and Related Works 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998). 
6 Edgar Wind, Art and Anarchy, 3rd ed. (Northwestern University Press, 1985), 20. 
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“It is significant that this word ‘experiment’, which belongs to the laboratory of 
the scientist, had been transferred to the artist’s studio. It is not a causal 
metaphor: for although artists today understand far less of science than they did 
in the sixteenth or seventeenth century, their imaginations seem haunted by a 
desire to mimic scientific procedures; often they seem to act in their studios as if 
they were in a laboratory, performing a series of controlled experiments in the 
hope of arriving at a valid scientific solution. And when these astringent 
exercises are exhibited, they reduce the spectator to an observer who watches 
the artist’s latest excursions with interest, but without vital participation.”7 
 
Performative experiments differ from these alleged applications of the scientific 
method to artistic creation in this one crucial respect: what they exhibit are not valid 
scientific solutions but rather the complex and uncertain methods by which scientists 
labor to arrive at such solutions themselves. Although the artists I write about too seem to 
be haunted by the desire to mimic scientific procedures, they do so in order to open those 
procedures up to public scrutiny and philosophical reflection. Artist Natalie Jeremijenko, 
whose work Tree Logic I discuss in Chapter 2, makes this commitment explicit when she 
states, “the public for a work of art, and for Tree Logic in particular, is encouraged to 
interpret (and debate) motives and outcomes, though the opposite is often true of "real" 
science, which does not invite public discourse.”8 Even where artists use of scientific 
techniques as a new medium and an impetus to the development of new aesthetic 
forms—as is particularly evident in the subgenre of genetic portraiture, which I discuss in 
Chapter 3—the solutions they reach are not ends in themselves. On the contrary, they 
challenge, antagonize and unveil the logic of the normative scientific mode of 
employment of these same media, bringing both artistic and scientific methods into the 
public arena. 
                                                
7 Ibid., 20–21. 
8 Laura Steward Heon and John Ackerman, eds., Unnatural Science: An Exhibition (North Adams, MA: 
Mass MoCa Publications, 2000), 21. 
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In the contemporary artworld artists are experimenting with and on the idea of the 
scientific experiment itself. They recruit scientific methods into the service of producing 
new modes of aesthetic engagement and generate works that reframe and refract the 
boundaries and possibilities of experimental knowledge. These practices reflect the 
changing understanding of science and its social implications that has been most 
explicitly theorized in the philosophy of science of the late twentieth century. It is to the 
philosophy of science, therefore, that I turn in order to make sense of the emergence of a 
genre of artworks that take the form, more and less precisely, of scientific experiments. 
 
II. 
In the last half century, the philosophy of science has been transformed by the 
turn from theory toward practice. Since the 1960s, historians, sociologists and 
anthropologists have generated increasingly nuanced accounts of the actual activities that 
occupy scientists from day to day, including tinkering with instruments, negotiating with 
colleagues and recalcitrant materials, and recording lab notes. Whereas philosophers had 
long tended to privilege theories as the central locus of scientific knowledge, accounts of 
scientific practice drew attention to the need for a more comprehensive account of 
experimentation, which, after all, occupies the majority of scientists’ time. Following Ian 
Hacking’s seminal intervention, there has been a shift in focus from studies of how 
scientists represent the world through theories to how scientists intervene in the world 
through experiments.9 In the work of a group of scholars collectively labeled the “New 
Experimentalists”—including Hacking, Alan Franklin, Peter Galison, Nancy Cartwright, 
                                                
9 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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and Robert Ackerman, among others—the old view of experiment as a mere court of 
appeal for hypotheses or a “handmaiden of theory” was replaced by a conception of 
experiment as a largely independent domain of scientific activity, replete with its own 
epistemologies and ontologies.10 These scholars have interrogated the functions of 
scientific models and instruments, the interpretation of experimental data, and the 
challenge of distinguishing between natural, artificial, and artifactual phenomena. These 
are problems that are transposed into an aesthetic register in performative experiments. 
What art and science share with one another—but not with philosophy—is the dimension 
of material practice. My aim in this dissertation is to articulate the philosophical 
implications of this collection of artworks, which can themselves be understood as 
material models that exhibit features of scientific practice in an alternative epistemic 
space. I show that performative experiments allow under-theorized dimensions of 
scientific practice to become newly visible. But before I elaborate further upon how I take 
artworks to do this, I want to consider why the methods of scientific experimentation 
should have become salient for artists around the turn of the twenty-first century.  
The recent attention to experimentation in philosophy of science corresponds to-, 
perhaps it even drives or reflects-, a changing conception of how scientific inquiry alters 
the world that it discloses. I want to bring this difference into focus by juxtaposing what 
Martin Heidegger, in 1938, called “The Age of the World Picture” with what Bruno 
                                                
10 For a history of the treatment of experiment in the philosophy of science and the emergence of the New 
Experimentalism see Friedrich Steinle, “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science,” Perspectives 
on Science 10, no. 4 (2002): 408–432; Deborah Mayo, “The New Experimentalism, Topical Hypotheses, 
and Learning from Error,” PSA 1 (1994): 270–279. 
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Latour—in an essay on an artwork by Olafur Eliasson—called “the age of experiment.”11 
Between Heidegger and Latour there is no disagreement concerning the importance of 
experiment to science; the difference between their views on this matter lies rather in 
their conceptions of experiment itself. The essence of modern science, according to 
Heidegger, is research. Research in the natural and the humanistic sciences, from physics 
to history, consists in the projection of a metaphysical conception of what is onto the 
world, a “ground plan” into which each natural or historical event must be fitted in order 
to become visible and intelligible as such. In the natural sciences, research takes place 
through experimentation. Heidegger’s understanding of experiment accords with that of 
his philosophical contemporaries: his is the so-called “received view of experiment” that 
has been largely dismantled by the new experimentalism. “Experiment,” he writes, “is 
that methodology which, in its planning and execution, is supported and guided on the 
basis of the fundamental law laid down, in order to adduce the facts that either verify and 
confirm the law or deny it confirmation."12 In a similar manner to a Kuhnian paradigm, 
the “ground plan furnishes a criterion and constrains the anticipatory representing of the 
conditions,” such that the results of experiment contribute to the verification or 
falsification of that representation of nature upon which the experimental design was 
based.13 Accordingly, experimental science proceeds on the basis of and further 
entrenches the modern conception of the world as a picture. To be, in the age of the 
world picture, is to be represented.  
                                                
11 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology: And Other Essays. (New York: Garland, 
1977), 115–154; Susan May, Olafur Eliasson: The Weather Project / Olafur Eliasson,; 1967-, The 
Unilever series (London : Tate ; New York : Distributed in the U.S. by Harry Abrams, 2003). 




For Latour, with the new experimentalists, the importance of experimentation 
extends far beyond theory testing to encompass the production of new discursive spaces 
and modes of intervention, the description and control of variables, and the creation of 
new phenomena. Latour is best known for his claim that there is no sharp boundary 
between science and the rest of society. Having argued, (with Woolgar, 1979), that 
society penetrates the walls of the laboratory and influences the content of scientific 
knowledge, Latour has more recently emphasized the destruction of these boundaries by 
arguing in the opposite direction. In a catalogue essay for Eliasson’s The Weather Project 
(2003)—itself an example of what I call a performative experiment—Latour declared the 
present moment to be one in which “the sciences have expanded to such an extent that 
they have transformed the whole world into a laboratory.”14 No doubt prompted by the 
Eliasson’s installation itself, which transformed the monolithic exhibition space of the 
Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall into a swirling, artificial weather system, Latour’s 
observation is generalizable beyond this particular installation. It is not hard to see how 
laboratory conditions are manifested in everyday life by a proliferation of scientific 
instruments and analytical standards used in communications, agriculture, medicine, etc. 
Each of these domains is one in which the techniques of experiment enable the 
measurement, monitoring, control and reproducibility of conditions of everyday life. The 
expansion of the sciences beyond laboratory walls has engaged us in global experiments 
that are well beyond our individual or collective control. Climate change is surely the 
most dangerous of these inadvertent experiments; with it, we might consider the 
unforeseeable implications of introducing of genetically modified organisms into the food 
                                                
14 May, Olafur Eliasson, 76. 
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chain, extracting oil from below the seabed and new routes of disease transmission 
created by modern transportation, agribusiness and even public health initiatives 
themselves.15 “These experiments made on us, by us and for us have no protocol,” Latour 
warns. In what, to paraphrase Heidegger, we could call the age of the world experiment, 
highly consequential decisions must be made in medias res, without the normative 
foundation of a stable ground plan of nature.  
 The implications of this shift from a pictorial to an experimental world-view are 
twofold. First, one increasingly needs to know how in order to know that; one needs to 
know how DNA is analyzed, how climatic conditions are predicted, how the efficacy of 
drugs is evaluated-, in order to know that someone is guilty of a crime, that global 
temperatures are rising, or that a new medication is worthy of legal approval. These are 
not brute facts: each of these examples involves elements of interpretation and judgment 
that depend upon at least a rudimentary understanding of the scientific methods of the 
relevant field. A generalized belief in ‘the scientific method’ will not suffice to navigate 
scientific controversies. The methods of forensic genetics, its instruments, material 
methods, and statistical standards differ in important ways from those of biomedicine and 
again from environmental science, where virtual models play a far more significant role, 
for example. While these sciences share epistemological principles, the differences 
between them that arise in practice are of immediate consequence. No one can become 
conversant in all of the scientific fields that inform our lives. In this context, I want to 
                                                
15 The argument recently made by Jacques Pepin that HIV reached pandemic proportions only through 
iatrogenic transmission during colonial public health campaigns against infectious diseases provides a 
stunning new example of this notion of the world experiment; The Origins of AIDS (Cambridge, UK ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
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suggest, a familiarity with the epistemology of scientific experimentation forms part of 
the foundation of scientific literacy.  
Secondly, where the boundaries between the inside and the outside of the 
laboratory have broken down, we find ourselves implicated in the very conditions that we 
wish to study. Experiments, more often than not, are conducted upon entities of our own 
making—isolated fragments of DNA and databases of their sequences, chemicals 
synthesized or extracted from other materials, a climate altered by anthropogenic causes, 
and other intentional and unintentional artifacts. This condition demands an account of 
how the experimenter interacts with and influences the objects of scientific study. The 
age of the world picture and the age of experiment are, of course, not two different time 
periods, but two different ways of looking at the same period. This two-sided picture is 
what the arts help us to hold in view through a kind of stereoscopic vision. Artists, in 
mimicking scientists, are no longer constrained to represent and reflect upon what Wilfrid 
Sellars called the “scientific image of the world.”16 In adopting scientific means, they too 
enter into the laboratory to intervene. If the regulative ideals of experimentation are ones 
in which the boundaries of the laboratory are well marked and easily respected, these are 
not the rule of experimental practice but the hard-won exceptions. Art operates 
comfortably in the messy zones in which experiences are contrived but not controlled. 
Art’s capacity for critical self-reflection enables us to interpret and navigate these realms 
beyond the walls of the gallery or museum, which, like the walls of the laboratory, are 
constantly being eroded. 
 
                                                




The analogy between scientific experiments and theatrical performances has been 
examined from historical, philosophical and ethnographic perspectives in the works of 
Andrew Pickering, Karen Barad, Joseph Rouse and Robert Crease.17 This work, which 
has come to be known as “the performative turn” in science studies, has illuminated the 
ways in which phenomena are materialized in the laboratory through repetitive and 
sometimes virtuosic performances. The focus on performativity, affect and relationality 
in both the arts and science studies paves the way for the emergence of the new aesthetic 
forms and critical strategies embodied in the works that I call performative experiments. 
This dissertation’s title makes reference to these traditions and the specific terminology 
of performativity and experimentation that have been articulated therein. The artworks 
that I call performative experiments embody both of these senses of performativity. Like 
queer gender performances, they play up and render conspicuous specific aspects, phases, 
and problems associated with experimentation and display experimentation as a process 
that, like a theatrical or musical performance, realizes scientific objects through iteration 
and repetition. Through strategies of displacement and distortion of conventional 
laboratory practices, performative experiments render conspicuous features of 
experimental design, conceptual and material methods that tend to escape critical 
attention in the normal context of the laboratory. 
                                                
17 Andy Pickering, “After Representation: Science Studies in the Performative Idiom,” PSA: Proceedings 
of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (January 1, 1994): 413–419; Karen 
Michelle Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and 
Meaning (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); J. Rouse, How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming 
Philosophical Naturalism (University of Chicago Press, 2002); Robert P. Crease, The Play of Nature: 
Experimentation as Performance (Indiana University Press Bloomington, IN, 1993). 
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 Mark Dion's Systema Metropolis (2007) offers an instructive example of the 
methods and logics of performative experiments. (Figure 1.) Commissioned by the 
Museum of Natural History in London in honor of the three hundredth birthday of Carl 
Linnaeus, the piece featured Dion stepping into the role of Linnaeus himself. Armed with 
the binomial nomenclature that Linneaus invented to classify biological organisms, Dion 
set out to examine the biodiversity of four micro-climates in London with the help of the 
museum’s professional staff. One of these was the Highgate cemetery, which shelters the 
remains of three notable Victorians: political economist Karl Marx (1818–1883), 
women's suffragist Emmeline Pankhurst (1858–1928), and evolutionist Thomas Henry 
Huxley (1825–1895). After carefully collecting soil samples from each gravesite, the 
museum's entomologists identified all present species of insects and mollusks, and 
meticulously drew, labeled, catalogued and preserved the creatures in alcohol. These 
drawings, data, and specimen jars, along with the nets, microscopes, computers and other 
instruments used to collect and prepare the data, were displayed alongside type 
specimens from the museum's own historical collection in an installation that resembled a 
modern reincarnation of Linnaeus' study.  
Through this artwork staged as an observational survey spectators are reminded 
that the natural history museum is a working scientific institution, where research is 
performed and the specimens on display constitute only a small fraction of the historical 
archive. Likewise, the artwork is not merely composed of the objects on display: it 
includes the whole of Dion's anachronistic performance and indeed the museum's 
collaboration with him in this strange inquiry. Viewers are invited to take the project 
seriously as scientific research, but in doing so, they are led to ask what, precisely, is this 
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wealth of empirical data evidence of or evidence for? What hypothesis is being tested 
here, if any? A rationale for Dion's carefully directed investigation is never disclosed, yet, 
appropriately enough, the data reveal that Huxley's grave has greater biodiversity than 
that of either Marx or Pankhurst. Such suggestive data might tempt the interlocutor to 
supply the missing hypothesis: one could suppose, for instance, that insects demonstrate 
their ideological preferences by congregating preferentially around the evolutionist's 
grave. It is more than likely that a properly scientific study would yield the deflationary 
explanation that the temperature and moisture levels of the soil vary from place to place 
and happen to be most favorable for certain life-forms at the site of Huxley's grave.  
 
Figure 1. Mark Dion, Systema Metropolis , 2007 (installation view, Natural History Museum, London) 
 
The parodic character of this performative experiment lies in the manifest 
absurdity of the implicit question that its methodology addresses with the utmost 
scientific rigor. By supplying an hypothesis (and countenancing more plausible 
alternatives) the audience isolates the epistemic structure of an experiment from its 
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technical dimension and its institutional context. The work offers no basis for inference, 
but it captures the imagination and motivates “the search for causal relations”—which, 
for John Stuart Mill, was one of the primary functions of experiment.18 "I'm not doing 
science," says Dion, "I shadow aspects of the process to get to an essence of the desire to 
do those things."19 
Dion’s installation suggests a new way of understanding the artist as an 
experimenter on a specifically scientific model. By playing the role of a modern-day 
Linnaeus, Dion introduces alternative taxonomic orders into our comprehension of 
things. He intervenes rather than represents. Hence, my use of “experiment” in speaking 
or “classifying” certain sorts of artworks is not metaphorical. Performative experiments 
are not thought experiments, nor do they merely share certain characteristics with 
scientific experiments. In many cases, they stage and perform experiments themselves. 
One of the central claims of my dissertation is that artworks qua performative 
experiments aim to intervene in our understanding of scientific experimentation proper. 
They challenge the latter by addressing its epistemological, ethical, political, and even 
aesthetic assumptions and thereby contribute to our efforts to make sure that the 
collective experiments in which we are engaged are well designed, properly interpreted, 
and subject to critical review. Performative experiments direct our attention to different 
subject positions that are possible within an experimental set-up: the experimenter, the 
research subject, the reviewer or critic. They point out how our sensory experiences are 
mediated by the instruments, interpretative practices, and epistemological standards that 
                                                
18 As discussed by Steinle Steinle, “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science,” 408. 
19 Quoted in Colin Martin, “Exhibition: Art Shadowing Science,” Nature 448, no. 7149 (July 5, 2007): 26. 
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are operative in scientific experiments. And they indicate how experiences are altered 
when experiments are performed in a manner that is at variance with the relevant 
epistemological and ethical norms, or with the historically specific assumptions of the 
day. Ultimately, performative experiments reveal how scientific experimentation 
functions epistemologically and culturally as a mode of world making by which we 
represent, control, and intervene in the material and intellectual conditions of our lives.  
In what we might call the age of the world experiment a familiarity with the 
epistemological principles of scientific experimentation constitutes a new mode of 
scientific literacy that is crucial to contemporary social and political life. This facility is 
something that artworks cultivate, I argue, not by communicating scientific facts or 
representational knowledge but by interrogating and displaying how experiments are 
conducted, how protocols are designed—in short, by showing us how experimental 
knowledge is produced. And so, finally, I want to explain the performativity of artworks 
qua experiments. I use the term performative in a double sense. First, to makes reference 
to what has been called the performative turn in science and technology studies, in which 
scholars have urged us to recognize that science does not merely represent an enduring 
reality but also performatively enacts particular configurations of matter by means 
iteration and repetition over time. The second sense derives from queer theory, and 
particularly from the work of Judith Butler.20 Unlike the examples of real science studies 
by historians and philosophers, artworks often exaggerate, parody, and critique the norms 
of conventional science. Like queer performances of gender, performative experiments 
make the performativity of conventional experiments conspicuous and therefore available 
                                                
20 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (Psychology Press, 1990). 
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for inspection and critique. My analysis is ultimately guided by the demand that emerges 
from feminist philosophy of science for a stronger standard of objectivity and a 
constructive critique of science. 
 
IV. 
In my readings of performative experiments, I bring a mode of interpretation 
cultivated in the arts to the sciences. The transfiguration of experiments into artworks 
makes them subject to a different form of criticism than they receive in the peer review 
process or in the discourses of the philosophy of science. Walter Benjamin proposes in 
The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism that this historical form of art criticism 
consists in the articulation or potentiation of the logic of reflection that is given material, 
sonic or verbal embodiment in an artwork. “In this procedure,” he writes, “the critique is 
not meant to do anything other than discover the secret tendencies of the work itself, 
fulfill its hidden intentions.”21 Embedded in this concept of criticism, however, is 
another, quite different concept of experiment from those so far discussed. In Romantic 
thought, Benjamin writes, “experiment consists in the evocation of self-consciousness 
and self-knowledge in the things observed. To observe a thing means only to arouse it to 
self-recognition.”22 For the Romantics, Benjamin continues, “criticism when confronting 
the work of art is like observation when confronting the natural object…. Thus, criticism 
is, as it were, an experiment on the artwork, one through which the latter’s own reflection 
                                                
21 “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism,” Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings. Volume 1, 
1913-1926 (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 116–200. (p. 153) 
22 Ibid., 148.  
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is awakened, through which it is brought to consciousness and knowledge of itself.”23 
Accordingly, the artworks that constitute my archive may be understood as experiments 
upon scientific experiment. My attempt at criticism—an experiment upon experiments 
upon experiment—is meant to awaken the potential for self-reflection latent in both 
artistic and scientific practices of experimentation.  
Like scientific instruments artworks may be understood, too, as sites of what 
Davis Baird, in his philosophical study of scientific instruments, calls thing knowledge.24 
But artworks afford different kinds of knowledge, indeed different kinds of knowledge 
about scientific instruments, than direct study of these objects. As representations and 
performances of scientific things, artworks generate a mode of secondary reflection that 
operates in the same epistemological order as their thematic content. This is a reflection 
that takes place by creating and modifying things and practices, rather than through 
semantic ascent to theories and other verbal or textual forms.25 What I aim to articulate, 
though words rather than through art, is an abstract and critical understanding of science 
that is first embodied in things. Artworks mediate and moderate my understanding of 
science because they move laterally within this domain of things. As such, they embody 
materially the potential for reflection which their critics or interpreters then must make 
explicit. My aim is to show that artworks do not only illustrate certain philosophical 
accounts of scientific experiments (although they do do this); they also contribute to 
those accounts by crystallizing abstract ideas about scientific experimentation into 
                                                
23 Ibid., 151(emphasis mine). 
24 Davis Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004). 
25 For a discussion of the limits of semantic ascent in dealing with scientific instruments, see ibid, 8–12. 
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material forms. Like scientific models, performative experiments mediate between theory 
and matter.26 But in contrast to scientific models, these artworks do not aim to represent 
their objects faithfully. They disclose under-theorized dimensions of conventional science 
and explore its social implications by diverging from its norms, reinterpreting its 
histories, and appropriating its instruments and materials for alternative ends. 
Insofar as only “good” works of art admit of criticism, my readings are also a 
defense of performative experiments against the charge that they are technological kitsch 
or uncritical expressions of scientism. Although there are works that warrant such 
negative assessments, interdisciplinary work at the intersection of art and science is often 
misinterpreted. As Arthur Danto has argued, the ‘is’ of identification of objects as 
artworks rests on the whole history and theory of art; certain contemporary works of art 
now depend for their intelligibility on the history, philosophy and social studies of 
science. By and large, artworks qua performative experiments do not lend themselves, 
first off, to aesthetic appreciation under the concepts of beauty, sublimity, elegance, 
harmony or other conventional aesthetic attributes. They absorb our attention by 
becoming legible as cultural or artistic exercises in science. As such, I argue, they afford 
the sorts of “aesthetic experiences” that are suggestive of the modes of aesthetic 
appreciation that arise within experimental science itself. Yet appreciating performative 
experiments as artworks is not the same thing as appreciating the things and scenarios 
that they resemble. What I appreciate might be the accuracy of representation or 
incisiveness of the critique. Nonetheless, they make us pay attention to the aesthetic 
                                                
26 My use of the term mediation here derives from Mary Morgan and Margaret Morison’s work on 
scientific models, which I return to in Chapter 2. Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, Models as 
Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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properties of certain materials and instruments, the forms of attention that are practiced in 
science, the new temporality of DNA (which, by analogy with geologic time, we could 
call genetic time), and the ways that natural phenomena are exhibited and ‘unnatural’ 
phenomena are contrived in experiments. The richness and multiplicity of the modes of 
aesthetic engagement that these artworks generate suggests that accounts of aesthetics in 
science are extremely simplified. Indeed, it is only the focus on artworks since Kant that 
would lead us to doubt that the whole canon of aesthetic theory should apply any less to 
science than to art, or indeed, to every other aspect of life.  
My project does not offer a comprehensive account of scientific experiment or the 
place of aesthetics therein. Rather, by elaborating on a series of examples, I investigate 
what can be learned by bringing the philosophy of science into the gallery and an 
aesthetic sensibility into the laboratory. The artworks I focus on are carefully selected for 
what they show about the formal aesthetic and epistemic space of certain types of 
scientific experimentation, and for their technical and conceptual sophistication in 
engaging with specific scientific fields. This study is far from exhaustive of what I am 
calling the genre of performative experiments. Performative experiments, one might say, 
are what our lives are now saturated with and by. They are open-ended and challenging, 
and, in some sense, reveal what is most contemporary both about art and science.  
 
The dissertation consists of four chapters, divided, between Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3, by an ‘Intermission’ and followed by a brief Coda after Chapter 4. The first 
two chapters examine methodological issues concerning scientific instruments, models 
and the methodology of natural experiments. In each case, I show how artworks 
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transform material and epistemological practices derived from the sciences into formal 
devices for directing perceptual attention and imaginative reflection. The intermission 
reorients the discussion from general methodological issues toward the more specialized 
scientific topics of molecular genetics and experimental social psychology. Secondly, this 
section locates the experimenter as both a subject and an object of scientific knowledge, 
subject positions that are negotiated and refashioned through the performative 
experiments discussed in the last two chapters of the dissertation. 
In chapter 1, titled “Purposive Instruments,” I read Eve André Laramée’s 
sculpture installation Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions (1994-98) as a 
performative enactment of the stabilization of new scientific concepts and instruments 
during exploratory experimentation. One of the primary challenges to developing a 
philosophy of scientific instrumentation is that instruments, by their very nature, recede 
into their context of use and thus become transparent and invisible. They are here 
rendered visible through the aesthetic effect of what Kant called “purposiveness without a 
purpose”.  By reading his fragile hand-blown glass sculpture as a performance of 
stability, I slow down or freeze-frame of the process whereby instruments recede into 
invisibility and reveal how instruments, scientific concepts and phenomena themselves 
achieve stability in a mutually interdependent manner. Keeping instruments in view 
changes the way we think about the entities and concepts that are investigated through 
their use. By making instruments visible, I argue, our understanding of phenomena 
themselves is transformed.  
Chapter 2, titled “Framing Natural Experiments,” focuses on scientific models 
and so-called “natural experiments.” I argue that performative experiments dramatize 
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how we export habits of seeing and patterns of inference from the carefully shielded 
conditions of the laboratory to the unruly world outside its walls. I do so through a close 
reading of Stacey Levy’s Seeing the Path of the Wind (1991), which I read as a scientific 
model, and Natalie Jeremijenko's work Tree Logic (1999-present), in which six trees 
suspended upside-down gradually twist into contorted and unnatural-looking shapes as 
they grow upwards towards the sun, exhibiting the phenomenon of phototropism. 
Reversing Francis Bacon’s famous claim that “nature reveals herself more truly under the 
vexations of art than when left to herself,” the strange appearance of the trees 
foregrounds the material and epistemic structure of the experimental set-up itself. Like 
the frame around a picture, the experiment delimits the conditions under which a 
phenomenon can manifest as natural, and nature can appear experimental.  
The third and fourth chapter of the dissertation move from the formal structures of 
experiments to artworks that engage with the specific material practices and histories of 
two scientific fields that have held enormous cultural authority when it comes to defining 
human nature: molecular genetics and experimental social psychology. Chapters 3 
“Genetic Portraits” focuses on the use of molecular genetic analytical techniques as a 
new medium of portraiture and performance art in the work of artists including Steve 
Miller, Kevin Clarke, Gary Schneider and Marc Quinn. Attending to the way that each 
artist samples and processes DNA fragments and deploys them visually, I read molecular 
genetics as a new medium that asserts its own distinctive representational claims within 
and against the tradition of portrait photography. Even it usurps the photograph's claim to 
index the real, genetic portraiture restages the portrait genre’s perennial concern with the 
representation of a unique historical individual in medium that calls human identity 
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fundamentally into question. As technological and imaginative experiments in self-
fashioning, genetic portraits expand the genre’s temporal horizon to comprehend our 
kinship with distant human and non-human ancestors and the uncertain futures augured 
by diagnostic assays. 
 Chapter 4 examines the artistic practice of institutional critique and argues for its 
efficacy as an instrument of agnotology, an avenue of study that complements traditional 
epistemology to identify how sites of ignorance are produced, how knowledge is 
suppressed, and topics of inquiry are overlooked. I conduct a close reading of Jennifer 
Gradecki’s IRB# G10-02-066-01 (2010), an artwork in which gallery visitors are invited 
to participate in a social psychology experiment titled “Social Interaction as a Function of 
Voluntary Engagement with a Shock Machine” – a work for which the artist tried and 
ultimately failed to win approval from her university’s institutional ethics review board. 
Analyzing both Gradecki’s correspondence with the review board and the results of the 
forbidden experiment that it aimed to regulate, I trace how practices of parody and 
playful antagonism are used to exhibit hidden assumptions and unasked questions, and 
ultimately to test the limits of the epistemological and ethical standards that govern 
institutionalized knowledge production in the social sciences. Secondly, drawing upon 
Nicholas Bourriaud’s analysis of relational aesthetics, I examine how the experimental 
protocol is used in a series of artworks to configure a relational space in which certain 
affects and emotions, subject positions and modes of social interaction are either made 
possible or foreclosed. Together, chapters 3 and 4 disclose how formal practices of 
experimentation mediate subjective experiences as well as abstract concepts of identity 
and human nature.  
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Chapter 1. Purposive Instruments 
 
The turn towards material practice in the philosophy of scientific experimentation has 
drawn scholars’ attention to the prominent role that instruments play in driving and 
constraining empirical inquiry. Devices such as microscopes and telescopes mediate our 
access to domains that are out of reach for the unaided senses. Other types of apparatus, 
such as spectrometers and particle accelerators, enable us to measure and manipulate 
phenomena under controlled conditions or to create phenomena that do not occur 
spontaneously in nature. During periods of conceptual change, instruments provide sites 
of invariance between theories that might otherwise be regarded as incommensurable. 
Indeed, contrary to the widespread view of science as a theory-driven enterprise, it has 
been argued that, “the history of physical science is largely the history of instruments and 
their intelligent use.”1 Yet in their material and historical particularity, instruments do not 
readily lend themselves to philosophical abstraction. For reasons that I will explore 
below, instruments have a tendency to disappear—to become transparent their users, 
absent from historical records, and under-theorized even in epistemologies of scientific 
experimentation.  
This chapter explores what we can learn about scientific instruments when they 
are divorced from the ends for which they are normally used and repurposed into works 
of art. My analysis centers on an artwork by Eve André Laramée titled Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions (1994-98), a large glass sculpture installation that 
                                                
1 Quoted in Davis Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004), viii. Original source: Muller, R. 1940. “American Apparatus, Instruments, and 
Instrumentation.” Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, Analytical Edition 12, no. 10: 571-630. 
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resembles a chemical or an alchemical laboratory (Figure 2).2 This performative 
experiment literally and figuratively puts scientific instruments on display, and by doing 
so, I argue, provides us with an unprecedented opportunity to observe instruments in the 
very act of becoming transparent. In titling this chapter Purposive Instruments, I make 
reference to one of Kant’s definitions of the beautiful as ‘purposiveness without a 
purpose.’ What I mean to suggest is that, in the form of an artwork, instruments can 
become and remain visible in their purposiveness without receding behind their purposes. 
Indeed, by capturing the purposiveness of artifacts in advance of their utilization for the 
purposes of science, this artwork displays artifacts in the process of becoming 
instruments as such.  
 
Figure 2. Eve André Laramée, Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions (1994-98) 
                                                
2 All images courtesy of the artist. 
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 Entering the gallery to view Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions is 
like stumbling into a laboratory to witness an experiment in progress, or even to conduct 
an experiment oneself. Mounted above several large industrial tables, an elaborate system 
of interconnecting glass vessels, spiraling tubes and wires is held aloft by a multilevel 
scaffold. The installation appears chaotic and jerry-rigged, with no obvious overall logic 
governing its locally precise organization. If one is familiar with the equipment used in a 
modern chemistry laboratory then one will immediately recognize many elements in the 
work: ring stands and Burette clamps, Pyrex beakers, flasks and test tubes, funnels, 
evaporating dishes, watch glasses and graduated cylinders for measuring liquids. But 
closer inspection reveals that many of the vessels are made of hand blown glass. They are 
lopsided and irregularly shaped; some are etched with expressions like “hazard of the 
die” and “matter of chance.” A wobbly hand blown flask bearing three spouts is inscribed 
with the words “Dither,” “Falter,” and “Hesitate,” evoking indecision and self-doubt. 
Others are marked with nonstandard weights and measures such as “Handfuls” and 
“Mouthfuls,” quantities that make reference to the human body as a measuring 
instrument—another with the instruction to add “as much as possible.” On the tables 
below lie overturned containers of colorful powers, jars filled with rotting leaves and the 
crystalline residues of spilled liquids, a state of disarray that suggests a train of thought 
rudely interrupted or an avenue of inquiry abruptly abandoned. (Figure 3.) Brightly 
illuminated by spotlights inside the darkened gallery, the delicate glasswork appears 
haunted by an experimenter whose affects and emotions are betrayed by the apparatus 
itself. The surreal, dreamlike quality of the installation and the sexually evocative 
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morphology of the interpenetrating vessels suggest, perhaps, that the work operates in the 
domain of the repressed unconscious of experimental science.  
 
Figure 3. Eve André Laramée, Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions (Rice Gallery, 1996) 
My reading of this artwork rehearses analyses of a set of problems that have been 
generated at the intersection of the history and philosophy of scientific experimentation 
and the philosophy of technology. First and foremost among these is the question posed 
by the historians of science David Gooding, Simon Schaffer and Trevor Pinch in their 
introduction to The Uses of Experiment. “Why,” they ask, “do the procedures and 
instruments recede into the background (or disappear entirely) rather than [the 
phenomena that they are used to investigate]?”3 In a case study of Michael Faraday's 
development of electromagnetic field theory, Gooding observes that when scientists 
become adept at using their instruments and experimental techniques, the instruments 
themselves tend to become transparent. This allows the phenomena under investigation 
                                                
3 David Gooding and Trevor J. Pinch, The Uses of Experiment: Studies in the Natural Sciences (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 5. See especially Gooding's “'Magnetic Curves' and the Magnetic Field: 
Experimentation and Representation in the History of a Theory,” pp. 183-223. 
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to appear independent of and unmediated by the very experimental conditions under 
which they become accessible to us in the first place. This experience is familiar to every 
student who has learned how to use a microscope; one no longer sees the instrument itself 
once one has learned how to see through it.4 At first one is preoccupied by getting the 
light to turn on and the slide centered on the stage, then by bringing the specimen into 
focus, and finally by distinguishing the specific object of study from bubbles and other 
debris visible in the sample. Only after the instrument itself has been mastered is it 
possible to look through a microscope and see a bacterium, for example, in the same way 
that one sees a tree through a pair of eyeglasses. 
The sense of transparency that is exemplified by the skilled use of instruments 
that augment vision is analogous to that which arises through the use of instruments that 
enable us to measure and manipulate phenomena that are outside of our sensory domain 
altogether. What is problematic about the transparency of instruments becomes clearer, as 
it were, in such cases. When the physicist speaks of ‘seeing’ subatomic particles we are 
reminded of the extent of our reliance on instruments and of the importance of being able 
to return to their inner workings in order to comprehend the significance of experimental 
data. Ian Hacking has argued that when biologists and physicists alike use visual 
language to describe how they obtain knowledge through the use of instruments, what 
they mean is that they are able not so much to literally see as to manipulate and interact 
with their specimens in a systematic and repeatable way. In order to do this, scientists 
must be able to distinguish rigorously between artifacts and aberrations introduced by the 
instruments themselves and data that give us information about the entities beings 
                                                
4 See Hacking, Representing and Intervening, chap. 11. Microscopes (187–209). 
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studied.5 Recognizing that “[t]he invisibility of instruments is... an important if 
paradoxical consequence of experimental achievement,” Gooding, Schafer and Pinch 
contend that “[r]ecovering the role of instruments in experiment represents an important 
advance in the understanding of how scientists achieve certainty," and it is with this goal 
in mind that I inspect the Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions.6  
In his recent book Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, 
Davis Baird has articulated the philosophical challenge more clearly. He argues that 
scientific instruments embody a specific kind of knowledge, which in turn demands its 
own epistemology—a theory of how knowledge is embodied in material things. But first, 
he hazards an explanation of why scientific instruments have been neglected by 
philosophers, even, to a great extent, by those who lament the neglect of experiment and 
attend carefully to actual laboratory life. The analyses of philosophers, historians and 
sociologists of science alike have tended to sublimate the materiality of instruments into 
the discursive and theoretical work that those instruments enable. When instruments 
become textualized, Baird argues, we lose sight of the multiple ways in which scientists 
make and use instruments to manipulate phenomena even without having a firm 
conceptual grasp on what those phenomena are or agreeing about why the instruments 
work in the way that they do. This is what allows instruments to survive theory changes 
and to function as a source of resistance against investigators’ theoretical commitments 
and networks of social power. Yet this same brute materiality renders instruments 
inscrutable to those who lack a “working knowledge” of them. And it is this notion of 
                                                
5 Ibid., chap. 11. Microscopes (186–209). 
6 Gooding and Pinch, The Uses of Experiment, 5. 
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working knowledge that Baird advances as the epistemological province of instruments. 
Working knowledge may be understood as a non-humanist form of pragmatic knowledge 
in which knowledge as effective action “has been separated from human agency and built 
into the reliable behavior of an artifact.”7 Working knowledge is normally passed on 
through practical training. Understanding how knowledge is embodied in instruments and 
produced through their operation therefore requires abstraction from contemporary and 
historical examples thereof.8  
In lieu of (or in addition to) direct experience, the philosophical study of 
instruments must rely on a variety of sources, including written descriptions by scientists 
and instrument makers, drawings, instruction manuals, and surviving examples of 
instruments themselves.9 In order to distill a general account of the role of instruments in 
experiment from this heterogeneous archive of material artifacts, we must be able to 
exercise in concert a multiplicity of practical, visual, tactile and conceptual ways of 
knowing. Modes of interpretation that are customary in the philosophy of art have much 
to offer to the philosophy of science in this regard. My reading of Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions delimits and repurposes the problems of interpretation 
that attend scientific instruments into an aesthetic register, thereby drawing the close-
reading practices of aesthetic theory and art criticism into the epistemology of things. 
Interpreted against a background of theory, history and sociology of science, this artwork 
                                                
7 Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, 12. 
8 A further limitation to this methodology is that it our philosophy may be over-determined by our choice 
of examples: which instruments should we select as exemplary of their kind? Shall we consult failed 
instruments, those that led scientists astray, or base our philosophy only on the “good” or currently popular 
ones?  
9 See Trevor H Levere, “Apparatus and Experimentation Revisited,” Spontaneous Generations: A Journal 
for the History and Philosophy of Science 4, no. 1 (August 30, 2010): 148–154. 
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contributes to the philosophical project of recovering the role of instruments by freezing 
the instrumentarium in the in the very act of disappearing into an experimental 
achievement that has not yet come to pass. 
  This chapter is organized into three sections. I begin by digging deeper into the 
problem transparency by bringing Martin Heidegger’s paradigmatic analysis of the 
phenomenology of equipment to bear on scientific instruments, and, in so doing, I clarify 
the role of art in making instruments visible. The next section considers how instruments 
achieve stability in conjunction with the concepts and phenomena that they are used to 
investigate, reading Laramée’s sculpture as a performance of the process of instrumental 
stabilization that takes place in the context of what Friedrich Steinle calls exploratory 
experimentation. Finally, I examine a companion artwork to the Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions titled Salt of Sweat, which I read as an exhibition of what 
we can learn about instruments by attending not only to the “real data” but also to the 
“artifacts” that they produce. Instrumental artifacts constitute a crucial site of self-
reflexivity within experimental practice, a site where instruments always remain at least 
peripherally in view. I conclude that we ought to read instruments for evidence of the 
traces that we leave upon the phenomena disclosed through their purposeful use. 
 
I. Transparency 
The invisibility of instruments is not a problem that is unique to science, of 
course. As philosophers of technology since Heidegger have recognized, the capacity of 
things to disappear in the course of being put to use is precisely what enables them to 
function as apparatus for the conduct of our everyday life activities, from domestic to 
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laboratory life. Heidegger’s analysis of the phenomenology of ‘equipment’ in Being and 
Time remains paradigmatic in this regard. If we were to begin by asking for examples of 
equipment, we would quickly see that the category accommodates all sorts of things that 
do not have anything in particular in common, just as we find that the scientific 
instruments used in one field or historical period bear little resemblance those used in 
others. This is because, as Heidegger argues, “Equipment is essentially ‘something-in-
order-to…’ [“etwas um-zu”];” it is defined the end for which it is to be used.10 Like 
apparatus, equipment is a collective noun. Instruments and tools may thus be understood 
as pieces of equipment or as belonging to a collection of things to which a prior purpose 
gives unity.11 Our awareness of that broader context of purpose precedes and underlies 
our engagements with any particular tool and constitutes it as such.  
Heidegger’s widely circulated example of a hammer nicely illustrates the central 
difficulty inherent in the philosophy of technology.12 The character of a hammer reveals 
itself in the absorbed and unreflective activity of hammering, not to inspection or 
contemplation of its properties. A hammer is not a platonic thing that exists apart from 
                                                
10 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson (Harper & Row, New 
York, NY, 1962), 97. 
11 An equivalent notion to equipment borrowed from the philosophy of scientific experimentation is that of 
the instrumentarium, which Harré adapts from Robert Ackerman. “Each laboratory has its characteristic 
instrumentarium, the actual equipment available to an experimenter. Depending on the generosity of the 
budget, the instrumentarium will consist not only of what is in the storeroom but also what is to be found 
for purchase in the catalogs of instrument makers.” Rom Harré, “The Materiality of Instruments in a 
Metaphysics for Experiments,” in The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, ed. Hans Radder 
(University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2003), 25. 
12 Heidegger’s hammer is an example that is taken up widely in the philosophy of science, although this 
field otherwise remains unreceptive to his philosophical program and in particular his treatment of 
technology in “The Question Concerning Technology.” Without referring to Heidegger directly, for 
example, Morgan and Morrison discuss the hammer as a basis for understanding the partial autonomy of 
models. Baird is more direct in his recognition of Heidegger’s contribution to understanding why scientific 
instruments have been overlooked. See Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators, 11; Baird, Thing 
Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, 146; Heidegger, Being and Time, 95–107.  
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and prior to being used to deliver a blow to a surface for a particular purpose—that of 
building a house or tearing down a wall, for example. It is the assignment of a use to a 
thing in practice that distinguishes it from a mere thing and constitutes it as equipment. 
And anything that that is used in order to accomplish such a project becomes a hammer, 
regardless of whether or not it was explicitly designed for that purpose.13 Only by using a 
hammer, or any other equipment, do we come into contact with its essence or ‘the kind of 
Being’ that equipment posses. Heidegger calls this kind of Being ‘readiness-to-hand’ or 
Zuhandenheit. To be ready-to-hand is be reliable, manipulable, available and familiar, 
and in so being to open up a world to our fingertips and our intentions at once. This 
essential virtue of instruments reveals itself most fully in the domain of tacit knowledge 
and kinesthetic sense. And yet, Heidegger observes, “[t]he peculiarity of what is 
proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw 
[zurückzuziehen] in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”14 To be ready-to-hand 
a thing must not impede the course of action by arresting attention: it must remain 
transparent and, for this specific reason, invisible. 
Primitive hammers and complex scientific instruments alike remain transparent 
only so long as they remain readily available for employment in whatever project they are 
appropriate for. When a piece of equipment breaks down it arrests attention as a thing 
                                                
13 Peter Kroes’ distinction between technological artifacts and technological pseudo-artifacts is useful in 
clarifying this point of indeterminacy in Heidegger’s concept of equipment. Technological artifacts are 
objects that we design for a purpose and fabricate according to that design. Technological pseudo-artifacts 
are objects that we find and make use of for a specific purpose, such as using a stick as a cane, or a seashell 
as a cup. Insofar as a hammer is defined by hammering, it clearly matters not whether what we use for that 
purpose is a designed object or one that is appropriated from nature, or an artifact that was designed for 
another purpose altogether but nonetheless does the job. Peter Kroes, “Physics, Experiments and the 
Concept of Nature,” in The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation, ed. Hans Radder (Pittsburgh, Pa.: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 68–86; Peter Kroes, The Dual Nature of Technical Artefacts, Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science; 37.2006, 1; Special Issue (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2006). 
14 Heidegger, Being and Time, 99. 
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individuated from the task that it was being used to perform, an obstacle standing in the 
way of that towards which it was supposed to be a means. Conversely, tools tend to 
become unusable when one becomes preoccupied by their ontology; one is apt to hit 
one’s finger if one is thinking too hard about what a hammer is rather than how to do 
something with it. Though the ends for which tools are taken up is constitutive of things 
as tools to begin with, when a tool becomes unwieldy its does not therefore return to 
being a mere thing. Rather, its un-readiness-to-hand—the incongruity between the thing 
and the assignment we have given to it—the broken or malfunctioning tool becomes 
conspicuous and obtrusive. When instruments break down “[t]he whole context of 
equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly 
sighted beforehand in circumspection [or the kind of awareness we have in making use of 
things].”15 In these moments of hypervisibility, it becomes possible to recognize how 
things have been enrolled as equipment for our projects, even without any explicitly 
formulated plan or design.  
When we seek to recover the role of instruments in experiment, what we are 
seeking is first and foremost a characterization of instruments in their reliability—an 
account of how instruments work in the double sense of functioning mechanically and 
physically embodying knowledge, precisely the condition in which they are by their very 
nature most inscrutable. In the case of scientific instruments, what is obscured by this 
necessary withdrawal into readiness-to-hand is the way instruments mediate between 
theory and the phenomena that they are used to investigate—in short, the role of 
instruments in experiment. Baird notes that “[i]nstruments, when they are working, 
                                                
15 Ibid., 105. 
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connect seamlessly with theory; they provide information, data that can be enfolded into 
the propositional life of theory. This is why epistemology has been able to carry on under 
the illusion of knowledge solely as a play of ideas.” He continues, following Heidegger, 
“The materiality of instruments only surfaces in their making and breaking.”16 When 
scientific instruments break they excite anxiety and uncertainty, thrusting them into the 
same sort of spotlight that shines on Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions—
though usually with less welcome effects. In both the art gallery and the laboratory, these 
moments of heightened visibility present opportunities to consider how reliability was 
achieved in the first place—instruments in the making. Indeed I would suggest that this is 
the achievement that is crucial to understand; for it is just the ability to calibrate scientific 
instruments, to know when they are working correctly, and to repair them when they 
malfunction, that enables scientists to distinguish data that describe the phenomena under 
investigation from “artifacts” in the data that are introduced by the instruments 
themselves. For scientific instruments, phenomenological reliability and epistemic 
reliability are two sides of the same coin. Understanding how scientists achieve certainty 
thus demands an account of how instruments become reliable and thus invisible.  
While the history of science offers one indispensable set of resources to the 
philosophy of scientific instrumentation, it may come as a surprise that art and its 
criticism should supply another well-worn path of philosophical inquiry into this matter. 
In his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger again addresses the challenge of 
penetrating the veil of transparency and self-evidence that shrouds equipment in plain 
                                                
16 Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments, 146. (emphasis mine) 
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sight.17 Although his aim in this text is to reveal what is distinctive about works of art, it 
becomes explicit that one of things that distinguishes art from equipment and from ‘mere 
things’ is that art affords a form of visibility to objects of use that is foreclosed by use 
itself. Art allows us to decontextualize tools from the purposes that define them as such 
and regard them instead from an aesthetic distance. Heidegger’s famous example here is 
the depiction of a pair of shoes alleged to belong to a peasant woman in a painting by 
Vincent Van Gogh. In this painting, we are permitted to glimpse something that the 
peasant woman cannot see for herself, namely the traces of the shoes’ reliability for her 
and the way they are embedded in her world. The painting does not present an accurate 
representation or a perfect reproduction of the shoes; these would be no more useful to us 
than the grapes painted by Xeuxis were to the birds that he fooled into pecking at a flat 
surface. “The artwork,” Heidegger claims, “lets us know what shoes are in truth.”18 
Artworks do this, so far as I understand, by allowing the reliability of equipment to 
manifest itself to others than those for whom it possesses this virtue. Reliability thus 
becomes phenomenologically and conceptually separable from the specific ends that 
confer instrumental status upon mere things in practice. This manner of looking through 
artworks to discover the nature of equipment is the methodology that I pursue in the 
service of scientific instruments. 
                                                
17 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (Harper & Row, 1971), see esp. 29–38. 




Figure 4. Apparatus; Detail View 2001 
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Although Laramée's sculpture is mostly made out of transparent material—
various kinds of glass—the artworks renders the instruments of chemistry visible by 
displaying their fragility and making them appear unreliable. Fragility is literalized by 
the delicate glasswork and precarious arrangements of the work's components. In one 
place in the installation, for example, a winding glass tube leads into a lopsided, hand-
blown vessel positioned above a Pyrex funnel, whose spout, in turn, holds in place 
another hand-blown flask below it. (Figure 4.) The entire arrangement is held aloft by 
sturdy ring stands and Burette clamps but these reliable, standardized components hardly 
seem to secure some the strangely shaped vessels they are rigged up to support. Although 
the elements of the work are in fact precisely arranged and firmly held in place, the whole 
arrangement appears makeshift and haphazard. On the tables below, meanwhile, a bunch 
of test tubes appear to have been carelessly discarded in a puddle of now crystallized 
fluid, as though they had been tossed aside in frustration. (Figure 5.) 
 





Only because the components of this strange apparatus seem to be instruments, 
hovering between purpose and purposiveness without purpose, does the work offers the 
philosophy of scientific instruments an opportunity to reflect on instruments in 
abstraction from the very purposes in relation to which they are defined as such. In 
speaking of purposiveness without purpose I am adopting the language that Kant uses to 
explain what gives rise to pure aesthetic pleasure in the beautiful in the Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgement. From the Third Moment of the Beautiful Kant derives the following 
definition: “Beauty is an object’s form of purposiveness insofar as it is perceived in the 
object without the representation of a purpose.”19 An object is beautiful when it seems as 
if it had been perfectly designed for a purpose—but only so long as no purpose is actually 
imputed to it.20 A flower may be beautiful so long as we do not look at it as a botanist 
would, taking the colors of its petals or the shape of the stamen to serve a teleological 
purpose, for example, that of attracting pollinating insects and enabling the plant to 
reproduce. “Hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows what sort of thing a flower is 
[meant] to be; and even he, while recognizing it as the reproductive organ of a plant, pays 
no attention to this natural purpose when he judges the flower by taste.”21  
Insofar as instruments are defined as such only by the uses to which they are put, 
the quality of purposiveness without purpose is something that instruments categorically 
                                                
19 Ibid., 84 [236]. 
20 I am here adopting Pluhar’s translation of Kant’s term is zweckmässigkeit as ‘purposiveness’ rather than 
Meredith’s ‘finality’ because the idea of ‘finality without an end’ seems especially awkward in relation to 
my discussion of instruments, which are more readily described as having purposes than ‘ends’—a term 
that implies a more lofty determinate purpose than is appropriate in this context. In Chapter 2 I discuss the 
same section of the Critique but there I make use of the Meredith translation for reasons that I make clear 
there. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett Publishing, 1987), 64–5 
[220]. 
21 Ibid., 76 [229]. 
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cannot have. But to be clear, I am not concerned that we will fail to appreciate the beauty 
of scientific instruments. On the contrary, some are highly prized on this count. Rather, 
my concern is about the difficulty of abstracting from the particularity of the historical 
record, which offers us only examples of instruments designed and used for very specific 
purposes. Even specious purposes and unsuccessful instruments foreclose the kind of 
reflective contemplation that gives rise to judgments of taste, in Kant’s terms. The value 
for my inquiry of thinking about the purposiveness of instruments is that it offers us a 
way in to thinking about what makes things suitable for-, and even suggestive of-, new 
ways of being put to use in the context of experimentation.  
Making scientific instruments involves working in a space in which things have 
not yet acquired distinct purposes or in which those aims have not yet been achieved. 
Baird describes eight different factors that often contribute to the development of a 
scientific instrument: an experimental idea, a theoretical test, an empirical test, functional 
components, intuition and trial and error, tinkering, adapting devices from other 
instruments, and perhaps most important, knowing when the apparatus is working. 
Although each of these elements can be discerned in Apparatus for the Distillation of 
Vague Intuitions, I want to focus on how the artwork exhibits just one of these factors, 
the strategy of adapting devices from other instruments and modifying old instruments 
for new purposes. In the absence of a glass case and an explanatory plaque of the sort one 
would find in a science museum, the viewer confronts Laremée’s sculpture installation 
much as an historian confronts an artifact of uncertain provenance and function. Even if 
one recognizes this work as a distillation apparatus (about which more below), it is 
impossible to tell by means of visual inspection alone whether this particular set-up is 
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functional at all, and if so, how to operate it. One searches for clues in the material itself, 
bringing to bear whatever background knowledge one has about similar artifacts and 
plausible uses.  
The artwork is composed of a motley array of components: hand blown glass 
vessels, natural materials such as leaves and flowers, metal wires and tubes and 
unidentified liquids and powders. Intermixed with these are items that are evidently 
recycled equipment from the instrumentarium of contemporary chemistry, including 
ceramic mixing bowls, Pyrex beakers, funnels, evaporating dishes and test tubes. The 
hand blown glass vessels resemble those used by chemists and alchemists of earlier era. 
Clouding and scratching on the hard Pyrex glassware betrays thorough use that is 
consistent with the actual origins of these components, which are in fact salvaged surplus 
from Los Alamos National Laboratory. Like every scientific laboratory, Apparatus for 
the Distillation of Vague Intuitions embeds within itself an archeological record of its 
own historical development: new and repurposed instruments, vestigial traces of older 
techniques and materials, the imprint of their operators hands, decisions and mistakes.  
The heterogeneity of the components that comprise the works is representative of 
chemistry’s instrumentation, which has, historically, been continuous with kitchen tools 
and other basic implements.22 The modular structure of Apparatus is also consistent with 
the types of instrumentation typical of chemistry, as compared with the complex 
instruments of physics. Chemists have required instruments that can be reused, 
recombined, and assembled into new configurations in order to conduct different kinds of 
                                                
22 See Roger G. W. Anderson, “The Archeology of Chemistry,” in Instruments and Experimentation in the 
History of Chemistry, ed. Frederic L. Holmes and Trevor H Levere, Dibner Institute Studies in the History 
of Science and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 5–34. 
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experiments. This is due not least to the fragility of chemical instruments, which are often 
considered disposable. Independently, the modular units of chemical apparatus are of less 
obvious interest than the complex instrumentation of many fields of physics and biology. 
In their relative simplicity and fragility, however, they offer exemplary sites at which to 
consider how the construction of instruments out of other devices embeds within 
instruments a record of historical affiliations, idiosyncratic decisions and radically 
particular innovations.  
But finally, let us concede that what we have before is a distillation apparatus: the 
title indicates as much. We are forced now to subsume the Apparatus for the Distillation 
of Vague Intuitions under a concept of a particular kind of scientific equipment—
although the specific of purpose of this particular apparatus remains perpetually 
suspended. Distillation is an ancient practice that is used to separate substances from one 
another on the basis of differences in their volatilities or boiling points; it has long been 
used to create alcohols, perfumes and medicinal agents, and it is now deployed on an 
industrial scale to prepare petroleum products and many other substances. Distillation is 
used as a method of purifying and concentrating substances, but one can readily see why 
these chemical terms lend themselves to analogies for thought processes. Indeed we have 
adopted the term quintessence from the alchemical tradition in which the ‘fifth essence’ 
or the result of fifth distillation of a liquid was thought to extract the pure and life giving 
substance inherent to a greater or lesser degree in every material.23 Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions offers itself ambiguously in the service of thoughts and of 
substances: the apparatus might itself be the material embodiment of a metaphor—an 
                                                
23 Bruce T. Moran, Distilling Knowledge: Alchemy, Chemistry, and the Scientific Revolution (Harvard 
University Press, 2006), chap. 1. 
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instrument for a philosopher to think with (as it is for me)—or it may be metaphor for the 
material practice of purifying chemical substances. We are faced, then, with the strange 
case of objects that purport to be instruments, instruments of a certain kind even, but 
whose use and particular function is nonetheless remains quite vague. In their ambiguity, 




The title of Laramée’s work suggests still another possible interpretation: 
Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions could also be read as representative of 
what Friedrich Steinle calls exploratory experimentation, a phase of inquiry that he takes 
to be characteristic of the early stages of a scientific research program.24 Indeed, this 
artwork hardly looks like the kind of experimental set-up that one might use to test a 
well-formed hypothesis or demonstrate a law of nature. Rather, the work magnifies the 
elements of chance, indeterminacy and subjectivity that philosophers of science have 
traditionally relegated to the context of discovery, factors that are supposed to be 
eliminated through experimentation in the context of justification. One of the 
consequences of the conceptual division between the context of discovery and the context 
of justification is that the kind of experimental inquiry that takes place in advance or in 
the absence of theoretical speculation has been sorely neglected, and with it, the role of 
instruments therein. Yet the image of experiment presented in this work accords 
surprisingly well with the accounts of research activity given by historians and 
                                                
24 Steinle, “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science.” 
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philosophers of science such as Steinle, Peter Galison and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger.25 The 
work contributes to our philosophical understanding by making the instruments of 
experiment visible, allowing the us to discern how material and conceptual stability are 
achieved together in the exploratory phase. 
The purpose of exploratory experiments, according to Steinle, is to stabilize a 
physical regularity and to develop a concept to describe it. In this kind of 
experimentation, as contrasted with theorizing, the distillation vague intuitions takes 
place practically through the production and repetition of patterns of physical 
regularities. Only once a phenomenon has been stabilized experimentally does it becomes 
possible to develop a theoretical framework for explaining it. But once both concepts and 
phenomena have been stabilized together, Steinle notes, newly articulated scientific 
objects “disappear as possible objects of revision, and tend to appear as unproblematic or 
even “natural.”26 Exploratory experimentation is the site at which uncertainty and 
ambiguity are disciplined in order to establish the conceptual resources and reliable 
techniques that form the basis for further research, including theory-directed 
experimentation.27 This element of research is a prerequisite to the description of 
                                                
25 Ibid.; Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things: Synthesizing Proteins in the Test 
Tube (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997); Giora Hon, Jutta Schickore, and Friedrich Steinle, 
Going Amiss in Experimental Research (Springer, 2009); Peter Galison, How Experiments End, 1st ed. 
(University Of Chicago Press, 1987). 
26 Steinle, “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science,” 423. 
27 According to Steinle, exploratory experimentation is characteristic of the early stages of development of 
new scientific specialties and in situations in which theories and concepts have been destabilized by new or 
anomalous observations. Steinle describes exploratory experiments as taking place in a manner that is not 
directed by theory. Laura Franklin describes another kind of exploratory exper` imentation that takes place 
against a theoretical background, but does not test or directly bear upon what she calls a local theory. The 
point of such theoretically informed exploratory experimentation is less to stabilize a particular 
phenomenon than to collect data about a range of phenomena that are supposed to be related, data which 
may then be analyzed as a basis for more specific, theory directed experimentation. See L. R. Franklin, 
“Exploratory Experiments,” Philosophy of Science 72, no. 5 (2005): 888–899. 
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regularities in scientific laws. An account of how regularities emerge from the unstable 
conditions of exploratory experiments thus prepares the ground for assessment of how 
those laws bear on their objects. What is revealing about the artwork, read as an 
exploratory experiment, is that it resists the tendency for the processes of stabilization to 
result in the disappearance of the factors that produce and maintain this condition in 
mature research programs. And it suggests that, if the appearance of an object as natural 
depends upon the invisibility of instruments and of the process of conceptual 
stabilization, then, paradoxically, under the conditions of experiment entities appear 
natural precisely where they are most labored. 
 Steinle's description of exploratory experimentation correlates closely with Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger's detailed study of the development of in vitro protein synthesis over 
the twenty-year period of 1945-1965.28 This research program eventually resulted in the 
identification of RNA as the intermediary product that enables a DNA sequence to be 
translated into the string of amino acids that compose a specific protein. Rheinberger's 
“non-anticipatory” historiographic method, however, does not narrate this research as the 
story of the discovery of RNA. The image of experiment that he presents is rather one of 
open-ended exploration punctuated by occasional achievements of regularity, stability 
and unexpected experimental success. His account captures an aspect that is perhaps 
much more typical of laboratory life than philosophers have previously appreciated.  
                                                




Figure 6. Eve André Laramée , Three Forms of Onanism 
One might read Laramée's work as a representation of the exploratory 
dimension—a spatial term—of experimental research, rather than as a sequential stage to 
be overcome. This also suggests why the static medium of sculpture should be 
appropriate for the representation of a dynamic process. Like Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions, in the story Rheinberger tells experimentation is 
everywhere marked with diversions, interruptions and points at which the path of 
investigation doubles back upon itself, much like the glass tubes that wind and curl only 
to reverse direction and form dead ends or nonstarters. A certain detail of the installation, 
to which Laramée gave the humorous title, Three Forms of Onanism, consists of three 
glass vessels that, on close inspection, turn out to be fully self-enclosed. (Figure 6.) What 
Rheinberger reveals is that it is not the existence of the material or physical phenomena 
themselves, but of any particular regularity that can be isolated therein, that depends 
upon intense labors of thought and many varied and repeated performances. 
Rheinberger identifies the locus of scientific research as the experimental system, 
which is composed of what he calls epistemic things and technical objects. Epistemic 
things are the targets of scientific enquiry, poorly understood phenomena that are 
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gradually defined and stabilized within experimental systems. Included in this category 
are entities becoming manifest for the first time in a new context as well as more familiar 
entities of which we seek to refine our understanding through scientific analysis. By 
contrast, technical objects are aspects of experimental systems that are already 
standardized and function in predictable ways.29 These include mechanical instruments 
and model organisms, measuring devices and conventions, theories and concepts, 
practical skills, and even the coordination of personnel and institutions, all of which are 
required for the orderly conduct of scientific research. These two dimensions of 
experimental systems are relational and interdependent: “[t]he technical conditions 
determine the realm of possible representations of an epistemic thing; and sufficiently 
stabilized epistemic things turn into the technical repertoire of the experimental 
arrangement.”30 Thomas Kuhn offers an illustration of instruments taking shape along 
with the concepts of phenomena that they are used to manipulate and measure, on that 
reminds us of Laramée’s irregularly marked graduated cylinders. 
Many of the early experiments involving thermometers read like 
investigations of that new instrument rather than investigations with it. 
How could anything else have been the case during a period when it was 
totally unclear what the thermometer measured?... Before the thermometer 
could become unequivocally a laboratory instrument rather than an 
experimental subject, thermometric reading had to be seen as the direct 
measure of 'degree of heat,' and sensation and simultaneously to be viewed 
as a complex and equivocal phenomenon dependent upon a number of 
different parameters.... As Heathcote and McKie have brilliantly shown, 
the last stages in the development of the concepts of specific and latent 
                                                
29 When Hacking argues that we become assured of the reality of entities when we can use them as tools for 
intervening in the world—“if you can spray them, they're real”—I take this to mean that we may be 
confident in the existence of an entity when it achieves the stability of what Rheinberger calls a technical 
object.  
30 Rheinberger, Toward a History of Epistemic Things, 29 (emphasis mine). 
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heat display intuited hypotheses constantly interacting with stubborn 
measurement, each forcing the other into line.31  
 
Accomplishing the goal that Steinle sets for exploratory experimentation—that of 
stabilizing the phenomenon that is the object of investigation—thus also involves 
stabilizing the functions of the instruments and other components of the experimental 
system in which that phenomenon manifests itself regularly. Technical objects become 
reliable through exploratory experimentation in tandem with the regularities that they are 
used to distill and the concepts that are fashioned to express the latter. An additional 
reason that instruments tend to disappear from historical memory is that, as J.E. Tiles 
points out, “the instruments used in one branch of science are frequently not the former 
experimental subjects of that science.”32 Although instruments and epistemic things tend 
to ‘disappear as possible objects of revision’ in one experimental system, what are 
counted on as a technical objects in one context often remain subjects of closer scrutiny 
in other scientific fields. There is no better example of this than Hacking’s; even as our 
facility in manipulating electrons and using them as tools in some experimental contexts 
provides strong evidence that they are real, their properties and behaviors nonetheless 
remain objects of inquiry.33 
 With these considerations in mind, I return to a close inspection of the artwork in 
order to examine how Laramée confronts and engages the constraints imposed by the 
sculptural medium upon her representation of scientific experimentation. To do so, I 
                                                
31 Quoted in J.E. Tiles, “Experiment as Intervention,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, 
no. 3 (September 1993): 472; Original Source Thomas S. Kuhn, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in 
Scientific Tradition and Change, First ed. (University Of Chicago Press, 1977), 218–19. 
32 Tiles, “Experiment as Intervention,” 472. 
33 Hacking, Representing and Intervening, chap. 1. 
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invoke the eighteenth-century aesthetic theorist Gotthold Ephraim Lessing's classic study 
of how artistic mediums constrain the form and content of sculpture in comparison to 
poetry.34 Through a close reading of the ancient Greek Laocöon sculpture, Lessing 
argued that while poetry has the advantage of being able to narrate events that take place 
over time, as a static medium, sculpture must capture a moment of tension, a 'pregnant 
moment' that anticipates and signifies an impending change. He attributes the power of 
the Laocöon sculpture to its representation of the priest, Laocöon, with his head thrown 
back and mouth agape, arms and legs entwined by serpents, as though he were about to 
emit a final blood-curdling cry toward the heavens. If one were to follow Lessing's advice 
in creating a sculptural representation of scientific discovery, one might be tempted to 
portray the scene just before a 'eureka!' moment, such as Henri Poincare stepping onto 
the bus just before the resolution of a mathematical problem came to him, or Friedrich 
August Kekule dozing off and dreaming of a serpent biting its own tail, the clue that 
enabled him to resolve the ring structure of benzene.35  
By refusing to depict a pregnant moment, Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague 
Intuition contests this conception of the instantaneous temporality of scientific discovery. 
Instead, the sprawling maze of interconnecting vessels suggesting continuity, multiple 
points of entry, and many possible beginnings, ends, and diversions in an ongoing 
process of knowledge production. Biographies of great scientists do often relate flashes 
of insight that turn out to be correct. What makes these moments possible and affirms 
                                                
34 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Laocoon: An Essay Upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry (Roberts 
brothers, 1874). 
35 Jacques Hadamard emphasizes the instantaneous temporality of scientific discovery in his discussion of 
this example from Poincare's biography, although he clearly demonstrates that such moments are the 
products of extended research activities. Jacques Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the 
Mathematical Field (Dover Publications, 1954). 
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their status, however, is the preparatory work that proceeds in the absence of such 
inspiration and the work of confirmation or corroboration that is carried out afterwards. 
The moment of discovery can be narratively constituted only in retrospect. In the moment 
of its occurrence in the laboratory, it cannot be more than a “leap in the dark,” the 
feelings of insight anything more than “faith.” (Figure 7.) Laramée's inscription of these 
words on glass vessels arrest such fleeting moments in unreconstructed form by 
localizing them in space, and thus permit us to examine them as though in real time.  
 Although it is strictly neither a performance nor an experiment, I read Apparatus 
for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions as a performative experiment in the dual senses of 
parodic representation and iterative realization. The work is parodic in the sense that it 
exaggerates features of scientific inquiry that are a source of some embarrassment to a 
certain privileged image of science. But how can a sculpture be read as a performance?36 
Rather than taking the artwork as a static object, I read it as a performance of stability. 
The stability of the sculpture installation is maintained through its endurance in space 
over time in a specific configuration, yet the work displays this configuration and its 
components as unstable. Stability thus appears as a contingent and labored achievement, 
an effect that is all the more interesting if we consider the historical specificity of the 
different kinds of glass of which it is composed—common glass, which is liquid, and the 
                                                
36  I was motivated to think about Laramée's sculpture in this way by Roslyn Krauss's essay “Sculpture in 
the Expanded Field” (October, (Spring, 1979) reprinted in The Ant-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern 
Culture, Ed. Hal Foster, New York, New Press, (1998)). Krauss positions traditional, monumental 
sculpture as defined against landscape on the onehand, and architecture on the other. The expanded field 
identifies new sculptural forms that exist at different intersections of the field of possibilities, such as the 
marked site, positioned between landscape and not-landscape, and site construction at the intersection of 
landscape and architecture. Greenberg identified the three dimensional spatiality of sculpture as its essential 
feature, as contrasted with the flatness of painting. Yet if we were to position sculpture in relation to 
performance (which could include musical, theatrical, or even experimental performances as sharing 
elements of change or movement that takes place over time), we might identify sculpture's static quality as 
its distinctive feature. Between painting and performance we might locate the tableau-vivant as a peculiar 
kind of sculpture, which dramatizes the difficulty of holding still. It is this stillness as a site of tension that I 
wish to foreground in reading Laramée's Apparatus as a performative experiment.  
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harder, extruded glass of the Pyrex.37 The work represents directly the process of 
stabilizing the instruments and technical objects used in experiments. Indirectly, it shows 
how the regularities that are the object of exploratory experimentation come to appear as 
stable entities and effects. The sculpture thereby dramatizes the difficulty of holding 
still—and it is this stillness as a site of tension that I foreground in reading it as a 
performative experiment that can illuminate our understanding of how scientists achieve 
certainty. 
 
Figure 7. Eve André Laaramée, Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions, “Faith” (Detail View, 
2001) 
 
It has frequently been remarked that scientists tend to prefer theories that they 
perceive as simple, unified, orderly, elegant and beautiful. Philosophers have 
attempted to define these terms precisely in order to estimate the degree to which the 
aesthetic properties of theories bear any correlation or causal relation to their truth.38 
                                                
37 On the importance of methods of tempering glass to the history of chemistry see W. A. Smeaton, 
“Platinum And Ground Glass: Some Innovations In Chemical Apparatus By Guyton De Morveau And 
Others,” Instruments and Experimentation in the History of Chemistry (2000): 211. 
38 James W. McAllister, Beauty and Revolution in Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); 
The Elusive Synthesis: Aesthetics and Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science v. 182 
(Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer, 1996). 
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Like the philosophy of science more generally, studies of the role of aesthetic 
considerations in science privilege theory, while neglecting the aesthetics of 
experimentation. Glenn Parsons and Alexander Rueger's study, “The Epistemic 
Significance of Appreciating Experiments Aesthetically,” is a noteworthy exception to 
this tendency.39 Parsons and Rueger locate a legitimate epistemic role for aesthetic 
properties in the design of experimental set-ups. They argue that operational 
simplicity, or simplicity in the organization and probabilities of alternative outcomes 
for an experiment is ceteris paribus more conducive to success than complexity in 
experimental design. A key difference between the aesthetics of theories and the 
aesthetics of experiments is that while theories are representations, experiments are 
activities that are performed.  
By distinguishing between representation and practice, Parsons and Reuger 
avoid the charge that classical taste in theories cannot be a reliable guide to the true 
representation of a complex and unruly world. Operational simplicity need not be an 
aesthetic property of the world itself in order for it to be a property of successful 
scientific experiments. I contend, though, that philosophical enquiry into the aesthetics 
of experiment ought to extend beyond the aesthetic properties of successful 
experiments to the aesthetic dimensions of the broad range of experimental practices 
that have been described in historical and philosophical studies of experiment. In 
keeping with Rheinberger’s methodology, I urge that the aesthetics of constructing and 
operating scientific instruments, manipulating materials, interpreting and 
misinterpreting data, and narrating these activities in written form also deserve our 
                                                
39 Parsons and Rueger, “The Epistemic Significance of Appreciating Experiments Aesthetically.” 
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attention. Whatever protocol one might possibly devise to perform with it, Apparatus 
for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions clearly lacks the aesthetic virtue of operational 
simplicity. This lack, however, enables another important aspect of experiment to 
become visible, an aesthetic virtue whose epistemic significance is under-appreciated.  
A mature experimental system is one in which most of the relevant variables 
have been identified and can be reliably controlled (or controlled for). This enables a 
researcher to use the system to conduct the kinds of experiments necessary for testing 
hypotheses and demonstrating scientific laws. What Rheinberger emphasizes, 
however, is that the elements of instability, uncertainty and lack of control are 
precisely the factors that permit experimental systems to function as generators of 
surprises. Although the goal of exploratory experimentation is to stabilize a regularity 
and achieve control over the variables in an experimental system, it is the delicate 
balance of uncertainty and control that enables new phenomena to emerge and 
concepts to be revised. This balance, and the ability to sustain and negotiate it, is the 
aesthetic aspect of exploratory experimentation that emerges most powerfully from 
Laramée's work. Whereas messiness and ambiguity are usually narrated as an occasion 
of anxiety and frustration, the aesthetics of disorder and complexity here shows itself 
as an epistemic virtue. 
To say that the work embodies the purposiveness of instruments while holding 
this quality apart from any particular purpose, then, is to ascribe to the work the 
attribute of beauty in precisely the sense that Kant gives the term. Yet to say that 
Apparatus is beautiful in this specific sense is not to ascribe an aesthetic property to 
the work’s visual appearance. The delicacy of the glasswork, the manner in which the 
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arrangement refracts light and invites the viewer’s gaze to trace its contours through 
space, might too justly be described as beautiful. But like many of the artworks that I 
consider in this dissertation, Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions is more 
beautiful in respect of its form than its material embodiment. Its formal beauty arises 
from the way it sets intuitions and ideas into motion. I close this section, then, with the 
suggestion that we find in this artwork precisely the apparatus longed for by the 
eighteenth-century aphorist and experimentalist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg40 when 
he wrote the following: 
“How many ideas are scattered in my head which, if some came together 
to make a pair, could effect the greatest of discoveries! But they lie as far apart 
as the sulfur from Goslar, the saltpeter from East India, and the dust of the 
charcoal kiln that together would make gunpowder… When while thinking we 
rely on the natural ways in which forms of the understanding and of reason join 
together, then the concepts often stick to each other too much, failing to unite 
with those to which they properly belong. If only there were something (like the 
solution in chemistry) where the individual parts could swim about in 
suspension and could thus follow the tug of every attraction. But since that is not 
possible, one must bring things together intentionally. One must experiment 
with ideas.”41 
 
Performative experiments generate a space in which experimenting with ideas and 
experimenting with materials converge—a space in which to experiment with and upon 
our philosophical understanding of experiment itself. In doing so they magnify a degree 
of freedom that must be present in every experimental system. 
 
III. Instrumental Artifacts 
                                                
40 (1742-1799) Lichtenberg held the first chair of experimental physics at the University of Gottingen. A 
contemporary of Goethe, Kant, Allessandro Volta, he is known as much for his investigations of electricity 
as for his aphorisms and satirical writings. He is the discoverer of Lichtenberg figures, fractal patterns 
created in dust.  
41 Michel Chaouli, The Laboratory of Poetry: Chemistry and Poetics in the Work of Friedrich Schlegel 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 
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In order to let nature speak for itself scientists strive to erase the traces of human 
intervention from the products of their labor. Proper interpretation should eliminate traces 
of the scientist's quivering hand, doubting mind, or wishful theorizing on the data that 
emerge from experimental practice. Instead, these doubts are legible on Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions as through they were stage directions: “hesitate,” 
“dither,” “doubt.” Moreover, they are everywhere built into the experimental set-up itself, 
for instance, where a pair of unbalanced, goose-necked beakers seem to bend pliantly 
under the experimenter’s will. Instruments remain conspicuous in this work not least 
because they appear to require a particular rather than a universal operator, someone with 
a great deal of tacit knowledge of this idiosyncratic instrumentarium. They also remain 
visible because the hand-blown glass vessels are obviously unique products of craft rather 
than industrial manufacture, giving them an auratic quality that marks the implied 
operator or fabricator of this apparatus as an artist than a scientist, or perhaps, an 
alchemist as opposed to a modern chemist. When the artist's role is transfigured into that 
of a scientist, her presence becomes intrusive and epistemically compromising. The work 
suggests that an adequate account of the role of instruments in scientific experiment must 
include an account of how the experimentalist too disappears.  
 Whereas Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions conjures a ghostly 
apparition of the experimentalist as an embodied, creative agency, a companion artwork 
sometimes exhibited with it presents concrete evidence of the manual labor involved in 
fabricating the artwork itself. Titled Salt of Sweat, this work consists of a broad glass 
evaporating dish covered with a brownish film of salt crystals. These are the residues of 
sweat that Laramée collected from the glass blowers with whom she worked to fabricate 
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Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions during her residency at New York 
Experimental Glassworks. The exhibition of the two works together implies (to me-it was 
not the artists's intention) that the distillation equipment was actually used to create Salt 
of Sweat, figuring the latter work as a chemical substance distilled from ‘vague 
intuitions.’ I have argued in the foregoing sections that the absence of any specific 
content in this performative experiment heightens the visibility of its instruments. Paired 
with Salt of Sweat, it becomes apparent that the substantive content of Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions lies in the self-reflexive view that it affords of its own 
making and breaking.  
Salt of Sweat may be read as an engagement with the work of historians of 
science like Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, whose work seeks to make visible the 
manual, intellectual and social labor of producing scientific knowledge, the visibility of 
which conflicts with the self-evidence of scientific facts.42 Here it becomes clear that 
along with instruments themselves, the labor of experimental practice must recede into 
reliability. Indeed, in his study of the role of technicians in Robert Boyle’s laboratory, 
Shapin describes technicians' labor in virtually identical terms to those used to describe 
instruments: “Technicians' work was transparent when the apparatus was working as it 
should and the results were as they ought to be. In contrast, the role of technicians was 
continually pointed to when matters did not proceed as expected. In such circumstances, 
technicians' labor (or, rather, the incompetence of their labor) became highly visible.”43 
And not only were technicians supposed to be reliable; some instruments, like this early 
                                                
42  Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental 
Life, Reprint. (Princeton University Press, 2011). 
43 S. Shapin, “The Invisible Technician,” American Scientist 77, no. 6 (1989): 558. 
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version of an air pump, were built purposefully to keep them out of sight. (Figure 8.) 
The critique of self-evidence should not be taken to undermine the legitimacy of 
scientific knowledge. Indeed a close study of experiment shows that the appearance of 
self-evidence that accrues to the most well accepted scientific facts does so only as a 
consequence of the laborious process of stabilizing instruments, cleaning up messy 
experimental data and negotiating the social and bureaucratic structures of scientific 
knowledge production. But where the obtrusive presence of the inquirer as a reasoning 
and desirous mind raises concerns about the contamination of observation by theory, the 
presence of the experimenter's laboring body here suggests the contamination of the 
experimental material itself. One can even imagine the experimenter sweating into the 
Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions and contaminating her sample. And yet 
it would be a mistake to take this intrusion of the subject into the experiment to indicate 
that the results derived therefore are in any sense subjective. Rather, these data provide 





Figure 8. An early airpump at the home of Otto von Guericke44  
 
In their discussion of the transition from truth-to-nature to mechanical objectivity, 
Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison describe how scientists traded distortions introduced 
into scientific images by the subject for distortions introduced by mechanical devices.45 
Although machines offered a corrective to the eye and mind, automatism generated a host 
of problems of its own, most importantly, that of the instrumental artifact. Now, in 
addition to guarding against the tendency to project her expectations onto nature, the 
scientist had to guard against the errors introduced by in her instruments. I read Salt of 
                                                
44 Shapin, “The Invisible Technician.” 
45 Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (New York: Zone Books, 2007). 
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Sweat as an artifact in the precise sense in which this term is used by scientists. As Peter 
Kroes explains, “Data are called 'artifacts', as opposed to genuine data, when they carry 
no information about the object of study, but only tell us something about the equipment 
used in the experiment.”46 Like the invisibility of instruments, the problem distinguishing 
artifacts from genuine data is not restricted to experiments; it is a familiar problem of 
perception and cognition.  
For a presentation of this problem that is usefully abstract, we can turn to the 
introduction to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, in which he dismisses as a pseudo-
problem a worry that arises when cognition itself is understood as an instrument or a 
medium through which we have access to ‘the Absolute’ (for which we might here 
substitute the lesser prey of truth or empirical adequacy). “[I]t is obvious” Hegel writes 
“that the use of an instrument on a thing a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for 
itself, but rather sets out to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an 
instrument but a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, 
then again we do not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in 
this medium.”47 Whether the instrument is cognition, a microscope or a particle 
accelerator, the same procedure suggests itself as a solution to the challenge of 
distinguishing the reality from artifacts. “It would seem, to be sure, that this evil could be 
remedied through an acquaintance with the way in which the instrument works; for this 
would enable us to eliminate from the representation of the Absolute which we have 
                                                
46 Peter Kroes, “Science, Technology and Experiments; The Natural Versus the Artificial,” PSA: 
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (January 1, 1994): 433. 
47 A.V. Miller, “Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit,” Translation. Oxford (1977): 74. 
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gained through it whatever is due to the instrument, and thus get the truth in its purity.”48  
The elimination of whatever is due to the instrument is not unproblematic, of 
course. Kroes discusses the example of a stick partially submerged in water: the bent 
appearance of the stick is an artifact, a visual distortion caused by well understood 
features of the context of observation (the effects of the difference in the density of air 
and water on light rays), while we know that the ‘genuine data’ indicates that the stick is 
straighter than it appears. We know the causes of the artifacts well enough that we could 
even predict the angle at which the stick would be appear bent if we have the relevant 
information about the water, the air, and the actual shape of the stick. This process is 
more difficult in cases where the instruments or methodology themselves are unfamiliar, 
yet such clear-cut cases support the widespread assumption, among scientists and 
philosophers, that it is always possible in principle to “eliminate all that is due to the use 
of technology.”49  
 Rather than representing artifacts as the objects to be eliminated through 
experimentation, Salt of Sweat displays the artifact as a site of self-reflexivity within 
experimental methods. The possibility of distinguishing artifacts from genuine data 
depends upon the transparency of instruments. As I discussed above, the achievement of 
transparency is not itself automatic or assured, yet once this accomplishment is made, the 
distinction itself can also be stable. In fact it is stable enough that the production of 
artifacts is used to calibrate instruments.50 Eliminating artifacts, indeed recognizing them 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
49 Peter Kroes, “Science, Technology and Experiments; The Natural Versus the Artificial,” PSA: 
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994 (January 1, 1994): 433. 
50 On calibration and experimental checks, see Allan Franklin, The Neglect of Experiment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chap. 5. 
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as such, requires the most intimate familiarity with one’s instruments and methods as 
well as a willingness to subject them to the suspicious gaze of one’s peers. Attending to 
artifacts reveals that instruments are hidden in plain sight. 
 By separating the purposiveness of instruments from their purposes Apparatus 
enables us to comprehend the phenomenological process whereby instruments 
themselves become stabilized and can be used to stabilize concepts. Artifacts, by moving 
from the periphery to the center of attention, demonstrate that the self-awareness of the 
experimenter and his or her familiarity with the instrumentation provides the conditions 
of their own invisibility—the condition under which epistemic things come into focus. 
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Chapter 2. Framing Natural Experiments 
 
This chapter examines the transfiguration of the world into a patchwork of natural 
experiments. Philosophers have long spoken of ‘observation and experiment’ in one 
breath, without distinguishing between the observation of nature as we find it and the 
observation of phenomena that manifest themselves under laboratory conditions. Recent 
scholarship has driven a wedge between these two modes of empirical inquiry by 
showing how experimental practices configure opportunities not only for observation or 
data collection but also for the emergence of new kinds of phenomena themselves. It has 
become increasingly difficult to regard experimentation as a special case of the more 
general practice of observation. Indeed the resurgence of interest in Francis Bacon’s 
writings on scientific method, prompted by Ian Hacking (1983), has made it more 
plausible to contrast (active) experiment with (passive) observation. The concept of a 
natural experiment, widely used in the social and natural sciences, combines these two 
opposing tendencies.  
Natural experiments exploit spontaneously occurring or unintentionally produced 
circumstances that resemble the sorts of carefully controlled situations that experimenters 
manipulate in the laboratory. This methodology allows scientists to treat data collected by 
means of observation alone as if the observed situation had been contrived for the 
purposes of answering a preconceived question or testing a hypothesis. It is the as if that 
interests me here. In the context of a particular scientific research program, there is little 
risk of collapsing the distinction between the world as we find it and the 'world as we 
would have madeit.’ On the contrary, the methodology sections of papers on natural 
experiments testify to the difficulty of making the unruly world fit researchers’ questions 
  
62 
and, conversely, of posing questions that the world can answer. And yet, I will argue, 
framing nature, history, and social life as a collection of natural experiments effects a 
profound transformation of the world, one that collapses the distinction between 
passively observing and actively configuring the world of experience and experiment.  
 I concentrate here on two artworks that were exhibited together at the 
Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art (MassMOCA) as part of the 2001 
exhibition “Unnatural Science,” (an exhibition that also included Apparatus for the 
Distillation of Vague Intuitions, discussed in the previous chapter). First I consider Tree 
Logic (1999-Present), by the artist Natalie Jeremijenko, a work that literally takes the 
form of a scientific experiment on the growth patterns of living trees. Second, I examine 
a work by Stacey Levy titled Seeing the Path of the Wind (1994), which I read as a 
scientific model. Read through the philosophy of science and aesthetic theory, these 
artworks together illuminate the methodology of natural experimentation by calling our 
attention to the manner in which we learn to view pockets of the world as if it were 
systems and experiments of our design. But as artworks, they also disclose a broader 
cultural logic at work. What I propose in this chapter and argue throughout this 
dissertation is that the conditional practice of seeing-as that is essential for natural 
experiments ultimately gives way to what the philosopher of art Arthur Danto, in a very 
different context, called transfiguration. Even without materially intervening, I argue, the 
transfiguration of the world into a patchwork of natural experiments substantively alters 
that world in the very process of disclosing its properties.   
It is fitting that Danto introduces the concept of transfiguration in the context of 
explaining how artworks like Andy Warhol’s Brillo Box—which, he thought, looked just 
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like the ones in the supermarket—could be considered artworks, and how they could be 
distinguished from any number of other commonplace objects might be put forth as 
contenders for the same lofty status. Only by drawing upon knowledge of the history and 
theory of art, Danto argued, can one use the “is of artistic identification” to assert that a 
found object (like a urinal) or an object that is indiscernible from a commonplace 
commodity is an artwork.1 This is because art is the kind of thing that is dependent upon 
its own concept; each artwork embeds within itself a history and theory of what art is, 
and, in the best of cases, it also adds something to that concept. Danto famously called 
the nexus of art objects and theory the (or an-) artworld. “[I]t is essential for our study,” 
he writes, “that we understand the nature of an art theory, which is so powerful a thing as 
to detach objects from the real world and make them part of a different world, an art 
world, a world of interpreted things.”2 Seeing a part of the word as if it were a controlled 
experiment, I will argue, proceeds by a similar logic as the transfiguration of 
commonplace objects into artworks. The method of natural experimentation likewise 
detaches situations from the ‘real world’ and mobilizes them into a world of interpreted 
things.  A key difference, however, between found artworks and natural experiments—or, 
as they are sometimes called—found experiments, lies in their respective modes of 
exemplarity.3 Artworks can be understood as exemplary in the sense that they embody in 
                                                
1 Arthur Danto, “The Artworld,” The Journal of Philosophy 61, no. 19 (October 15, 1964): 580. 
2 A.C. Danto, The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (Harvard Univ Pr, 1981), 135. 
3 The terms “found experiment” and “natural experiment” are both used widely (and often interchangeably) 
in scientific literature to refer to the studies performed on situations or phenomena that occurred without 
the investigator’s direct influence. When this methodology is used in the social sciences the situations upon 
which analyses are conducted are clearly human constructs—lotteries, gerrymandered voting districts—
whereas other scientific fields treat as natural experiments phenomena that are far beyond any form of 
human control, e.g. evolution and celestial phenomena. Because the question of what sorts of phenomena 
should count as natural is fraught with conceptual and political difficulties, I view natural experiments as a 
subset of the more general category of found experiments. For rhetorical purposes, I mainly use the term 
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a radically particular way something implicit in the concept of art—something that need 
not be present in all other artworks. Experiments, by contrast, are meant to reveal 
underlying tendencies that are present in all comparable domains, whether we take these 
to be laws of nature that obtain universally or capacities that manifest themselves more 
discretely.  
In suggesting that artworks such as Tree Logic and Seeing the Path of the Wind 
can help us to understand how the world comes to be intelligible as a patchwork of 
natural experiments, I make reference to a view advanced by the philosopher of science 
Nancy Cartwright. Against those philosophers and scientists who dream of a ‘theory of 
everything,’ Cartwright argues that nature as it is disclosed to us by the sciences is 
described by few, if any, universal laws. What the sciences actually give us is a “jumbled 
world of material things” loosely governed by overlapping, oddly fitting and sometimes, 
conflicting laws—and often by no law at all.4 Two important implications follow from 
Cartwright’s analysis of the ways that laws apply to the world. First, scientific laws apply 
best to the kinds of tidy situations that can be set up inside laboratories, often with the 
help of complex instrumentation. And second, the real world outside the laboratory has 
some (but perhaps not many) patches in which relatively simple and regular causal 
patterns can be observed and therefore described in law-like terms. Whether they are 
constructed by us or discovered in undisturbed nature, Cartwright calls such pockets of 
order nomological machines. She defines a nomological machine as “a fixed (enough) 
arrangement of components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right 
                                                                                                                                            
‘natural experiment here; yet the sense in which an experiment may be considered natural is precisely what 
this chapter puts into question.  
4 Nancy Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge (UK); New 
York (N.Y.): Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1. 
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sort of stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of 
regular behavior that we represent in our scientific laws.”5 To conduct a rigorously 
controlled experiment, a clinical trial, for example, one must have access to such an 
arrangement.6 And in such cases, one must be careful in extrapolating the results obtained 
inside the nomological machine to other, less orderly patches of the world. Sometimes 
this means drawing inferences from a laboratory experiment to the world as we find it; in 
other cases, it means inferring the condition of one part of the universe from that which 
obtains in another part—a project that is made much more difficult if the appeal to 
universal laws is foreclosed. But often, indeed more often than not, we are forced to carry 
out our inquiries in uncharted territory—to look for order without being assuring of 
finding it and to make locally practical decisions without the benefit of global 
understanding. One way we do this is by performing natural experiments.  
My readings of artworks explore how we become attentive to patches of order in 
the world and learn how to frame those patches by asking particular kinds of questions 
and training our habits of perception to attend selectively to features of the world-as-we-
find-it. By drawing philosophy of science and aesthetic theory into direct conversation 
about these works, I show how the problem of framing natural experiments can be 
illuminated by an analysis of how artworks themselves are framed so as to enhance or 
detract from our aesthetic appreciation thereof. I argue that Cartwright’s concept of a 
nomological machine is formally homologous to the aesthetic concept of the parergon or 
frame, which Jacques Derrida distills from Kant’s Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. From 
                                                
5 Ibid., 50. 
6 Robyn Bluhm, “Clinical Trials as Nomological Machines: Implications for Evidence-Based Medicine,” in 
Establishing Medical Reality, ed. Harold Kincaid and Jennifer McKitrick, vol. 90 (Dordrecht: Springer 
Netherlands, n.d.), 149–166. 
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an unlikely conversation between these three interlocutors I derive a deeper 
understanding of how the boundaries of nomological machines recede into invisibility 
and tempt us to over-extend the scope of the knowledge claims that we are warranted in 
deriving from experiments both artificial and natural. I conclude by suggesting a brief 
thought experiment designed to illustrate the transformative power of seeing-as inherent 
in the methodology of natural experimentation. 
 
I. Intervention 
In the courtyard outside the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art 
(MassMOCA), six live Maple trees are suspended upside-down from a high truss (Figure 
9). Installed as a permanent exhibit in 1999, Tree Logic, by artist Natalie Jeremijenko, 
has undergone continuous transformation as the first set of trees adapted to their habitat 
and eventually outgrew their steel containers, and ultimately had to be replaced. If one 
visits the museum shortly after a new generation of trees has been planted, one observes 
straight-trunked young saplings with their leaves and branches pointing directly toward 
the ground. Over time, the trees turn to grow upward toward the sun, forming strange and 
contorted-looking shapes in the process. Inside the planters their roots reverse course in 
response to the pull of gravity, an expression of gravitropism. In the original context of 
the exhibition Unnatural Science (2000), the contortions of Jeremijenko’s trees provoked 
enduring concerns about what science does to nature in the pursuit of knowledge. Indeed, 
the denatured trees illustrate well Francis Bacon’s famous maxim that “nature exhibits 
herself more clearly under the trials and vexations of art than when left to herself.”7 
                                                
7 Bacon’s use of the term “art” refers to craft or technology, not to fine art—but the double meaning serves 
my purposes well here. Francis Bacon, The Works of Francis Bacon, ed. James Spedding, Robert Ellis 
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Although the trees appear as though they had been sculpted by human hands, the artwork 
in fact exhibits their eminently natural response to their contrived environment. 
Meanwhile, in the woods out behind the museum, retired generations of twisted trees 
have been replanted up-right, only to reverse their direction of growth once more—a 
dubious return to nature that effectively constitutes a second phase in this ongoing 
performative experiment.  
 
Figure 9. Natalie Jeremijenko, Tree Logic (1999) 
 
A forceful advocate of the emerging seventeenth-century experimental science, 
Bacon urged the study nature not merely by means of passive observation but “under 
constraint and vexed; that is to say, when by art and the hand of man she is forced out of 
her natural state, and squeezed and molded.”8 His writings mark an important historical 
                                                                                                                                            
Leslie, and Douglas Dennon Heath, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, 1870), “Of the Dignity and Advancement 
of Learning, Books II-VI,” 298.  
8 Francis Bacon and Rose-Mary Sargent, Selected Philosophical Works (Hackett Publishing, 1999), “The 
Great Instauration,” 82. 
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shift in perspective on the place of experiment in empirical inquiry, and concomitantly, 
on experimental methods. Experimentation has and still does serve several distinct 
epistemic purposes. This is one reason, as J.E. Tiles has argued, why the importance of 
actually performing experiments—rather than merely carrying them out in thought—has 
historically been quite varied.9 First, experiment places opportunities for observation 
within an inquirer’s control, enabling her to observe phenomena and to demonstrate them 
to others in an especially clear and convenient way. This was the primary function of 
experiment in the age of Aristotelian empiricism, Tiles argues, as it remains in teaching 
demonstrations today.  
What distinguishes modern, Baconian science from its antecedents is the use of 
‘art’ to alter the course of nature itself and thereby to bring about phenomena that occur 
rarely, or not at all, independently of human intervention.10 Here, in addition to making 
possible occasions for controlled observation, experiment affords opportunities to discern 
nature’s hidden depths—the underlying order of its laws, its motions and its material 
composition—secrets that do not betray themselves voluntarily to surface inspection. 
Experimentation, conceived as a practice of inquiry through intervention, must be carried 
out materially in order to reveal patterns and processes unanticipated in thought and 
unobservable in nature at large. According to Bacon, the object of scientific inquiry is 
thus threefold: nature in its normal course (the object of Aristotelian empiricism), 
                                                
9 J.E. Tiles, “Experiment as Intervention,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44, no. 3 
(September 1993): 463–475. 
10 Tiles draws upon and historicizes Hacking’s argument that modern experimental science consists largely 
in the investigation of phenomena that are products of human artifice—entities and effects that do not occur 
at all, or do not occur in isolation except when they are brought about inside laboratories and with the help 
of sophisticated instrumentation. See Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in 
the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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monsters or spontaneous deviations from nature (about which I will say more later), and 
nature vexed by ‘art’ or technology. It is the strange, if now familiar, notion that nature in 
its vexed or monstrous states provides the template for understanding nature in its normal 
course that distinguishes modern experimental science from observation-driven 
empiricism.11 
If there is one epithet that Tree Logic consistently invites, it is that of being 
disturbingly unnatural. A certain anxiety binds ethical qualms about vexing nature to 
questions about the epistemological implications of intervening, and it is this anxiety that 
Tree Logic manifests aesthetically. The artwork re-stimulates a worry that has plagued 
Bacon’s conception of experiment since its inception: the worry that, taken too far to the 
extreme, the vexation of nature yields only false and misleading confessions. Bacon’s 
term vexationes artium, variously translated as the ‘torture,’ ‘torments’ or ‘vexations’ of 
art, has long evoked disgust and outrage.12 Critics both historical and contemporary have 
sought to demonstrate that the violation of ethical, political and aesthetic mores of respect 
for nature tracks an epistemological error. “Nature grows dumb when subjected to 
torture,” wrote Goethe, an advocate for a gentler approach to learning nature’s secrets.13 
More recently, feminist historians and philosophers of science have defended the priority 
of intuition and empathy with nature over masculinist tropes of penetration and conquest, 
while others have defended Bacon’s vexationes atrium as a recipe for heroic struggle 
                                                
11 As Tiles rightly points out, "[i]t is also easy to forget that Bacon's policy is not the only or the most 
obviously sensible way to deal with nature. Surely interference is as likely as not to obscure the natural 
behavior of phenomena.” Tiles, “Experiment as Intervention,” 466. 
12 For a comprehensive analysis of the translation of the term in various historical contexts see Carolyn 
Merchant, “Francis Bacon and the ‘vexations of Art’: Experimentation as Intervention,” British Journal for 
the History of Science (2012): 1–49.  
13 Ibid., 12. 
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among equals.14 What has concerned philosophers of science interested in the revival of 
Baconian experimentalism is less his violent rhetoric of than the boundary between 
nature and artifice over which these battles are waged. What do the entities and effects 
contrived under controlled experimental conditions tell us about how nature behaves 
when left to follow her own course in her own way? Can theories that find their 
justification in experimental data purport to carve nature at its joints, or do our best 
theories refer only to artifacts of our own categorical schemes and material practices? 
How can what happens inside the laboratory be extrapolated to the world outside? Is 
science natural?15 
                                                
14 Merchant is perhaps the most prominent of Bacon’s contemporary feminist critics, however the question 
of the Baconian origins of an environmentally dangerous and misogynistic ethos in science has sustained 
scholarly debate for over two decades. For indictments of Bacon see Carolyn Merchant, The death of 
nature: Women, ecology, and the scientific revolution (Harper Collins, 1980); S.G. Harding, The science 
question in feminism (Cornell Univ Pr, 1986); B. Easlea, “The masculine image of science with special 
reference to physics: How much does gender really matter,” Perspectives on gender and science (1986): 
132–158; E.F. Keller, “Baconian science: The arts of mastery and obedience,” Reflections on Gender and 
Science 33 (1985). For recent defenses of Bacon see Peter Pesic, “Proteus Unbound: Francis Bacon’s 
Successors and the Defense of Experiment,” Studies in Philology 98, no. 4 (October 1, 2001): 428-456; 
Brian Vickers, “Francis Bacon, Feminist Historiography, and the Dominion of Nature,” Journal of the 
History of Ideas 69, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 117-141. 
15 I borrow this question from Catherine Elgin, who answers a decisive ‘no’—not, at least, by the standards 
of David Lewis. “Naturalness of properties,” she argues, “is an output of successful inquiry, not an input 
into it.” In other words, science confers naturalness upon the properties (or entities or phenomena) that it 




Figure 10. Natalie Jeremijenko, Tree Logic (1999) 
  
In their retirement from the service of art, Tree Logic’s first generation of trees 
stand out from the rest of the forest in virtue of the visually arresting manner in which 
they exhibit the effects of phototropism and gravitropism. Yet such sights are not entirely 
uncommon in the wild, where trees and shrubs may be found clinging to the underside of 
cliffs and forcing their way into patches of sunlight by growing around obstacles. With 
the right questions guiding our observations, such uncontrived deviations from plants’ 
typical growth patterns allow us to study the effects of the relative position of a light 
source and gravitational field on plants’ direction of growth, and consequently, on the 
shapes they assume over time.  
Bacon did not overlook the value of such strange sights; they belong to his 
category of monsters, marvels, or wonders, and their importance is remarked in what is 
perhaps his most infamous quote: “from the wonders of nature is the nearest intelligence 
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and passage towards the wonders of art: for it is no more but by following and as it were 
hounding nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place 
again.”16 Whereas Aristotelians sought to discern through their observations the 
regularity of nature’s patterns, the purpose of hounding nature in her wanderings was not 
only to comprehend but also to replicate the effects observed when nature veered off 
course. “When nature wandered from its wonted paths without the prodding of art,” 
Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park explain, “the marvels thereby produced mimicked 
the variability induced by art – or rather, marvels were proto-art, nature anticipating 
art.”17 It bears reminder in this context that Bacon’s use of ‘art’ is closer to what we 
would call technology. Where nature anticipates art, it holds the promise of guiding the 
development of technologies useful for human ends, which Bacon considered the 
ultimate aim of his new science. But providing a stimulus to technological innovation is 
not the only virtue of monsters. In contemporary science, random or rare phenomena 
such as eclipses, lotteries, natural disasters, isolated islands, and twins separated at birth 
are frequently deployed as staging grounds for natural experiments.  
In a natural experiment, the investigator does not perform the work of intervening. 
Rather, she takes advantage of a situation that is not of her own making but nonetheless 
sufficiently resembles a controlled experiment, typically in order to test a preformed 
hypothesis. Strictly speaking, natural experiments are observational studies, in which data 
is collected about some aspect of the world-as-we-find-it, but the analysis of that data is 
                                                
16 Cited in Lorraine Daston and Katherine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750 (New York: 
Zone Books; Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by the MIT Press, 1998), 222–23. For an extended discussion 
of the significance of monsters in Bacon’s scientific program and its implications for collapsing the 




directed by a Baconian logic according to which the situation observed is regarded as if it 
possessed the characteristics of an artificially controlled one. Natural experiments are 
indispensable in scientific fields in which it is difficult or impossible to perform 
controlled experiments, for example in astronomy and historical sciences like geology, 
archeology, and (until recently) evolutionary biology—and even in the humanistic 
discipline of history.18 Perhaps the most famous example of the use of this method is Sir 
Arthur Eddington’s measurement of the curvature of starlight during an eclipse, an 
experiment that provided strong corroborating evidence for Einstein’s general theory of 
relativity. (Indeed, natural experiments are as good candidates as any for the status of 
“crucial experiments”.)  
Insofar as such occasions offer the prepared observer an opportunity to draw 
causal inferences from situations beyond her control, they also relieve the experimenter 
of any ethical responsibilities associated with intervening in the system under scrutiny—
or so it would seem. It comes as no surprise, then, that natural experimentation is 
increasingly popular in fields such as econometrics, political science, ecology and 
epidemiology, where intervening directly involves human interests.19 Yet even without 
putting nature on the rack, to return to Bacon’s provocative idiom, this method extends 
indefinitely the transformation of the world into a patchwork of experiments. When 
                                                
18 Jared Diamond and James A. Robinson, eds., Natural Experiments of History, First ed. (Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2010). The advancement of natural experiments as a method of historical study 
text provides additional support for argument about the experimentalization of the world that I make in the 
introduction to this dissertation. 
19 For a discussion of the growing use of found or natural experiements in these fields see e.g. Thad 
Dunning, “Improving Causal Inference,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (June 1, 2008): 282 –293; 
David F. Phillips and Susan C. Halebsky, “The Epidemiology of Found Experiments,” JAMA: The Journal 
of the American Medical Association 273, no. 15 (April 19, 1995): 1221; J. Reiss, “Practice Ahead of 




artworks qua performative experiments show us how we come to see nature as a natural 
experiment, I argue, they also reveal that the transfiguration of nature into a patchwork of 
natural experiments does not leave the concept of nature itself undisturbed.  
Let us consider a controlled experiment to involve, in its barest outlines, an 
inquiry into the causal relationship between two variables, for example, a drug and a 
health outcome.20 The former, the putative cause, may be labeled the independent 
variable, and the latter, the putative effect, the dependent variable. What is required in 
order to establish whether the drug is the cause of patients being cured of a disease is the 
ability to manipulate this and only this causal relation. The possibility of other causal 
connections between the two variables must be ruled out; it must be established, e.g., that 
the mere administration of the drug—the act of manipulation itself—does not affect the 
health outcome directly, as it frequently does in the form of the placebo effect, for 
example.21 Likewise, the drug’s effects must be isolated from other processes that might 
impact the patient’s recovery. If these conditions are met, if the independent variable is 
truly independent and the dependent variable truly dependent, then it becomes possible to 
learn something about how changes to the independent variable affect the dependent 
variable. Under such conditions, a change in the condition of the independent variable 
may be labeled an intervention.  
Intervention is defined much more narrowly here than in the above discussion of 
the Baconian experimentalist tradition. But this definition allows us to isolate the 
conceptual transition point between the vexation of nature and natural experimentation. 
                                                
20 This discussion is based on J. Woodward, “Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences,” The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51, no. 2 (2000): 197–254. 
21 This problem is very serious in clinical trials; see e.g. Irving Kirsch Ph.D, The Emperor’s New Drugs: 
Exploding the Antidepressant Myth, First Trade Paper ed. (Basic Books, 2011). 
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“A causal process that does not involve human beings at any point,” explains James 
Woodward, “will qualify as an intervention as long as it meets [the requisite conditions]. 
Indeed, it is precisely this sort of possibility that one has in mind when one talks about a 
‘natural experiment’.”22 The transfiguration of a situation into a natural experiment takes 
place, therefore, by assigning to various aspects of the situation the statuses of 
intervention, independent and dependent variables. Lest the term intervention mislead us 
into thinking that we are now dealing with another variable or event, Cartwright speaks 
more precisely of variation in the independent variable.23 Variation may be due to human 
actions intended to bring about this particular effect, as in the case of a controlled 
experiment, or inadvertently by human activities not directed toward this end, or by 
entirely natural causes. In the first case, the Baconian notion of intervention converges 
with Woodward’s usage; in the latter cases, the investigator treats unintentional variation 
as (Baconian) intervention. It is in this specific sense that controlled experiments provide 
a model for looking at nature and society. 
 In what follows, I will argue that transforming the world into a collection of 
natural experiments calls into doubt the distinction between art and nature. Just as Tree 
Logic confounds viewers’ understanding of the causal processes that make the trees 
assume the shapes that they do—and thus who or what is responsible for bringing about 
these effects—in regarding natural and social phenomena as loci for natural experiments 
the investigator implicitly assumes a form of quasi responsibility within the situation 
                                                
22 Woodward, “Explanation and Invariance in the Special Sciences,” 201. 
23 For example, if a randomizing event makes it possible to compare the relation between variables in two 
comparable populations, the intervention is the condition of randomization itself, not the event that causes 
randomization. Nancy Cartwright, Hunting causes and using them: Approaches in philosophy and 
economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
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under investigation. It remains to be determined just how far this responsibility extends 
and what implications follow from it, a question that returns us to the moral and 
epistemic anxieties associated with intervening. But first, I want to step back from the 
idea of experiment as intervention and concentrate on scientific models and their role in 
experiments.  
 
II. Models  
Scientific models take an infinite variety of forms: scale models, model 
organisms, mathematical equations, visual renderings of hypothetical entities, 
idealizations and abstractions of every sort. What this diverse array of material, 
mathematical and fictional objects share is the functional role that they play in scientific 
thought and practice. The role that models play in science is similar to that of theories, on 
the one hand, and to instruments, on the other. Like theories, models are representations 
of domains of inquiry. Like instruments, models can be manipulated, often with the aid of 
other apparatus. For my purposes in this chapter it will suffice to generalize Marcel 
Bouman’s succinct definition of an economic model for the cases at hand; accordingly, a 
model may be understood to be “a formal… system taken to provide the key relationships 
between a number of variables.”24 Models are representations that can be manipulated 
physically, in thought, or in silico in order to analyze conditions internal to the formal 
system itself (such as the relationship between a specific subset of the variables 
represented) and to compare the effects on the model to those anticipated by theories 
                                                
24 Marcel Bouman's definition of an economic model as “a formal (mathematically expressed) system taken 
to provide the key relationships between a number of variables” strikes me as apt and sufficiently general to 
capture the way models are understood in a wide variety of nature and human sciences, with the caveat, of 
course, that expression of the formal system is not limited to mathematical expression in many fields. 
Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators, 13. 
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and/or to empirical data about the system that the model represents. As such, I take 
models to constitute the material, mathematical and/or conceptual domain in which 
experiments are performed.25 To experiment, then, is just to intervene on a model system 
in a manner that is directed by a particular set of epistemic goals.  
As Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison have argued, scientific models serve as 
mediators between theories and the parts of the world that those theories are intended to 
represent or explain—or the target system.26 When we manipulate models we learn first 
and foremost about the features of the model itself. The purpose of building models, 
however, is to learn more about systems that are beyond our control or to which we do 
not have physical or epistemic access. In order to do so, we must determine what sorts of 
inferences we are warranted in drawing from the model to the world. The ability to learn 
from models thus depends on correctly comprehending the relation of representation that 
connects models to their target systems.  
As I suggest in the introduction to this dissertation, the artworks I call 
performative experiments can similarly be read as mediators between the philosophy of 
                                                
25 There is a great deal of ambiguity about the relation and the difference between models and experiments. 
Baird treats scientific models as the material counterparts of theories, the loci of a form of practical 
representational knowledge that he calls ‘things knowledge.’ Harré claims that experimentation consists, in 
the most basic sense, in the manipulation of apparatus, a category to which models belong. Focusing on 
economics, Morgan contrasts experiments with models by claiming that experiments do not represent but 
rather ‘replicate’ part of the real world inside the laboratory, whereas models represent the real world 
through an ‘artificial world’ constructed in a different medium (i.e. mathematics, images, or a different 
material). Gooding and Addis defend the view that “experiments can be considered as models of the 
particular aspects of reality they are designed to investigate.” (p.18; emphasis mine) My view comes closest 
to Baird’s when he claims that “[t]he model is an experimental setup for investigating a particular kind of 
technological artifact,”. (p.32) See Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of Scientific Instruments; Rom 
Harré, “The Materiality of Instruments in a Metaphysics for Experiments,” in The Philosophy of Scientific 
Experimentation, ed. Hans Radder (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 19–38; M.S. Morgan, 
“Experiments Versus Models: New Phenomena, Inference and Surprise,” Journal of Economic 
Methodology 12, no. 2 (2005): 317–329; D. C. Gooding and T. R. Addis, “Modelling Experiments as 
Mediating Models,” Foundations of Science 13, no. 1 (January 2008): 17–35.  
26 Morgan and Morrison, Models as Mediators, chap. 1. 
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science and its target system—namely science itself, whether the latter is construed 
normatively or descriptively.27 Like scientific models, the artworks I deploy in my 
investigation magnify certain features of scientific inquiry even as they distort and elide 
others. My interest here lies in what performative experiments as material embodiments 
of our philosophical understand of science can teach us about scientific models.  
Consider the following description of an installation by the artist Stacey Levy, 
titled Seeing the Path of the Wind (1991), an artwork, I argue, that is both a model of a 
natural system and a self-reflexive representation of a scientific model in abstracto 
(Figure 11).28  
 
Figure 11. Stacey Levy, Seeing the Path of the Wind (1991) 
 
Seeing the Path of the Wind replicates the direction and strength of the wind 
across a large field of 1200 flags, each 3' high. Eight fans placed at the cardinal 
points (north, northwest, etc.) around the edges of the circular field are wired to 
a computer that receives signals from a weather station outside. Attached to the 
                                                
27 See my introduction to this dissertation, pages 11-13. 
28 Or to put the matter in Goodman’s terms, I read the artwork both as an instance or sample of the class of 
models and a nonverbal description of a model, similar to a diagram. Goodman suggests that the term 
‘model’ be reserved for nonverbal (as well as non-mathematical) descriptions, a suggestion that Baird 
largely adopts in his discussion of material models in science. While Goodman’s stipulation excludes too 
many scientific models to be adopted generally, it is nonetheless useful for clarifying the symbolic relation 
that models have to their target systems. See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art; an Approach to a Theory 
of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 170–73; Baird, Thing Knowledge: A Philosophy of 
Scientific Instruments, chap. 2. Models: Representing Things. 
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roof of a building across a courtyard from the gallery, the weather station is 
visible from inside. The viewer can watch the whirling anemometer and see that 
information translated across the rippling organza flags, which, in their height 
and massing, recall a field of Queen Ann's Lace....  
 
On calm days, the fans blow softly from the west to create gentle 
undulations across the flags, but on a stormy day, complex patterns emerge with 
quickly shifting winds…. With repeated viewing, visitors could learn to read the 
flags for signs of changes in the weather. This knowledge could then be applied 
to a field of Queen Anne's Lace like that which inspired the installation in the 
first place.29 
 
In stark contrast to Tree Logic and its disconcerting aesthetic, Seeing the Path of 
the Wind offers a mesmerizing evocation of nature in its normal course. The field of 
fluttering translucent flags keeps the viewer’s eyes in continuous, yet irregular motion, 
sustaining constant attention without demanding concentration—a state that may be 
restful, exciting or merely boring, depending on the weather. Occupying almost the 
entirety one of MassMOCA’s vast industrial gallery spaces, the installation leaves 
visitors only a little bit of room to walk around its perimeter. The system is in motion 
when one enters the gallery and continues indifferently once one leaves the space. These 
features position the viewer as an observer of an autonomous system, one that shares 
certain formal features with natural phenomena—the height and distribution of the flags 
and their patterns of movement in the air currents—but is itself clearly a work of artifice, 
separate from that which it loosely resembles. As such, it raises no worries about 
disturbing nature. Rather, it is nature—in the form of data translated from an instrument 
that passively registers the weather outside the gallery—that intervenes in the artwork 
qua model system. This element, in combination with the formal similarity between the 
                                                
29 Laura Steward Heon and John Ackerman, eds., Unnatural Science: An Exhibition (North Adams, MA: 
Mass MoCa Publications, 2000), 71. 
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flag field and a field of flowers, forms the point of extrapolation from- and inference to- 
what takes place in nature itself. 
Three features of this artwork are especially salient for my analysis. Each 
illuminates the manner in which scientific models are used in experimental science 
generally and, more importantly, the way models inform natural experiments. Firstly, 
Seeing the Path of the Wind invites us to consider what happens when a natural 
phenomenon is reconstructed in a model; how does the model simplify, idealize, isolate 
or caricature the phenomenon it represents? Secondly, the artwork presents an exercise in 
seeing nature as or through the model, and thus engages the question, how do we apply 
what we learn through use of the model to the original system upon which it is based? 
Thirdly, it forces us to consider a feature of models that have garnered limited attention in 
the philosophy of science, namely the manner in which models focus and direct aesthetic 
attention. It is this last consideration that provides the clue to answering the question: 
what is Seeing the Path of the Wind really a model of?  
In the foregoing chapter, I analyzed how scientific instruments become stabilized 
and therefore transparent in relation to the concepts and materials that they are used to 
investigate. There, I relied implicitly upon Rom Harré’s taxonomy of scientific apparatus, 
which he divides into the two broad families of instruments and models.30 He reserves the 
term ‘instrument’ for devices that are detached from the world, in the sense that they are 
causally affected by the part of the world that they index without in turn affecting it—
devices like the anemometer stationed on the roof of the museum, which registers and 
                                                
30 Because Harre focuses on the materiality of apparatus his account of models is limited; nonetheless the 
relation of analogy that material models have with natural systems is comparable to that of mathematical, 
conceptual and digital models. See Hans Radder, ed., “The Materiality of Instruments in a Metaphysics for 
Experiments,” in The philosophy of scientific experimentation (University of Pittsburgh Pre, 2003), 19-38. 
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records the path of the wind. Models, by contrast, are systems that are embedded in the 
world and bear a relation of analogy to other systems, as does a mouse model of a human 
disease to humans afflicted by the same disease, for example. Harré further divides the 
genus of models into what he calls domesticated versions of natural systems, which 
reproduce systems that are found in nature, and Bohrian apparatus/world complexes, 
which are apparatus that generate phenomena that do not occur in nature in the absence 
of human intervention. I discuss this second species of model elsewhere; for the moment 
I want to focus on domesticated versions of natural systems, of which Seeing the Path of 
the Wind offers an illustrative, if somewhat unruly example.  
The metaphor of domestication is useful for thinking about the reconstruction of a 
natural phenomenon in a model because it captures many of the conceptual operations at 
work in the heterogeneous practice of modeling. “The laboratory,” Harré writes, “is like a 
farm. It is like neither an art gallery nor a zoo—neither wholly artifactual nor wholly 
wild. The material setup has been tamed, rather than represented or caged.”31 As 
compared to their “feral” counterparts in the wild, the domesticated versions of nature 
that we deal with in the laboratory are “simpler, more regular, and more manipulable.”32 
Models are frequently described as simplified, idealized, caricatured or isolated versions 
of natural systems. What the idea of domestication foregrounds is that these qualities are 
valued because they make it possible to manipulate models in ways that we cannot—or 
                                                
31 Rom Harré, “Recovering the Experiment,” Philosophy 73, no. 285 (July 1998): 368. 
32 Harré, “The Materiality of Instruments in a Metaphysics for Experiments,” 27. 
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ought not—manipulate their targets.33 When models are designed for use as experimental 
apparatus, the criterion of manipulability sets the standards for representation. 
Domesticated versions of natural systems are tractable versions of wild systems, 
for example, colonies of genetically identical drosophila or the Theodoric model of a 
rainbow, in which the refraction of light through a spherical glass vessel filled with water 
stands in for the effects of sunlight on a single raindrop. A defining characteristic of this 
type of model is that they are made of the same kind of ‘stuff’ as that which they 
represent, a feature, Harré argues, that supports especially strong back inferences from 
the model to the world.34 But what counts as ‘the same kind of stuff’? As Wendy Parker 
has argued, what is important is less material identity in and of itself than relevant 
similarity.35 In regard to the construction of models of all sorts, research priorities 
determine which aspects of the world need to be represented in the model, and how. They 
tell us whether to strip away features of the actual situation that may distract us from the 
problem at hand (Aristotelian idealization) or to distort the target system so that we can 
resolve complex problems into simpler and more manageable parts (Galilean 
idealization). With respect to domesticated versions of natural systems, research priorities 
determine what kind of material, biological, social, and environmental ‘stuff’ the model 
                                                
33 Moreover, what counts as simple, ideal, distorted or isolated often depends upon our investigative 
priorities and therefore which aspects of the system we want to be able to manipulate. 
34 Morgan endorses this position and builds upon it in order to distinguish experiments from models; she 
argues that experiments are material replications while models are artificial representations of their target 
systems. In the context of economics, this means conducting experiments using real people and real 
incentives, for example, as contrasted with performing calculations using mathematical models that rely on 
abstractions like that of the perfectly rational agent. See Morgan, “Experiments Versus Models.”  
35 W.S. Parker, “Does Matter Really Matter? Computer Simulations, Experiments, and Materiality,” 
Synthese 169, no. 3 (2009): 483–496. 
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needs to share with the target system in order for the model to be used to answer 
particular questions. 
What, then, does Seeing the Path of the Wind share with a field of Queen Ann’s 
Lace blowing in the wind, such that it might be considered a domesticated version of a 
natural system? Here we return to the question, what is this artwork a model of? 
Depending upon the uses to which it might be put in a scientific context, various features 
might have been selected for representation in the plastic and silk model: the flexibility of 
the plants’ stems, the weight of the heads of flowers, the size and density of leaves—all 
features that moderate how the plants move in response to the airflow. The model might 
have been built so that the fans’ speed, strength and direction could be more precisely 
controlled. Live plants could have been planted in orderly rows inside the controlled 
environment of the art gallery, or the same set of flags could have been installed 
outdoors. Whether motivated by aesthetic or scientific priorities, decisions made in the 
process of building a model have the effect of retrospectively picking out what belongs to 
the “original” phenomenon upon which the representation is based. If Seeing the Path of 
the Wind is a model of a field of Queen Ann’s Lace then it is not a domesticated version 
of a natural system because it is not made out of the same material. But if it is a model of 
the path of the wind through common air and the flowers or flags serve simply make that 
path visible, then the live data feed and the controlled airflow do in fact transform the 
gallery space into a simplified, more orderly and more manipulable version of the wild 
phenomenon. But I want to countenance yet a third possibility, namely that Seeing the 
Path of the Wind is, first and foremost, a model of the perceptual experience of seeing the 
path of the wind and ordering it cognitively.  
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Returning to the central theme of this chapter, let us mark the translation of some 
fragment of the real world into a model as the first phase of the transformation of the 
world into the site of a natural experiment. Moving from the world to a model involves 
an imposition of boundaries on the target system as a system, a part of the world that is 
internally coherent and interrelated, not merely physically contiguous. Neither material 
similarity nor formal similarity is adequate to determine which aspects of the world 
should be built into a model, or conversely, which aspect of the world the model 
represents. Yet, Susan Sterrett explains, “How a system ought to be characterized is 
generally not entirely a matter of choice or convention.” In other words, it is not just a 
matter of habitual seeing-as. Rather, “It depends upon the behavior of interest, i.e., which 
behavior one wishes to draw inferences about may put some constraints on what counts 
as a system for the purposes of making inferences about that kind of behavior, and may 
rule out others as insufficiently inclusive.”36 Modeling involves valorizing certain 
features of that system and deemphasizing others. The latitude for decision making in this 
arena is such that it is common for scientists to employ numerous and not necessarily 
commensurable models of the same target. From this fact the question arises, in what 
sense can heterogeneous models be considered models of the same system? And from it 
follows the a slate of well-known worries about how knowledge gathered through use of 
models and the experiments performed with them applies to the undomesticated world 
outside of the gates of the farm.  
Natural experiments would seem to present one solution to these problems. In 
them, the criteria of material identity and relevant similarity converge, and however rare 
                                                
36 S. Sterrett, “Abstracting Matter” (2009). 
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or strange are the circumstances that permit of natural experiments, they have the great 
advantage of being real, even with all of the messiness and complexity that that entails. 
What matters here is what one actual situation can tell us about others that are similar in 
certain relevant respects. But how to we learn to find such situations? Here, I argue, we 
must make recourse to habits of cognition and perception in which we are trained by 
scientific models. A model system, Mary Morgan explains “is one that we see with in a 
double way—we both see the world through it and we see our experiences in it: it 
converts our experiments into life experiences.”37 Coming to see the world through a 
model is the second phase of the transformation of the world into the site of natural 
experiments. When we construct a model, we prepare a version of a natural system in 
which selected properties, causal relations, and variations of the sort that can be exploited 
as natural experimental interventions are well marked. Scientific models thus functions as 
a kind of map or diagram for locating comparable systems in the wild. This is what is 
meant by the claim that “with repeated viewing, visitors could learn to read the flags for 
signs of changes in the weather. This knowledge could then be applied to a field of Queen 
Anne’s Lace….” We do not learn anything in particular about weather, wind, flags or 
flowers from Seeing the Path of the Wind. Rather, we learn about patterns that occur in 
systems that are formally similar to this model. As this artwork demonstrates, models 
accomplish an adequate mimetic relation not necessarily when they visually resemble 
nature, but when they teach the audience to see in nature the same types of entities and 
causal relations that are made to manifest themselves explicitly in the laboratory.  
                                                
37 Angela H. N. Creager, Elizabeth Lunbeck, and M. Norton Wise, eds., Science Without Laws: Model 
Systems, Cases, Exemplary Narratives (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2007), 269. 
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Before nature can become the site of a natural experiment, then, it must become a 
natural model. Although little discussed in philosophy, the concept of a natural model is 
widely used in scientific literature to refer to naturally occurring systems that mimic other 
systems that are targets of investigation. Natural models are offered as more accurate or 
complete representations of their target systems than the available alternatives because 
they are often better at capturing complexity than the models we build. A random 
sampling of the literature returns examples of spontaneously occurring physiological 
conditions that are similar in animals and humans, a biochemical pathway that is nearly 
identical in the chick embryo and the human brain, and the experimental exploitation of a 
random genetic mutation in a single individual to study the effects of estrogen deficiency 
on human male psycho-sexual disposition.38 In each of these cases, establishing the 
validity of the natural model is prerequisite to the use of that model as a domain in which 
to observe the natural history of a disease process (or other phenomenon) or to conduct 
experiments by intervening in that process.  
Natural models do not imply natural experiments; on the contrary, they are 
typically used for purposes of conventional experimentation, in which an intervention (or 
variation in the independent variable) is brought about intentionally by human action. 
However natural experiments do presuppose natural models. Implicit in the idea that the 
results of a natural experiment can be extrapolated from one situation to another is the 
assumption that the situation in which the (nonhuman) intervention occurs is similar in 
relevant ways to those other situations. Prior to the performance of a natural experiment, 
                                                
38 See JC Hendricks et al., “The English bulldog: a natural model of sleep-disordered breathing,” Journal of 
Applied physiology 63, no. 4 (1987): 1344–1350; Manuel Sarasa and Pedro Pesini, “Natural Non-Trasgenic 
Animal Models for Research in Alzheimer’s Disease,” Current Alzheimer Research 6, no. 2 (April 2009): 
171-178; C. Carani et al., “Role of oestrogen in male sexual behaviour: insights from the natural model of 
aromatase deficiency,” Clinical endocrinology 51, no. 4 (1999): 517–524. 
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there is no reason that any situation should be taken for a model of any other. Rather, the 
natural experiment performatively confers exemplarity upon one situation with respect to 
others by treating the former as a natural model and the latter as target systems.39  
Just as it is possible to apply the epistemic logic of experiment qua intervention to 
situations not brought about through human agency, we can apply the logic of models to 
situations that are not contrived to represent something else. Seeing the Path of the Wind 
teaches us to attend to the patterns created by wind as it moves through a system with a 
certain limited range of properties. If such a system is found outside in the wild, indeed if 
it is found anywhere except a climate controlled environment like an art museum or a 
scientific laboratory, then these patterns might be interpreted as signs of changes in the 
weather. But in order for one system to function as a model of another, we need to know 
which features of each to attend to and which ones to ignore.40 Here is where aesthetic 
theory becomes crucial to my analysis. In the next section, therefore, I recast my 
discussion of Seeing the Path of the Wind and Tree Logic in aesthetic terms and thereby 
return to the question of how models and experiments focus aesthetic attention.  
 
III. Parergra  
                                                
39 Establishing that one situation, system or group can be treated as a model of another is by no means 
unproblematic. In the context of political science, Jasjeet S. Sekhon and Rocio Titiunik have recently 
pointed out that methodological problems arise when “[t]he groups that the researcher wishes to compare 
are not the groups that the intervention guarantees to be comparable, or the groups that the intervention 
guarantees to be comparable are not the groups that are informative about the effect of interest.” J.S. 
Sekhon and R. Titiunik, “When Natural Experiments Are Neither Natural Nor Experiments,” American 
Political Science Review, no. February (2012): 19. 
40 Or to put the matter in Mary Hesse’s terms, we need to be aware of the analogies and the disanalogies 
between the two systems, and attentive to features about which we don’t yet know whether they are 
analogous or not, the neutral analogies. Mary B. Hesse, Models and Analogies in Science (University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1966). 
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Jacques Derrida calls our attention to a little-discussed passage in Kant’s Critique 
of Judgment.41 The passage comes in the middle of the third moment of the Analytic of 
the Beautiful, the moment of relation, from which Kant derives the following definition: 
“Beauty is the form of finality in an object, so far as perceived in it apart from the 
representation of an end.”42 At this point in the text we have already learned that a 
representation that keeps the faculties of cognition in a state of free play without 
resolving into a concept pleases universally (the lesson of the second moment), and that 
to take pleasure in such a state we must pass judgment on the object of representation 
without taking moral or sensual interest in its real existence (the lesson of the first 
moment). The third moment of the beautiful brings these two conditions together and 
allows us to isolate the feeling of causality that attends the activity of conceptualization 
as the locus of pleasure in the contemplation of the beautiful. When we experience this 
feeling of causality without bringing the process of conceptual determination to 
completion, we experience what Kant calls the finality or purposiveness of a concept with 
respect to its object, or the capacity of the concept to bring about its object as a 
phenomenon—an object that is intelligible to us. “We dwell on the contemplation of the 
beautiful,” Kant writes, “because this contemplation strengthens and reproduces itself,” 
in contrast to the normal state of affairs in which contemplation rapidly achieves its aim 
and affords only a vanishing opportunity for pleasure.43 But here there arise a number of 
complications, which Kant aims to resolve by means of examples. As is often the case 
                                                
41 Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
42 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952), 80 (236). [Paragraph numbers given in parentheses.]  
43 Ibid., 64 (222). 
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with Kant’s use of examples, however, this effort at clarification betrays a deeper 
problem. What Derrida exposes is that the question of what counts as the proper object of 
aesthetic contemplation, and thus of a pure aesthetic judgment, is irreducibly dependent 
upon a determination of what is extrinsic to that object—an object that sustains pleasure 
only insofar as it remains indeterminate.  
  This paradox comes to a head in the following passage, in which Kant seeks to 
distinguish that which appeals to the senses or emotions from that which pleases purely 
on account of its form: 
“Even what is called ornamentation (parergra), i.e. what is only an adjunct, and 
not an intrinsic constituent in the complete representation of the object, in 
augmenting the delight of taste does so only by means of its form. Thus it is with 
frames of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces. But if 
the ornamentation does not itself enter into the composition of the beautiful 
form—if it is introduced like a gold frame merely to win approval for the picture 
by means of its charm—it is called finery and takes away from the genuine 
beauty.”44 
 
Insofar as one can easily spot a gaudy frame, Kant’s consternation is well placed. 
More perplexing is what constitutes good ornamentation or parergra. A clue is provided 
a few paragraphs earlier, when, after going to great lengths to distinguish charm from 
beauty, Kant permits charm a very nominal role in promoting the appreciation of beauty. 
Though charm cannot actually enhance beauty, “charms may be added to beauty to lend 
to the mind, beyond a bare delight, an adventitious interest in the representation of the 
object, and thus to advocate taste and its cultivation.” Lest we mistake the role of charm 
as anything more than an incentive for more austere pleasures, he continues, “[t]his 
                                                
44 Ibid., 68 (226). 
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applies especially where taste is as yet crude and untrained.”45 This makes it all the more 
puzzling to understand how ornamentation might please ‘by means of its form’ or how an 
exterior frame might ‘itself enter into the composition of the beautiful form.’ How can 
ornamentation remain outside the object and enter into its form at the same time?  
By applying pressure to this small fissure in Kant’s argument, Derrida opens up 
the concept of the parergon as an underlying problematic of the entire third Critique. If 
parergra must not be crudely introduced (angebracht: ‘fixed on’) to the objects that they 
frame, edge or border, Derrida argues, they must instead be connected to those objects 
via an internal logic, indeed a relation of necessity. “The parergon inscribes something 
which comes as an extra, exterior to the proper field...” he explains, “but whose 
transcendent exteriority comes to play, abut onto, brush against, rub, press against the 
limit itself and intervene in the inside only to the extent that the inside is lacking.”46 A 
parergon that does not detract from the object that it frames or decorates must be ‘held in 
place,’ as it were, by a lack in the beautiful object itself. “It [must be] lacking in 
something and it is lacking from itself,” he continues. Otherwise, the frame will appear to 
have been tacked on, to be superfluous and excessive. Kant offers just one suggestive 
example of how parergra might be expected to perform their function in a brief comment 
on how colors and tones “seem to contribute to beauty,” though, he insists they are 
nothing more than agreeable in themselves. “The real meaning [of this mistaken view] is 
that they [tones and colors] make this form more clearly, definitely and completely 
intuitable, and besides stimulate the representation by their charm, as they excite and 
                                                
45 Ibid., 67 (225). 
46 Derrida, The Truth in Painting, 56. 
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sustain the attention directed to the object itself.”47 This helps us to see how the 
exteriority of the parergon might be said to arise from something interior to the proper 
object of aesthetic judgment. The purpose of the frame is to excite and sustain precisely 
directed attention, not attention to the beautiful object in its physical entirety but rather 
attention only to those aspects of the spatio-temporal object that set the cognitive 
faculties into play—in short, to its form. We might imagine the form of the beautiful 
object as exerting a sort of gravitational pull, such that the ornamentation hardens around 
the edges of its form and heightens its visibility. The parergon thus marks the boundary 
of the object—a painting, a sculpture, a work of architecture or music—in a way that 
makes that boundary seem less arbitrary, less artificial than it truly is.  
 Derrida’s project is to deconstruct this relation between the parergon and that 
which it frames and thus to trouble the notion that a precise line can be drawn, even in 
principle, between the inside and the outside of a beautiful object. On this turns the very 
possibility of making a pure judgment of taste—a judgment that is not infused with the 
seduction of the agreeable, the constraints of a concept or a telos. My primary interest, 
however, is in the clarification that Derrida’s analysis gives to the idea of the parergon as 
a substantive conceptual and material counterpart to the beautiful object, even if it is one 
that ultimately cannot be disarticulated there-from. While a frame can be physically 
detached from a picture, the parergon that supports pure aesthetic contemplation cannot 
be so detached. It forms a seemingly natural boundary—and its naturalness is the 
measure of its efficacy. Without going so far as to liken it to an animal’s skin, Derrida 
describes a parergon as a self-protective covering; “[f]raming always supports and 
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contains that which, by itself, collapses forthwith.”48 In the examples Kant gives, the 
supporting and containing function of the frame is much harder to discern than the perils 
of excess and finery. We can readily imagine a frame that overshadows or competes with 
its content, but the problem of a statue that is insufficiently supported is far less obvious. 
Perhaps this is because, even if we can also follow Derrida in problematizing where the 
artwork ends and its material support begins, our discussion is thus far confined to the 
kinds of artworks that are bounded physical objects. But if we ask what remains extrinsic 
and what belongs to artworks like Tree Logic and Seeing the Path of the Wind, which 
I’ve been discussing in this chapter, the task of determining the proper object of aesthetic 
contemplation becomes much more difficult. To do so, one needs to work from the inside 
out—to find the focal point of the work’s form and then to locate what in its total 
presentation serves to excite and sustain attention towards that form. 
 
IV. Nomological Machines 
 Let us first consider Seeing the Path of the Wind before returning to the more 
complicated case of Tree Logic. I have argued above that Seeing the Path of the Wind 
may be construed as a scientific model. We are now in a position to answer the question, 
what is this artwork a model of? The installation includes many different elements: in 
addition to the field of flags there are the fans inside the gallery and the anonemeter 
outside, and somewhere there is a computer system that controls the direction of the fans. 
There are also the walls and windows of the gallery and the areas marked off for visitors, 
and then there are the sounds—the constant whirring of the electrical system, the shifting 
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sound of blowing air, and the soft rustle of the flags in the wind. The title of the work and 
the structure of the installation together mark out one among many possible ways of 
orienting one’s aesthetic attention in this field of possibilities, selectively focusing our 
attention on the visible path of the wind. It assigns less relevance to other properties of 
the situation, like the lighting and the acoustic properties of the gallery, properties that 
may be important when other artworks are exhibited in the same space. As such, the work 
promotes certain kinds of aesthetic attention to the exclusion of others.  
I also proposed that Seeing the Path of the Wind is both a model of a phenomenon 
and a model of a scientific model. Reading the work as a model of a phenomenon 
suggests that the proper object of aesthetic attention is the way the installation registers 
the path of the wind and makes it visible. Considered this way, the walls and windows of 
the gallery and the carefully demarcated edges of the flag field might be considered its 
parergra. They literally bound the work, but more importantly, they shield and insulate 
the work from other sources of stimulation. The windy field thus assumes the semblance 
of being independent and self-contained even though it is not literally so. Although the 
museum’s enormous exhibition spaces and natural light attract great admiration, here 
they melt into the background, allowing the work itself to spring into the spotlight.  
If we take this work also as an abstract model of a scientific model then 
appreciating the role of the parergra is crucial. What is modeled here, then, is the mode 
of attention that scientific models require—a mode of attention that relies upon tacit 
awareness of the ragged edges of both model system and the target system. What we 
learn how to do by looking at this artwork is first to impose a frame around the work such 
that a phenomenon becomes visible, and, secondly, to export that frame to other similar 
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systems, including that upon which the work is based. The ability to frame a situation in 
such a manner as to stimulate and focus attention on a particular form is what enables us 
to transfigure messy natural phenomena into natural models. So we may read this work 
not only as a model of a field of Queen Anne’s Lace but also as a model for treating a 
field of Queen Anne’s Lace as a model of itself, on which are marked its own formal 
properties and key relationships.  
 Tree Logic performs the same epistemic operation by opposite aesthetic means. 
Seeing the Path of the Wind magnifies and intensifies subtle patterns in an artificial 
system and trains us to recognize similar patterns in natural systems, and moreover, to 
read those patterns as indicators of oncoming weather. Tree Logic also isolates and 
intensifies natural phenomena, but it does so by making that those phenomena appear in a 
way that is add odds with the way they typically manifest in the natural world. Forced out 
of their normal course, the twisted trees motivate a search for the cause of their 
monstrous appearance. Whereas Seeing the Path of the Wind simply represents a natural 
system, Tree Logic shows what happens to a model system when there is an intervention. 
The model upon which this experiment is performed is the garden variety Maple tree. 
The intervention consists in varying features of the trees’ environment. Although what 
first arrests attention about this work is the shape of the trees themselves, as we move 
from this focal point of the work to the conditions that stabilize it, our attention is 
directed towards the parergra. But because the search is motivated by displeasure, the 
frame becomes all too conspicuous. For me methodologically, this is the work’s most 
important formal feature. 
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 In order to see what is at stake when the frame lacks charm, so to speak, consider 
that absent from both Kant and Derrida’s discussion is any mention of parergra adorning 
objects of natural beauty—which, for Kant, is the highest form of beauty, to which art 
can only aspire. Natural beauties have no need for frames, for it is the very definition of 
beauty that the artwork appears as if it had been created just for the entertainment of our 
faculties of cognition. Implicitly, natural beauties seem as if they had been perfectly 
created for a telos by an omnipotent being, and yet in our enjoyment of natural beauty we 
contemplate such things without reference to an end. Even in its purely aesthetic 
presentation, the compatibility of the object of natural beauty with a telos suggests that 
the object’s boundaries or limits arise entirely and necessarily from within itself. 
Conceived under the regulative idea of teleology, the natural object has no constitutive 
outside; the turtle’s shell is not angebracht. So when Tree Logic forces us to look askance 
at the trees’ morphology, it asks us to look outside of the plants themselves to see what 
sustains them. Our gaze is led first to the truss, which keeps them elevated high above the 
ground, and to the steel planters to which their roots are forced to conform. These parts of 
the artwork literally frame the trees, and were we to view them as static objects—as 
sculpture—then this might be the end of our search for parergra. But in order to 
comprehend the dynamic growth pattern that the trees display, we are led to take account 
of the position of the sun and pull of gravity, omnipresent conditions of the trees’ 
environment. If we take account of these conditions, our attention is finally directed to 
the focal point of the work or its form, which is not the shape of the trees but rather the 
pattern of orderly behavior that they make intelligible. 
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 Performing a natural experiment involves projecting a frame onto the world, one 
that allows us to pick out from amidst the messy hodgepodge of things a ‘fixed enough 
arrangement of components with stable enough capacities and the right sort of 
environment.’ When we find such an arrangement ready-made by the hand of nature we 
are relieved of the worry that the regular behaviors that we observe obtain only as a 
consequence of our own actions.49 Consequently, we can be confident that the concepts 
and generalizations that we devise to describe those behaviors apply to the world itself, 
and not only to our representations or models thereof. What remains uncertain is just how 
pervasive those real conditions are—or how universal are the nomological machines that 
we can find. Cartwright takes orderliness, or lack thereof, to be inherent in the 
metaphysics of the world itself. However it has been objected—I think rightly—that the 
concept of a nomological machine is better construed pragmatically, in relation to our 
epistemic and practical goals. Stéphanie Ruphy has argued that “for a system, being a 
nomological machine depends on what kind of questions you ask about it, in the sense 
that it depends on the degree of precision and the degree of certainty being sought.”50 
Conducting natural experiments consists precisely in asking the kinds of questions that 
can pick nomological machines out of the jumbled world of material things.  
  What I mean to suggest, then, is that Tree Logic, in calling attention to its own 
overly conspicuous frame, discloses at the same time a very simple and familiar 
                                                
49 Another way of putting this is that there is a trade-off between internal and external validity; controlled 
experiments generally have higher degrees of internal validity because they warrant deductive inferences; 
natural experiments and other hybrid methods often sacrifice internal validity for external validity, meaning 
that they warrant stronger inferences beyond the experimental context. The trade-off is described clearly in 
relation to clinical trials in N. Cartwright, “Are RCTs the Gold Standard?,” Biosocieties 2, no. 1 (2007): 
11–20. 
50 S. Ruphy, “Is the World Really ‘Dappled’? A Response to Cartwright’s Charge Against ‘Cross-Wise 
Reduction’,” Philosophy of Science 70, no. 1 (2003): 62. 
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nomological machine: just those conditions that—ceteris paribus—cause trees to grow 
straight upward and their roots to grown down into the earth. This prepares us to take 
notice of certain homologous features in the concept of the parergon and that of a 
nomological machine.  An important part of any nomological machine is its shielding 
conditions; no system or space is completely isolated, but it must be insulated or shielded 
from the relevant features of the larger environment. For constructed systems, like a 
solution in a test tube, shielding is a matter of careful design and construction as well as 
careful use and maintenance, for example, maintaining a sterile environment. In systems 
that are ubiquitous, the relevant features can be harder to identify: “Sometimes for 
instance the whole situation is treated as one simple machine (like the lever), where the 
shielding conditions and the idea of repeated operation are so transparent that they go 
unnoted.”51 When they are operative, shielding conditions, like scientific instruments, 
become transparent and thus invisible; they tend to go unnoticed until they break down. 
Cartwright notes that scientific laws and concepts tend to obscure the ceteris paribus 
conditions which must be present in order for them to hold true: “Contrary to strict 
empiricist demands, the concepts of physics generally do not pick out independently 
identifiable or measurable properties. Its concepts, rather, build in – and thus cover up – 
the whole apparatus necessary to get a nomological machine to work properly: the 
arrangement of parts, the shielding and whatever it takes to set the machine running.”52 
By contrast, as a performative experiment Tree Logic makes shielding conditions visible 
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52 Ibid., 152. 
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through the aesthetic response it provokes, thereby magnifying a crucial formal feature of 
the experimental domain. 
Although the objects of their analyses are divergent, Derrida's and Cartwright's 
arguments have a shared logic: the proper object of judgment, be it an artwork, an 
architectural structure, or a natural regularity, exists as such only in relation to a specific 
set of conditions, conditions that form the constitutive exterior of the object itself. Like 
the ceteris paribus conditions that bound a nomological machine, “the parergon is a form 
which has as its traditional determination not that it stands out but that it disappears, 
buries itself, effaces itself, melts away at the moment that it deploys its greatest 
energy.”53 Thus in the aesthetics of experiment, ceteris paribus conditions frame the 
proper object of aesthetic judgment, the regularity that appears therein, precisely by 
disappearing. Like the frame, ceteris paribus conditions deploy their greatest energy by 
causing the phenomena disclosed by experiment to appear universal and independent of 
human interventions and contingencies. In aesthetic judgment, the frame should support 
the work in appearing autonomous, complete, and independent. In the same way, the 
disappearance of ceteris paribus conditions, along with instruments, labor, conceptual 
instability, and other conditions, is what enables an entity or effect that emerges within a 
nomological machine to appear natural, or as though these enabling conditions were 
internal to the phenomenon itself. The transparency of the frame is the condition of the 
appearance of nature as natural. Thus Cartwright's imperative to recognize the ceteris 
paribus conditions under which law-like regularities arise may be reinterpreted as an 
aesthetic imperative to recognize how nature is framed and disclosed by experiments—
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both artificial and natural. And in doing so, it becomes evident that without in the least 
subjecting nature to the vexations of art, to project a frame onto the world is to transform 
that world into one in which new epistemic and practical operations become possible.54 
Framing a patch of nature as a natural model or a natural experiment mobilizes it into a 
world of interpreted things. 
 
V.  
Drawing together the themes of this chapter, I propose a simple thought 
experiment: let us imagine a framed picture of a mountain vista in which a tree clings for 
its life to the underside of an outcropped rock. Or better, imagine taking notice of this 
small detail in a nineteenth-century landscape painting or an Ansel Adams photograph of 
untrammeled American wilderness. Is this image—and the fragment of the world that it 
represents—changed by the significance that our acquaintance with Tree Logic confers 
upon this otherwise unremarkable detail?  
My claim is that not only the hypothetical artwork but also the world itself is 
altered upon being enrolled into the experimental system whose bounds Tree Logic 
demarcates aesthetically. To see why this is so, consider Nelson Goodman’s explanation 
as to why, even if we cannot tell two works of art apart merely by looking at them, it 
nonetheless makes an aesthetic difference if one of those artworks of art is authentic and 
the other is a forgery.55 Although the two artworks might look the same, the knowledge 
                                                
54 I do not have the space to develop this complex idea here, but I take this to come close to Rouse’s 
meaning when he argues that nature, as disclosed by the sciences, is always already normatively 
constituted. J. Rouse, How Scientific Practices Matter: Reclaiming Philosophical Naturalism (University 
of Chicago Press, 2002). 
55 Goodman, Languages of Art; an Approach to a Theory of Symbols, chap. 3. 
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that one of them is a fake “instructs me to look at the two pictures differently,” Goodman 
notes, and once we learn to look differently, it becomes very likely that we will come to 
notice differences that were there all along.56 Once we learn to discriminate between the 
pictures, we develop the ability to project what we have learned about their styles, their 
materials, or other significant details, onto other pictures that we may encounter in the 
future. Returning to my hypothetical example, once we have learned to take notice of the 
upturned tree in the picture or in the world and interpret its significance, we have 
acquired in the process the ability to project a frame onto the world in all comparable 
situations. In short, we have learned how to transfigure a patch of the world into a 
nomological machine—and once we have done so, we cannot but organize our 
perceptions, our knowledge, and our actions in a manner that takes account of the regular 
behaviors disclosed therein.  
                                                







In their study of the historical development of objectivity as the crowning epistemic 
virtue of the natural sciences, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison argue that “the 
emergence of scientific objectivity in the mid-nineteenth century necessarily goes hand in 
glove with the emergence of scientific subjectivity.”1 From at least the seventeenth 
century until the emergence of objectivity in the nineteenth century, they argue, scientists 
and naturalists operated under the epistemic paradigm of “truth-to-nature.” Naturalists 
sought to identify, and, with the aid of artist-illustrators, to portray, the ideal types 
underlying the many varied and imperfect tokens of natural phenomena. With the 
introduction of mechanical techniques of image production and reproduction, the 
passively receptive machine replaced the discriminating eye and trained mind of the 
naturalist as the ideal model of scientific subjectivity. Through the most laborious 
exercises of self-surveillance and control, those who embraced the epistemic virtue that 
Daston and Galison term “mechanical objectivity” cultivated the ability to resist “...the 
temptations of aesthetics, the lure of seductive theories, the desire to schematize, 
beautify, simplify—in short, the very ideals that had guided the creation of truth-to-nature 
images.”2 The period of epistemic upheaval in which truth-to-nature was largely (though 
by no means entirely) superseded by mechanical objectivity was one in which the most 
heightened awareness of the observer, the experimenter, and/or the theorist, emerged as 
an essential complement to the production of both objective knowledge. Mechanical 
                                                
1 Daston and Galison, Objectivity, 197. 
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objectivity could only be practiced by objective subjects.  
If this subject is absent from most contemporary accounts of science, it is perhaps 
because this historically specific form of the scientific self has become as reliable and 
transparent to philosophers of science as instruments become to their users. As we have 
seen in the foregoing chapters, performative experiments tend to engage emotions, bodies 
and affects in a manner that is tension with the ethos of cool disinterest demanded by 
both objectivity and a certain standard of taste.3 In order to see what is at stake in thus 
exposing the scientific self, it will be useful to consider more closely how the antagonism 
between subjectivity and objectivity is intensified in the context of experiment.  
According to the "received view," experiment contributes to the production of 
objective knowledge by acting as the ‘handmaiden of theory.’ Just as mechanical 
apparatus serve to correct vision, experiments serve as correctives to thought by 
circumscribing scientists' tendencies to project their theories, intuitions, expectations and 
desires onto nature. Long before philosophers turned their attention to experimentation in 
the 1980s, the sharp division between theory and observation was challenged by Pierre 
Duhem and W.V.O. Quine, who argued that theories are underdetermined by observation, 
and Norwood Hansen and Thomas Kuhn, who argued that observations are irreducibly 
theory-laden. We might now say that the old problem of the theory-laden-ness of 
                                                
3 Although the objectivity of science is routinely contrasted to the subjectivity of both artistic creation and 
aesthetic response, within aesthetic theory the significance of subjectivity is a matter intense debate. 
Eighteenth century aesthetic theorists attempted to resolve the paradox of taste that arises from the equally 
prevalent convictions that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder, ” on the one hand, and that some artworks 
and natural objects are unquestionably superior to others in beauty, sublimity, and other aesthetic qualities, 
on the other. Aesthetic responses are exemplary and particular, and yet they claim universally validity, 
according to Kant; they are historically and culturally specific, and yet they should stand the test of time, 
according to Hume. Aesthetic response usually falls short of, but occasionally exceeds objectivity in its 
capacity to discern truth, as in those rare occasions when truth appears in the guise of beauty. At the same 
time, the problem of the purification of aesthetic judgment holds many parallels with the problem of 
eliminating the subject from objective knowledge. 
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observation has as its experimental counterpart the problem of distinguishing artifacts 
from genuine data. The worry here is not that the theorist projects her categories, 
assumptions and commitments onto the experimental data but rather that the 
experimentalist builds into the data traces of her own physical activities, instruments, and 
methodological choices. Before one can compare hypotheses to observations, one must 
distinguish between data that reflect the activities of the experimenter and those that tell 
us something about the target of inquiry. Thus, where the representationalist paradigm 
gives rise to the problem of distinguishing the real from the cherished hypothesis, 
experiments generate the problem of distinguishing the natural from the artificial, and 
more problematically, from the artifactual. In order to draw this distinction rightly, we 
must scrutinize the path of the embodied experimenter with the same degree of intensity 
as the objective subject surveils herself introspectively. Performative experiments make 
this path visible in a way that it must not become in real, or, better, good science.  
Thus far, I have examined how artworks draw attention to scientific instruments 
and models of natural phenomena. In these analyses--indeed in the artworks themselves- 
the figure of the experimenter has remained implicit. The experimenter's person is 
conspicuously absent—and yet therefore performatively present—as the invisible hand 
that vexes nature in Jeremijenko's Tree Logic, and as the purveyor of the idiosyncratic 
logic that organizes Apparatus for the Distillation of Vague Intuitions. Meanwhile, Levy's 
Seeing the Path of the Wind invites every viewer to use the artwork as a model through 
which to learn how to observe nature. Like displays of scientific instruments and 
experimental demonstrations in science and natural history museums, Levy's and 
Jeremijenko's works appear to be operated by no one in particular, and therefore to be 
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open to interpretation by anyone who passes through the gallery. The public and 
depersonalized character of the space generated by these works marks them as sites for 
the production of objective knowledge rather than merely subjective responses. Levy and 
Jeremijenko's works hold apart the particularity of the artist and the universality of the 
scientist in order to interpolate the audience of art into the role of a scientific community. 
The criticism of these works thus performatively expands the bounds of science criticism 
to include a wider public. By contrast, the implied operator of Laramée's apparatus is a 
particularized subject, a figure in whom the distinction between the artist and scientist 
collapses. The audience's encounter with this work is conditioned by its lack of expertise 
and tacit knowledge, in much the same way as it is in displays of real scientific 
apparatus.4As artworks, however, each of these performative experiments remain 
inextricably linked to the interests, desires, and fantasies of both artists and their 
audience. Performative experiments call into question the roles of the performers and the 
audience of scientific experiments and the norms of correct performance of those roles. 
They thus offer exemplary sites for the development of an account of the role of the 
experimenter in the experiment. 
As I discussed in Chapter 2, Rom Harré divides scientific apparatus into two 
categories: scientific instruments and models. Within the category of models, he 
distinguishes between domesticated versions of nature, like Seeing the Path of the Wind, 
and what he calls Bohrian apparatus/world complexes. In the case of domesticated 
versions of natural phenomena, making inferences from the laboratory to the world 
                                                
4 See Frogan, S. (1996) “'A nightmare of incomprehensible machines”: science and technology museums in 
the 19th and 20th centuries'. in M. Pointon (ed.) Museums and Late Twentieth Century Culture, pp. 46-68, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press. 
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depends upon correctly determining how well the model system resembles the part of the 
world it represents, and whether it resembles it in the relevant respects. But with the 
second type of model, Bohrian complexes, this kind of distinction impossible. Physicist 
Niels Bohr argued that what experiments tell us about is not a state of the world 
independent of the apparatus through which we investigate it, but rather a result produced 
through the operation of an apparatus. Unlike domesticated versions of natural systems, 
Bohrian complexes have no wild analogues; they are artifactual systems that are 
embedded in the world and generate effects that do not arise outside of apparatus—or at 
least not in local space-time. Bohrian complexes are as familiar as ovens and freezers, 
apparatus that can be used by sufficiently skilled operators to bake bread or make ice 
cream, entities that do not exist in nature independently of human intervention. Many 
kinds of laboratory equipment, from simple chemistry equipment to particle accelerators, 
count as Bohrian complexes according to Harré.5 Whereas domesticated versions of 
nature tell us something about how the world is outside of the laboratory, given the 
appropriate qualifications, Bohrian complexes tell us something different. They tell us 
what effects, entities, or activities it is possible to produce through the conjunction of the 
world, an apparatus, and a skilled operator. In other words, they allow us to learn what is 
possible in nature, or what kinds of actions and material configurations nature affords. 
 Karen Barad, a theoretical physicist and feminist philosopher of science, gives a 
more robust account of kind of experimental set-up that Harré calls a Bohrian complex 
and she draws more provocative conclusions for the epistemology of experimentation. 
                                                
5 Indeed it seems that any experimental set-up that enables an experimenter to produce a phenomenon that 
doesn't exist in nature would qualify as a Bohrian complex on Harré's definition. It must be noted therefore 
that the property of being a model of this kind depends upon the way that it is or can be used, rather than on 
any inherent property of the devices that compose the apparatus. 
  
107 
According to Barad, all experiments involve an entanglement of agency on the part of 
experimenters, apparatus, and the world. As such, objectivity depends upon the 
possibility of recognizing and assuming responsibility--both epistemic and ethico-
political-for the way our own actions configure our target of inquiry. Barad terms the 
entangled activity of the experimenter with her world intra-action.6 “The notion of intra-
action (in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which presumes the prior existence of 
independent entities/relata),” Barad explains, “marks an important shift, reopening and 
refiguring foundational notions of classical ontology such as causality, agency, space, 
time, matter, discourse, responsibility, and accountability. A specific intra-action enacts 
an agential cut (in contrast to the Cartesian cut—an inherent distinction—between 
subject and object) effecting a separation between “subject” and “object.””7 Rather than 
offering a thorough exposition of this complex notion, I will invoke the illustrative 
capacities of performative experiments. 
 I want to examine briefly two artworks that, as I read them, foreground the 
movement of the experimenter through the material and epistemic space of the laboratory 
by reconfiguring that space as a responsive sound environment. By rendering the 
presence of the experimenter explicit, these artworks raise the question of how the traces 
of human activity, subjectivity, and contingency are inscribed or erased from scientific 
knowledge and the objects of experimental enquiry. To render the performer of an 
experiment conspicuous is prima facie to impugn the objectivity of the enquiry, and 
                                                
6 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway; K. Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” Qui Parle: Critical 
Humanities and Social Sciences 19, no. 2 (2011): 121–158. 
7 K. Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences 19, no. 2 
(2011): 125; For a sympathetic exposition and analysis of Barad’s views see Rouse, How Scientific 
Practices Matter, chap. 1, 7 & 8. 
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indeed this is precisely the intention of many artists. My analysis, however, is guided by a 
different motive, namely by feminist philosophers’ of science demand for a stronger 
standard of objectivity.8 I read Lim Young-sun's Room of the Host (1998-99) and Tim 
Hawkinson's Überorgan (2000) as models of Barad's concept of intra-action, which 
exhibit the epistemological as well as political implications taking responsibility for 
experimental agency.  
 Room of the Host and Überorgan offer complementary phenomenological models 
of the experimenter’s engagement with an experimental set-up. Both artworks include a 
sound component and use motion detectors to render the artworks responsive to the 
movements of visitors in the gallery. Hawkinson's work is an enormous musical 
instrument with close affinities to other organ instruments (especially the bagpipe) as 
well as to biological organ systems, replete with a player console that controls the sounds 
made by each of the organs via an extensive electrical 'nervous system.' As the visitor 
moves through the gallery, motion sensors trigger different acoustic responses from the 
'brain' of this biomorphic organ system. These sounds are responses provoked by 
intentional and unintentional human actions. Upon becoming aware of the responsiveness 
of the Überorgan to her own actions, the visitor may plan her movements in order to 
discover what responses they will provoke. And having discovered these, she may learn 
                                                
8 For the proponents of feminist standpoint theory such as Sandra Harding and Donna Haraway “strong 
objectivity” requires an account of the knower as well as the object of knowledge. In Helen Logino's 
influential account of science as a social rather than individual process of producing knowledge, objectivity 
is reached only through the inclusion of diverse perspectives within the scientific community. The relevant 
account of the subject here, however, is primarily sociological and psychological. Although I am convinced 
of the relevance of these factors to the content of scientific knowledge, they fall within the domain of 
factors that experiment is designed to eliminate. In order to evaluate whether and how experiment can 
fulfill this important function, an account of the embodied subject's role in experimental practice is required 
as well. See Harding, The Science Question in Feminism; Helen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge, 
First ed. (Princeton University Press, 1990); D. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 




to 'play' the instrument by moving in such a way as to elicit the desired sounds. The 
movements made by the organ are recorded on paper in the artist's studio, providing 
documentation of the sounds produced in the gallery—sounds that we might call 
experimental music. What this work makes clear is that the data collected is as much a 
record of visitors' movements as it is a description of the sounds made by the instrument.  
 Whereas in Hawkinson’s work the visitor elicits sound, in Young-sun's what she 
elicits is silence. One enters a darkened room filled with eerily illuminated specimen jars 
suspended from the ceiling and hears a din of buzzing, chirping, tapping and other 
strange noises. Each jar contains what looks to be a creature that swirls and wiggles as 
though it were alive and in conversation with its similarly confined companions. The lid 
of each jar is equipped with a motion sensor. As the visitor approaches a specimen, in an 
expression of scientific curiosity, perhaps, the sounds become inaudible as though the 
specimen were resisting inspection. We are reminded of Isabelle Stengers’ warning of 
“the ever-present risk” in the process of experimenting on complex systems “of 
“silencing” the very thing one is investigating.”9 As a model of political surveillance as 
well as scientific inquiry, Room of the Host demonstrates how a discreet object of 
investigation is isolated from the whole situation and how its properties are altered by the 
very activity of observation, the process that Barad's terms the agential cut between an 
object and the agency of observation. The work thereby communicates the affective and 
political dimension of performing the agency of observation. 
The purpose of this section is to introduce a theme that runs prominently through 
the next two chapters. In the age of the world experiment, we find ourselves positioned as 
                                                
9 Isabelle Stengers, Power and Invention: Situating Science, Theory out of bounds ; v. 10. (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 17. 
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both subjects and objects of experimental inquiry. The way that we navigate the social 
and epistemic spaces of the laboratory and the many found experiments that the world 
discloses to our trained minds increasingly informs our understanding of ourselves and 
our relations with others. In Chapter 3, I examine the appropriation of molecular genetic 
techniques as a medium of portraiture, tracing the way scientific data is incorporated into 
the aesthetic representation and imagining of the self in the genetic age. In Chapter 4, I 
examine an artwork that takes the form of a social psychology experiment in which 
visitors to an art gallery are invited to make use of an experimental set-up that designed 
to enable them to deliver electric shocks to other participants. The artworks I examine in 
each of these chapters prompt us to reconsider the way we fashion our own identities in 
relation to objective knowledge and to other subjects within the epistemic and material 
structures of the scientific experiment. They are, in varying degrees, exercises in what 
Nicolas Bourriaud has called “relational aesthetics,” artworks whose form consists just in 
the social relations that they give rise to.10 Drawing Barad’s concept of intra-action into 
conversation with Bourriaud’s aesthetic theory, we may now mark the experiment itself 
as a relational space in which subjects and objects are configured and maintained over 
time through intra-active performances.  
                                                
10 Nicolas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics, trans. Simon Pleasance, Fronza Woods, and M Copeland 




Chapter 3. Genetic Portraits 
 
Figure 12. Steve Miller, Genetic portrait of Isabel Goldsmith. (1993) 
 
In the early 1990s, art collector Isabel Goldsmith commissioned a portrait by 
Steve Miller, an artist known for his work with biomedical imaging techniques. At an 
historical moment when the hype surrounding the nascent Human Genome Project 
abounded with portents and promises of decoding the essence of human identity, Miller 
persuaded Goldsmith to abandon her request for a traditional portrait and allow him to 
depict her DNA instead. (Figure 12.) To create the portrait, Miller obtained a blood 
sample from his subject and collaborated with geneticist Pat Heslop-Harrison to create 
images of Goldsmith’s chromosomes. Using cytogenetic techniques standardized only in 
the late 1950s, DNA was isolated from her white blood cells and photographed under an 
electron microscope during the metaphase stage of cell division, when the long strands of 
DNA coil up tightly and duplicate, forming puffy X-shaped macromolecules that are 
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visible under a light microscope.1 In his painterly reproduction of those photographs, 
Miller retains the standard scientific annotation of the images, which indicates the 
preparation techniques used (DAPI) and “46, XX.” The number 46 identifies his subject 
as a human with the standard complement of twenty-two autosomal pairs and two sex 
chromosomes, which in this case are identical (XX), indicating that she is genetically 
female.  
In contemporary American culture, saturated as it is with genetic iconography and 
rhetoric, the resulting images are readily intelligible as signifiers of human identity. And 
according to the cultural logic of genetics, they are indicative of inner character, physical 
health, outer appearance or phenotype, and relations to immediate and distant kin.2 Yet 
not even the trained eye of a geneticist could behold Goldsmith herself in Miller’s 
portrait. Doubly mediated through aesthetic and scientific representational modes, she 
becomes unrecognizable as an individual. In this work, Miller courts failure to meet the 
basic imperative of the portrait genre, which demands the representation of a particular 
historical individual rather than a generic type or an imaginary figure.3 In doing so, he 
reveals the tension between the representational conventions of the sciences and arts that 
constitutes the problematic of the sub-genre of genetic portraiture, which is the subject of 
this chapter.  
                                                
1 M. Susan Lindee, Moments of Truth in Genetic Medicine (JHU Press, 2008), 90–119. 
2 Judith Roof, The Poetics of DNA, Posthumanities ;; 2; (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2007); Dorothy Nelkin, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan, 2004); Suzanne Anker and Dorothy Nelkin, The Molecular Gaze: Art in the Genetic Age, 1st ed. 
(Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 2003). 
3 Martin, “On Portraiture.” 
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As a socially and technically authoritative discourse of identity, the science of 
genetics plays a prominent role in defining the content of contemporary portraiture. 
Genetic portraiture reflects the intersection of the art-historical conventions of portraiture 
with techniques of genetic testing, identification and comparison that are used in a 
number of different scientific fields. The relevance of genetic concepts and techniques to 
portraiture rests on a conception of the self as a scientific object, an object whose 
boundaries are demarcated and revealed through specific modes of investigation and 
explicable in terms of specialized scientific vocabularies.4 The subject of genetic 
portraiture is represented, moreover, as an object of intervention—as an experimental 
subject to be tested, diagnosed, identified and surveiled. Indeed, in addition to its use in 
the arts, the term “genetic portrait” refers to a variety of representational and diagnostic 
procedures deployed by the sciences of forensics, medical genetics, physical 
anthropology and genetic genealogy.  
Different dimensions of identity are salient for each of these fields, therefore each 
privileges different regions of the genome for representation. Medical genetic portraits 
focus on genetic mutations that are known to be associated either causally or statistically 
with specific health outcomes—typically mutations in functional genes, fragments of the 
genome that are expressed as protein products. Such tests are used to diagnose medical 
conditions and identify predispositions to disease, knowledge that may affect behavioral 
and reproductive decisions.5 By contrast, anthropologists and others interested in 
                                                
4 For an account of the emergence and transformations of the self as a scientific object, see Lorraine 
Daston's Introduction and Jan Goldstein's “Mutations of the Self in Old Regime and Post-Revolutionary 
France: From Ame to Moi to Le Moi,” Lorraine Daston, Biographies of Scientific Objects (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), chap. 4. (p.86-116) 
5 See e.g. Karen Sue Taussig, Rayna Rapp, and Deborah Heath, “Flexible Eugenics: Technologies of the 
Self in the Age of Genetics” (n.d.): 194–212; Joan H. Fujimura, Troy Duster, and Ramya Rajagopalan, 
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genealogy attend to regions of the genome that disclose kinship relations, information 
that is used to construct familial as well as ethnic, racial, national and geographic 
identities.6 The regions of the genome that are used for these purposes are usually found 
within the stretches of DNA that are thought to be non-functional, which are 
consequently referred to as “junk DNA.” For forensic scientists seeking to identify 
human remains or incriminate the perpetrators of crimes, the so-called “DNA fingerprint” 
now supplements the mug shot and the traditional fingerprint as a means to identify an 
individual uniquely. The forensic genetic portrait must focus on regions of the genome 
that are neither functional nor shared with kin, highly variable regions of the genome that 
are statistically highly unlikely to be shared by any two individuals. 
Because genetic portraits in all of these fields are created using a shared set of 
techniques for isolating, replicating, sequencing and imaging genetic material, their 
visual similarity tends to obscure the significant differences in their content. 
Autoradiograph images generated by the ubiquitous molecular separation technique of 
gel electrophoresis, for example, share the familiar visual appearance of luminescent 
bands against a dark background. Images of this kind, sometimes colorized, appear in 
frequently in artistic genetic portraits (including those of Gary Schneider and Inigo 
Manglano-Ovalle), where they have been described justly as Rothko-esque.7 When 
                                                                                                                                            
“Introduction: Race, Genetics, and Disease,” Social Studies of Science 38, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 643 –
656; Daniel Navon, “Genomic Designation: How Genetics Can Delineate New, Phenotypically Diffuse 
Medical Categories,” Social Studies of Science 41, no. 2 (April 1, 2011): 203 –226. 
6 See Nadia Abu El-Haj, The Genealogical Science: The Search for Jewish Origins and the Politics of 
Epistemology (University of Chicago Press, 2012); A. Nelson, “Bio Science: Genetic Genealogy Testing 
and the Pursuit of African Ancestry,” Social Studies of Science 38, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 759–783; 
Stephan Palmié, “Genomics, Divination, ‘racecraft’,” American Ethnologist 34, no. 2 (May 1, 2007): 205–
222. 
7 Dorothy Nelkin and Suzanne Anker, “The Influence of Genetics on Contemporary Art,” Nature Reviews. 
Genetics 3, no. 12 (December 2002): 968; Hélène Samson, “Figuration Et Esthétique De L’identité 
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genetic images circulate through cultural and scientific texts, Donna Haraway warns, they 
tend to be fetishized as windows that open onto unmediated reality: “the fetishist sees the 
gene itself in all the gels, blots, and printouts in the lab and “forgets” the natural-technical 
processes that produced the gene and genome as consensus objects in the real world.”8 
Artists who create genetic portraits enter into the volatile technical and cultural project of 
producing genes as consensus objects by mobilizing genetic materials into new visual and 
discursive fields, in which the significance of genetic images and data for conceptions of 
identity stand to be renegotiated. The artistic practice of genetic portraiture thus functions 
as a mode of secondary reflection upon the scientific practices of genetic portraiture and 
the cultural aesthetics and politics that attend them. 
Notions of identity generated by the application of genetics to the fields of 
forensics, medicine, anthropology and genealogy demand new formal devices for their 
aesthetic representation. To this end, artists including Kevin Clarke, Inigo Manglano-
Ovalle, Geraldine Ondrizek, Gary Schneider and Marc Quinn have adopted materials and 
techniques of molecular genetics as a new medium for portraiture. The formal 
possibilities inherent within the material-discursive space of molecular genetics 
demarcate what content can be represented and what tends to be concealed under what 
Suzanne Anker and Dorothy Nelkin have aptly called the molecular gaze.9 Genetic 
portraiture problematizes the genre of portraiture itself, and in the process, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Génétique : Autour De L’ Autoportrait Génétique De Gary Schneider,” Text.Serial.Journal, February 6, 
2009, 67, http://journals.uvic.ca/index.php/racar/article/viewArticle/13. 
8 Donna Jeanne Haraway, ModestWitness@SecondMillennium.FemaleMan©MeetsOncoMouse TM: 
Feminism and Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997), 146. 
9 Suzanne Anker and Dorothy Nelkin, The Molecular Gaze: Art in the Genetic Age, 1st ed. (Cold Spring 
Harbor Laboratory Press, 2003). 
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conceptions of the self that constitute its content. Portraiture is distinguished from other 
artistic genres by the imperative to represent a particular person. In place of images that 
resemble a person's physical appearance, genetic portraits accomplish this by displaying  
pictures of chromosomes, sequences of letters that signify DNA fragments, and banded 
patterns produced by techniques used to separate and identify parts of the genome; some 
even include genetic material embedded within the artwork itself. As a new medium for 
portraiture, molecular genetics brings with it its own discourses of identity, individuality, 
and identification, such that the medium potentially over-determines the very concepts of 
identity that it is enlisted to represent. The introduction of genetics as a medium therefore 
forces a fundamental renegotiation of both the form and the content of the genre.  
Prior to the interventions of modernism, the portrait was virtually synonymous 
with a likeness of the subject’s face, sometimes accompanied by a partial or complete 
view of the body. This familiar formula remains the predominant condition of 
intelligibility of an artwork as a portrait and grounds formal experimentation within this 
conservative genre. With its distinctive features and revealing expressions—the eyes as a 
window into the soul, the mouth a betrayer of suppressed emotion, and the nose and 
forehead indicators of civility and moral integrity—the face is the privileged synecdoche 
not only for the body but for the person as a whole. And provided that the likeness is 
sufficiently accurate, expressive, or perceptive—virtues governed by the medium and 
aesthetic conventions of the age—portraits tend to exercise over viewers a stimulus to 
recognition so powerful as to warrant description in naturalistic terms. “The imminent 
power of a portrait image stimulates cognition with such force,” writes art historian 
Richard Brilliant, “that the psychodynamics of perception interfere with the 
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comprehension of the image as something different from the actual person.”10 Even more 
so than other representational genres, such as landscape and still-life, the content of 
portraiture—its radical particularity, the cognitive power of the human face and the moral 
interest that it evokes—gives portraits a sense of transparency. In virtue of this genre-
specific attribute, portraiture has become a staging ground for contests over conventions 
of representation. Indeed, Benjamin Buchloh has argued that portraiture survived the 
modernist disavowal of representational art to become “the site where the myth of a 
natural motivation of the sign, and of the mimetic model of representation, would be most 
avidly reaffirmed within every generation of twentieth-century modernity.”11 It is 
precisely the tension between contesting and reaffirming the natural motivation of the 
sign that is restaged once again in genetic portraiture, not in the service of, but against the 
mimetic model of representation. 
In order to track the manner in which genetic portraits renegotiate the formal 
conventions of portraiture, it will be useful to define what art historians call the "portrait 
formula" in basic semiotic terms. Conventional form portraits are typically offered as 
exemplars of what C.S. Peirce termed an icon, a sign that denotes its referent through a 
relation of “community in some property,” usually (though not necessarily) that of visual 
resemblance. Yet as Wendy Steiner has argued, what distinguishes a portrait from a 
picture of an anonymous model or a mug-shot, either of which might also accurately 
resemble a real individual, is a portrait’s evocative capacity to “make the perceiver feel as 
                                                
10 Brilliant, Richard (1991) Portraiture, Reaktion Books, London, (p. 24)  
11 Melissa E Feldman, Face-Off: The Portrait in Recent Art (Philadelphia, Pa: Institute of Contemporary 
Art, University of Pennsylvania, 1994), 55. 
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if he were in the referent’s presence.”12 In this sense, a portrait is more accurately 
classified as an index, a sign that relates to its object as a causal trace of that object’s 
actual existence at a specific moment in time, just as tracks in the snow evidence the 
recent presence of an animal there. Symbols, the third category in Peirce’s semiotics, are 
purely conventional signs that bear arbitrary relation to their referents, such as words and 
letters in different languages do. Like any complex sign, a typical portrait deploys iconic, 
indexical and symbolic components at once in order both to denote and to describe the 
subject. For example, a widely circulated photograph depicts James Watson and Francis 
Crick, the co-discoverers of the double-helical structure of DNA, posing with the large 
metal apparatus that was their original model of the molecule. (Figure 13.) This image, 
(which might also be considered a genetic portrait of sorts), denotes its subjects by means 
of iconic resemblance as well as the indexical trace of their encounter with photosensitive 
paper. And like many portrait paintings, the image deploys the molecular model and the 
laboratory context as symbols to represent Watson and Crick as individuals with a 
particular profession and position in the history of science.13 It will serve my purposes, 
then, to define the concept of the portrait formula in terms of how these three sign 
functions relate in a particular artwork.  
                                                
12 Wendy Steiner, Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: Literary Portraiture of Gertrude Stein (Yale 
University Press, 1979), 6. 




Figure 13. James Watson and Francis Crick at Cavendish Laboratories; 1953. 
 
The capacity of facial likeness to elide the mediating presence of an artwork has 
earned portraiture a low status among artists and critics alike. Portraiture is often 
regarded as a genre in which the imperative to mimesis constrains the artist’s creative 
freedom and the immediacy of recognition on the part of the viewer brings the 
pleasurable free play of imagination too quickly to a halt. Only when this sense of 
transparency gives way, or when it is interrupted, does the tension between the portrait’s 
aesthetic form and its referential function make itself felt. The paradox of the genre, 
Steiner explains, is that “the reader or viewer is […] forced into conflicting modes of 
perception—the self-reference and enclosure of the aesthetic organization of the work 
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and the outward-turning, centrifugal impulse of the portrait’s denotation.”14 The iconic 
mode of signification is the one that genetic portraits most conspicuously lack. To 
dispense with the element of likeness as a means of securing reference is to risk falling 
outside the bounds of the genre even in the attempt to reconfigure them.  
The challenge for the artist and the critic of genetic portraits is to demonstrate this 
emerging sub-genre’s potential to intensify rather than to defuse the paradox of 
portraiture by mobilizing the latent aesthetic possibilities of the medium itself. Expanding  
upon Lessing’s classic study of the difference between poetry and painting (or, as we saw 
in chapter 1, sculpture), the philosopher and poet Friedrich Schiller theorized the medium 
as a productive constraint upon artistic creation. “If the poetic depiction is to be free,” 
wrote Schiller, “the poet must overcome language's tendency to the universal by means of 
the highest art and vanquish words (words and their inflections and laws of construction) 
through form (namely its application).”15 If the genetic depiction is to be 'free'--in the 
sense of moving beyond the myths of mimetic transparency and genetic essentialism-- it 
is the conceptual grammar of the genetic ‘code’ and the visual logic of the techniques 
used to manipulate DNA that must be transcended through aesthetic form. This chapter 
examines how artists explore the possibilities and limits of genetics as a medium by 
working within and against the specific demands, traditions and boundaries of the genre 
of portraiture, on the one hand, and scientific discourses of identity and its representation, 
on the other. 
                                                
14 Stein, Wendy, “The Semiotics of a Genre: Portraiture in Literature and Painting”, Semiotica 21:1/2, 1977 
(111-119; p. 111); for a longer discussion, see Exact Resemblance to Exact Resemblance: The Literary 
Portraiture of Gertrude Stein, Yale University Press, New Haven (1978) (especially chapters 1 and 4). 
15 Friedrich Schiller, 'Kallias or Concerning Beauty: Letters to Gottfried Körner,' in Bernstein, J.M. (Ed.) 
Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK (p.182-3) 
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 In the remainder of this chapter I focus on the work of three artists: Kevin Clarke, 
Gary Schneider and Marc Quinn. I begin by analyzing the semiotics of Clarke’s portrait 
formula and argue that molecular genetics is positioned as a new artistic medium by 
being used specifically within and against the tradition of portrait photography. This is an 
argument that I build upon by examining Schneider’s Genetic Self-Portrait, where I also 
turn to considering how genetic portraiture functions as a mode of self-fashioning. Here 
introduce the trope of the 'body-in-pieces' and examine how this idea is rearticulated in a 
genetic idiom, tracing how the aesthetic form of the fragment structures a movement 
from the representation of the visible surface of the body to the invisible domain of the 
genome as a locus of identity. Next I briefly examine Marc Quinn’s Sir John Sulston: A 
Genomic Portrait in order to show how biological sampling substitutes for mimesis, such 
that the traditional portrait formula gives way to an experimental protocol as a key 
element of the formula of any genetic portrait. Finally, I return to consider more closely 
Clarke’s technical protocol and the significance of the specific genetic locus that appears 
in each of his portraits. I conclude by suggesting how genetic portraiture captures the 
expanding temporal, interpersonal and interspecies horizons of the self that this new 









I. Kevin Clarke and the Molecular Remediation of Photography  
 
Figure 14. Kevin Clarke, Portrait of Friedrich von Schiller, Photo collage, 2001 
 
Kevin Clarke’s Portrait of Friedrich von Schiller depicts a canopy of cumulus 
clouds against a darkening orange sky (Figure 14). Each cloud is tinted a bright shade of 
yellow, green, blue or lavender, and fringed with a halo of yellow light. Spaced closely 
and evenly across the picture plane, the candy-colored clouds seem to float independently 
of one another within their own separate atmospheres, an arrangement that is discordant 
with the photographic naturalism of their shapes. Subtle inconsistencies in the direction 
of the shadows within the clouds compound the unnaturalness of the composition to 
deprive the picture of a sense of depth or a single point of perspective. The picture 
mimics the persistence of visual residues, as though the viewer had gazed all day long at 
a blue sky and were left only with its orange afterimage. The afterimage effect occurs 
when, by intense or extended exposure, the retina is exhausted of its capacity to perceive 
one wavelength of light and, subtracting this, sees only its opposite or complement. So 
construed, the clouds’ cartoonish colors register the movement of the sun across the sky, 
from the pale yellow light of dawn to the pink, orange and violet hues of sunset. Yet their 
simultaneous assembly in space disorders their succession in time, mirroring in the 
formal composition of the work the anachronism inherent in the relations between its 
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historical content and its media. Closer inspection reveals that, overlaid on this strange 
image, a faintly legible set of letters forms a grid-like pattern. In the four-letter alphabet 
of the genetic code, A, C, G and T, antiquated characters traced from Schiller’s own 
handwritten manuscripts spell out a DNA sequence extracted from a lock of his hair. 
Reading between the lines of text we are drawn to look, as it were, for Schiller’s face in 
the clouds. In a double sense, then, the portrait reveals itself as a coded message. 
The opacity of Clarke’s genetic portraits draws the viewer’s attention towards the 
aesthetic organization of the works by calling into question the manner in which they 
fulfill their referential function. This refusal of transparency situates Clarke’s work within 
a tradition of modernist and postmodernist portraiture in which critical excavation of 
conventions of representation, the specificity of artistic media, and interrogation of 
conceptions of the self and Other constitute central impulses. At the same time, the 
introduction of molecular genetics as both a new medium and a discourse of identity 
reconfigures the formal possibilities and the content of his portraiture in a manner that 
strains the visual and conceptual logic that sustains the genre’s narrative continuity. 
These conflicting tendencies—between internal form and external reference, critique of, 
and rupture with tradition, denotation and connotation—manifest in Clarke’s portrait 
formula as a conceptually sharp, but visually blurred, distinction between the works’ 
visual dimensions and between the media that are used to produce them.  
Rather than depicting his subject’s face or figure, Clarke explains, “I allow the 
genetic depiction to refer to their physicality. This allows me to make the image with the 
person in mind.” 16 The genetic depiction, as that which secures reference, is a necessary 
                                                
16 Kevin Clarke, Der Unsichtbare Körper = The Invisible Body (Museum Wiesbaden, 1999). 
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condition of the work’s status as a portrait. Yet the challenge that Clarke poses to the 
viewer is to decipher how the processing of a DNA sample into textual and visual form 
operates as a mode of depiction—a representational strategy, not necessarily pictorial, 
replete with its own internal logic and epistemic and aesthetic significance. Only by 
attending to the manner in which it is deployed in relation to the photographic image does 
the genetic depiction become legible as a formal intervention into the genre of portraiture.  
Clarke’s primary field of practice prior to his engagement with genetics was 
portrait photography, and it is into conventions of this genre that he intervenes most 
precisely. In portrait photographs, the transparency associated with facial likeness in 
general is intensified by the medium’s own unique capacity to bring its object to 
presence. When Clarke uses photographic techniques to create an image that he freely 
associates with his subject rather than to capture her appearance or to document her 
physical presence before the camera, he relieves the resultant photographic image of the 
sense of transparency that is characteristic not only of portraits but more specifically of 
photographic portraits. Roland Barthes famously describes the photographic image as a 
“message without a code.”17 By this Barthes meant that the photographic image 
approaches a relation of complete identity with the object that it depicts, such that content 
of its message is virtually exhausted by its denotation. A photograph differs in this regard 
from a painting or drawing because it is produced, he alleged, without the use of styles 
and conventions that encode meaning, including rule-governed transformations such as 
perspective, selective assignment of significance to elements like the eyes, hands, or 
mouth, or direct alteration of the represented object, for example, idealizing the 
                                                
17 “The Photographic Message”, in Image, Music, Text, (p. 17) 
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appearance of a patron. What distinguishes photography from prior mimetic strategies is 
that the camera substitutes for the creative human hand a mechanical process of recording 
images in which “the mechanical is here a guarantee of objectivity”.18 Thus, for Barthes, 
the transparency of the photographic image lies not in the immediate intelligibility of the 
un-coded message but rather in its power to denote its object by giving “the always 
stupefying evidence of this is how it was.”19  
As a record of an object’s encounter with photosensitive paper, a photograph of 
Schiller (1759-1805) constitutes an historical impossibility. Whereas painters and 
sculptors frequently rely upon memories, verbal or textual descriptions, and other artistic 
representations to portray deceased or geographically unavailable subjects, to depict this 
particular subject photographically Clarke must resort to what Barthes calls “trick 
effects.” Clarke's use of collage, color reversal film, and digital editing techniques strips 
the photographic image of its evidentiary status even with respect to the clouds that he 
associates with his subject. Photography thus assumes the position held by painting in the 
century-old contest between the mediums, while the genetic depiction assumes 
photography’s evidentiary claims. I read Clarke’s genetic portraits as staging an act 
remediation, a term that David Bolter and Richard Grusin have introduced to theorize the 
process by which new, particularly digital, media, compete with, transform and displace 
the representational claims of older media.20 The implications of remediation are often 
profound: the consequences of the invention of the printing press for the circulation, 
                                                
18 “The Rhetoric of the Image” (p.44) 
19 “The Rhetoric of the Image” (p.45) As the examples above suggest, photography displaces perspectival 
rendering and other practices of realism as a means of achieving transparency. 




content and social significance of texts, for example, cannot be overestimated. 
Photography’s remediation of the mimetic claims of painting served likewise as a catalyst 
for the development of new aesthetic forms within both mediums, an historical episode 
that offers a suggestive precedent for my analysis.  
By the late nineteenth century, portrait painters could not compete with the 
camera in the production of likenesses. Relieved of their domain of competence (and 
often of their livelihoods), painters were free to engage in the kinds of formal and 
conceptual experimentation that came to define modernism. In emphatic contradistinction 
to the alleged realism of photography, modernist painting rejected the mimetic imperative 
and embraced abstraction, symbolism, and the limits of the medium in the service of new 
forms of social and self-referential critique.21 At the same time, early portrait 
photographers confronted the charge that the camera recorded a “mere likeness” but 
failed to capture the soul and interior life of the bourgeois subject.22 Photographers also 
faced the challenge of distinguishing themselves as artists from the scientists and 
agencies of state discipline who used this same technology to identify individuals and 
catalogue deviants, criminals, and human types—much as genetic techniques are used 
today. The acceptance of photography as a proper art form has been justified, over time, 
by the revelation of the new medium’s own distinctive formal and aesthetic qualities as 
well as the political potential of its documentary employment. As portrait photographers 
who have experimented widely with the conceptual and material limits of their medium, 
both Clarke and Schneider have contributed to this ongoing critical investigation of the 
                                                
21 Donna M De Salvo, Face Value: American Portraits (Southampton, N.Y: Parrish Art Museum, 1995), 
42–50. 
22 Shawn Michelle Smith, American Archives: Gender, Race, and Class in Visual Culture (Princeton, N.J: 
Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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art form itself.23 Much as photography freed painters to explore their medium, the use of 
genetics permits Clarke to deploy photographic techniques in the genre of portraiture in 
new ways. What I want to investigate finally, then, is his claim that “through genetics I 
have arrived at an approach to portraiture that is at the roots of photographic thinking.”24  
The concept of remediation is productive for my analysis here in two respects: I 
use it, first, to show how molecular genetics is positioned as a medium in and through 
formal aesthetic choices. Second, the concept of remediation acts as a guide to 
recognizing the new medium’s own specific competences and limits. “We offer this 
simple definition of a medium:” Bolter and Grusin state, “a medium is that which 
remediates. It is that which appropriates the techniques, forms, and social significance of 
other media and attempts to rival or refashion them in the name of the real… we cannot 
even recognize the representational power of a medium except with reference to other 
media.”25 It is important to note that Bolter and Grusin’s definition of remediation, and 
therefore of a medium, is representational: a technique or material practices remediates 
when it rivals the way another medium operates ‘in the name of the real,’ rather than, for 
example, in the name of the beautiful. This limitation of the concept of a medium to its 
representational power proves instructive, however, in the analysis of how genetic 
techniques function as a medium within the categorically representational genre of 
portraiture. By rivaling and refashioning the representational claims of photography 
within this clearly demarcated genre, genetics is positioned as a medium whose 
                                                
23 William Least Heat Moon, Kevin Clarke, and Horst Wackerbarth, The Red Couch: A Portrait of 
America, First Edition (Olympic Marketing Corp, 1984). 
24 June Wayne et al., “Models, Metaphors, and Matter: Artists and Scientists Visualize Scientific 
Concepts,” Art Journal 55, no. 1 (1996): 33–43. 
25 Bolter and Grusin, Remediation, 65. 
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specificity is defined first and foremost by the alternative manner in which it fulfills the 
genre’s demand for reference.  
Through remediation, new media are made sense of in relation to the familiar 
media that they displace, yet remediation also has the potential to deepen our 
understanding of established media by distilling and crystallizing their distinguishing 
features. The concept suggests a strategy for attending to a new medium’s own specificity 
at a moment when its use as such is relatively rare and its formal possibilities still 
underdeveloped. John Guillory observes that “It is much easier to see what a medium 
does—the possibilities inherent in the material form of an art—when the same expressive 
or communicative contents are transposed from one medium into another.”26 The 
specificity of genetics as a medium becomes apparent by attending to the specific aspects 
of photography that are selected for remediation.  
Whereas photography rivaled painting’s potential to create a realistic likeness, 
Clarke's use of genetics clearly selects a different aspect of photographic medium for 
displacement. In order to understand how genetics remediates photography we must 
attend to photography’s own medium specificity and to the representational claims that 
are made on its behalf. It is often assumed that photographs owe their alleged 
transparency to their superior realism in comparison with paintings and drawings. As 
Kendall Walton has agued, however, photographic transparency cannot rest in 
                                                
26 John Guillory, “Genesis of the Media Concept,” Critical Inquiry 36, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 324. By 
allowing contents to become distinguished from their modes of transmission, Guillory argues, the rapid 
proliferation of remediating technologies in the nineteenth century, from the printing press to the camera to 




resemblance alone. 27 A photograph need not bear a close resemblance to its object, or 
even be intelligible at all, in order for this medium-specific sense of transparency to be 
predicated of it. Early photographs, blurred by the requisite long exposure times and 
limited chromatic range of grays and sepia tones, did not obviously bear better 
resemblance to their objects than paintings and drawings. Indeed, to see photographs as 
realistic requires adjustments of perceptual habits akin to those required for the 
interpretation of perspective and shading conventions, which vary culturally and 
historically.  
Rather than appealing to resemblance, the language that Barthes uses to articulate 
the photographic 'effect of the real' is grounded in the scientific terms of objectivity and 
evidence. The way that photography was understood in its early use in the history of 
science is suggestive for my investigation of the transformation of a contemporary 
scientific techniques into an artistic medium, because it is in these early stages that the 
uncertain implications of the new medium are articulated. Here we can see the points of 
antagonism between epistemic and aesthetic interests that recede from view once we 
become habituated to new standards of representation. Remediation draws attention not 
only to the virtues of new techniques, but also to what is lost upon the acceptance of a 
new medium and its attendant representational norms. The sacrifice of the evocative 
power and informational content of drawn images for the accuracy and integrity of 
                                                
27 In his defense of photographic transparency, Kendall Walton argues that the alleged realism of 
photographs cannot be explained by the assumption that they possess simply to a greater degree the same 
qualities that make paintings realistic. As Chuck Close has demonstrated, in appearance paintings can be as 
realistic or indeed indiscernible from photographs, and not all photographs are clear, well lit, or realistically 
colored. Rather there must be a difference in kind between the realism of photographs and that which is 
attainable through other media, a difference which Walton explains by comparing the camera to the 
microscope, the telescope, and other visual aids. (“Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic 
Realism”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 11. No. 2 (Dec., 1984), pp. 246-277; p.249-9) 
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photographs was felt, perhaps, nowhere more acutely than in the natural sciences of the 
nineteenth century. It is here that the epistemic paradigm of what Daston and Gallison 
call mechanical objectivity was inaugurated.28 Prior to the development of photographic 
techniques, scientists strove for truth-to-nature in their diagrams and illustrations; they 
directed their illustrators to create images of plants, animals, and natural phenomena that 
clearly displayed their inner logic, the idealized forms that lay beneath the infinite variety 
and imperfections of actual specimens. Much like the painting of a portrait, the 
production of an image that was true-to-nature in this sense demanded extensive 
background knowledge of the object to be portrayed—information not available through 
visual inspection alone. Photographs, by contrast, captured details indiscriminately, dust 
specks, artifacts of the instrumentation, and important features alike. Yet in spite of its 
uneven consequences for the visual content of images, the logic of mechanical objectivity 
justified the acceptance of photographic images as the ultimate standards of realism in the 
sciences and the arts alike.29  
The same logic grounds the use of genetics as a medium of portraiture, but with 
different aesthetic implications. If remediation, as defined by Bolter and Grusin, centers 
on how media function in the name of the real, the concept bears a certain productive 
affinity to other ways of theorizing the competition and exchange between media. In 
order to discover the specificity of the medium not only in terms of its representational 
                                                
28 Daston and Galison, Objectivity. 
29 For example, film theorist Andre Bazin claims that, “The photographic image is the object itself, freed 
from the conditions of space and time that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no 
matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its 
becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.” Cited by Kendall Walton 
(ibid. p. 250) [From: Andre Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”, in What is Cinema?, trans. 
Hugh Gray, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p.14]  
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power but also in terms of its aesthetic possibilities, we must examine how genetics rivals 
and refashions photography not only in the name of the real but also in the name of 
aesthetic form. If it were once the case that all arts aspire to the condition of music, 
Rosalyn Krauss argues, in American art in the nineteen-seventies, photography usurped 
music’s privileged position to “become the operative model for abstraction.”30 Insofar as 
forms of art as diverse as painting, performance and earthworks aspired to the condition 
of photography, it is the photograph’s capacity to offer the mere testament of presence of 
an object, a material or a social condition, that proves exemplary. What these works 
isolate and intensify is the photograph’s status as an index, a trace that merely registers an 
object’s encounter with photosensitive paper. Clarke too, in comparing the imaging and 
data collection techniques devised by geneticists to photography, uses the language of the 
index: “It is not the thing itself which the geneticist views but the shadow of the thing, its 
chemical trace.”31 Like the camera, genetic imaging and sequencing techniques offer 
access to dimensions of the world whose temporality and spatial configuration are 
inaccessible to the naked eye, and consequently, to the imagination. By incorporating the 
“chemical trace” of DNA into the artistic practice of portraiture, Clarke situates scientific 
practices of portraiture—such as typing bone marrow donors—within an ongoing 
discourse in the history of art about notions of identity and the capacity of different 
artistic mediums to define and to capture this content.  
This analysis suggests that in its remediation of photography as a medium of 
portraiture, the function in which genetics seeks to excel is as an index, a trace that bears 
                                                
30 Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America,” October 3 (Spring 1977): 68–81; 
Rosalind Krauss, “Notes on the Index: Seventies Art in America. Part 2,” October 4 (Autumn 1977): 58. 
31 Text from the website of From the Blood of Poets 
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a causal rather than a conventional relation to its denotation. In this regard, the seeming 
naturalness of the relation between the icon and that which it resembles has already been 
superseded by the naturalness of causality. Whereas the convergence of medium and 
genre intensifies the transparency of photographic portraits, the deployment of a new form 
of mechanical objectivity in genetic portraits has the effect of severing visual 
intelligibility from denotational force—and thus dividing these two modes of 
transparency. This raises the question, how does the transparency associated with 
traditional likeness portraits and with photographs migrate into genetic portraiture? And 
how are the aesthetics of transparency, objectivity, and signification are transformed 
therein? The transposition of transparency from the icon to the index, from photography 
to biology, coded image to the genetic code, demands a new visual and conceptual 
literacy with the language, techniques and materials of molecular genetics.  
In Clarke’s genetic portraits, representation is mediated through scientific data, 
metaphors, and techniques, disclosing as a subtext of the work a concern with the 
semiotics of DNA itself. In his study of the semiotics of the double helix, Grey Myers 
observes that the structure of the DNA molecule “has become an icon linking a whole 
cluster of cultural meanings.”32 Depictions of the double helix are used to signify the 
Judeo-Christian creation story, individual identity, genetic determinism, and the progress 
of biotechnology, among other grand narratives. Images of DNA serve to authorize the 
cultural narratives and scientific knowledge claims in which they are embedded and at 
the same time to “superimpose various significances in a way that makes them seem 
                                                
32 Greg Myers, “The Double Helix as Icon,” Science as Culture 1, no. 9 (1990): 49. 
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naturally related.”33 “The danger,” Myers warns, “is that because of its spectacular 
successes the part of us that can be made visible in an autoradiogram of a gel after 
electrophoresis will be taken as the image of our identity. The problem, of course, is not 
with gel electrophoresis, or with autoradiography, or with electron microscopy, but with 
the ways we read the images that result.”34 In order to disentangle the multiple meanings 
of genetic imagery and evaluate their empirical bases and social implications on their 
own terms, he argues, we need to attend to the different ways that images are associated 
with meanings.  
Myers distinguishes between icons, indices and symbols of DNA and analyzes 
how they are used in professional and popular scientific journals. Each of these types of 
sign appears in genetic portraits as well, and the relations among them constitute an 
important and easily overlooked dimension of the portrait formulae that are possible in 
this particular genre. Icons of DNA include diagrams and three-dimensional models that 
resemble the DNA molecule, such as the depictions of the double helix that saturate 
scientific works, popular journalism and fine art.35 Unlike the resemblance relation that 
holds between a portrait and its subject, the resemblance relation that holds between an 
icon and an entity that is outside the visible range does not permit of comparison, even in 
principle. Rather, like a portrait of a person with whom the viewer is unfamiliar, the 
resemblance relation posited by an icon of DNA enables the viewer to infer the properties 
of the real molecule from its representation. As such, icons represent DNA in the double 
                                                
33 Ibid., 51. 
34 Ibid., 70. 
35 For an survey of artworks that depict or model the double helix, see Martin Kemp, “The Mona Lisa of 
Modern Science,” Nature 421, no. 6921 (January 23, 2003): 416–420. 
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sense of standing-for and of standing-in-for their object by giving the molecule its only 
visible incarnation.  
It is notable that genetic portraits generally do not deploy icons of DNA, just as 
they do not deploy likenesses of the face or figure. Here the DNA molecule, in all of its 
formal beauty and its functional ingenuity, is not the ultimate object of signification but a 
mediate point in the representation of a person. For this reason, and also because of the 
genre’s photographic roots, the index figures much more prominently in genetic portraits. 
Indices of DNA include x-ray crystallography diffraction patters, electron micrographs, 
autoradiographs of electrophoresis gels used to separate DNA fragments for sequencing, 
and chromatograms—wavy, colored lines produced by certain automated DNA 
sequencing techniques. Like their macro-sized counterparts, photographs of stained 
chromosomes taken through a light microscope are indices that are also bear iconic 
resemblance to their objects.  
In science journalism, Myers argues, diagrams are paired with indices, “the icon 
to show us what is supposed to be there, and the index to show us it really is there.”36 In 
genetic portraits, indices are paired with one another, as in Schneider’s juxtaposition of 
medical and forensic test results, and with imagery that has no overtly genetic 
connotation, such as Miller’s abstract color compositions and Clarke’s photographs of 
objects and scenes that he associates with his subjects. Indices are also paired with 
symbols of DNA and other things. In any case, Myers’ analysis suggests, the insistent 
presence of genetic material that is asserted by the index confers upon the rest of the 
                                                
36 Myers, “The Double Helix as Icon,” 53. 
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artwork the semblance of transparency—even while, in the absence of a recognizable 
icon, it remains uncertain who or what is really there. 
The sequences of letters that appear in Clarke’s genetic portraits are symbols that 
are used to denote the nucleotide sequences he obtains from his subjects. Other symbolic 
representations of DNA include tables, restriction enzyme maps, and other alpha-numeric 
notation used to signify chemical properties and locations on the molecule (e.g. “5’” and 
“3’” endings, which signify the direction of the nucleotide chain). Nelson Goodman’s 
argument that all signs are conventional, and thus symbols, becomes relevant here. From 
this position Catherin Elgin contests the manner in which authority over allegedly 
different modes of signification is parceled out into arenas of disciplinary competence, 
the icon to the domain of visual art, the index to the domain of science, and the symbol to 
the domain of language and literature. “From a simple, elegant taxonomy of signs” she 
contends, “we slide practically unawares into a stereotypical vision of everyday language, 
science, and art as mutually irrelevant if not antagonistic to one another.”37 Yet however 
artificial it's basis is, this antagonism is central to the semiotics of genetic portraiture and 
to its ideological valences. This division offers a useful point of departure for analyzing 
genetic portraits, most of which are in fact products of rare collaboration between clearly 
divided disciplinary authorities. Despite its inherent ambiguities and limitations, Peirce’s 
distinction between icon, index and symbol is crucial to analyzing the visual, textual 
elements, and the polarized modes of portrayal that are common in genetic portraits. This 
is why it is crucial to delve into the technical detail of the way the genetic signs are 
produced. What happens when indices are used as symbols, and what, in their precision 
                                                
37 Catherine Z. Elgin, Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary (Cornell University Press, 1997), 138. 
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and authority, do they signify? Before I return to this question in relation to Clarke’s 
portraits, I want first to consider a very different formal practice of genetic portraiture in 
the work of Gary Schneider. 
 
II. Gary Schneider: Fragmentary Self-Fashioning  
 
Figure 15. Gary Schneider, Genetic Self-Portrait, Irises 1997 
 
As users of the instrumentarium of molecular genetics, artists confront a tension 
between the specificity of medical, forensic and genealogical genetic portraiture 
techniques  and the broader cultural significance of representing the portrait subject as a 
scientific object. No single scientific field holds the authority to offer an exhaustive 
description of the self; though genetic representations hold strong cultural authority they 
nonetheless compete with other empirical and theoretical discourses to portray their 
subjects. The process of incorporating scientific facts, including brain images, genetic 
data and biomedical disease categories into conceptions of ourselves as individuals, 
members of social groups and as subjects of networks of discourse and power has 
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recently interested anthropologists of science and medicine.38 This literature is informed 
by the Foucauldian paradigm of knowledge as at once descriptive and productive of new 
categories of identity and horizons of experience. Joseph Dumit has introduced the term 
objective self-fashioning to describe the manner in which positron emission tomography 
or PET scan images of the brain are used to define “normal,” schizophrenic and 
depressive brain types, (among others).39 The notion of the objective self is a way of 
conceptualizing personhood that takes account of scientific descriptions of the body, 
theories of the mind, and conceptions of human nature. Any idea of the objective self 
thus depends implicitly upon epistemological assumptions, about objectivity and 
knowledge production in general, and about the methods of particular scientific fields. At 
the same time, this concept recognizes that facts about the self are not simply known but 
also embodied and lived as meaningful within culturally and historically variable 
contexts..  
Practices of objective self-fashioning, Dumit shows, are mediated by multiple 
actors, with different interests and standards for enquiry into the description of the self. 
The concept of objective self-fashioning is meant to call “attention to the equivocal site 
of this production of new objective knowledge of the self.”40 Scientific experts, lay-
persons and intermediaries such as journalists and, in this case, philosophers and artists, 
negotiate this equivocal site to produce and to contest conceptions of identity and 
                                                
38 Alondra Nelson, “Bio Science,” Social Studies of Science 38, no. 5 (October 1, 2008): 759 -783; Lindee, 
Moments of Truth in Genetic Medicine; Debbora Battaglia, Rhetorics of Self-Making (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1995), chap. 6; Stephan Palmie, “AE Forum: Genomics and Racialization - Provocation 
- Genomics, Divination, ‘racecraft’” (n.d.).  
39 Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).  
40 Dumit, Picturing Personhood, 164. 
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standards for its representation. Thus, in treating the portrait subject as a scientific object 
through their choice of medium, artists ought not be assumed to endorse a reductively 
scientistic conception of the self. Rather, genetic portraiture may operate  as an assertion 
of artistic competence to represent, and thereby to intervene critically into the process of 
what we may call genetic self-fashioning. Rather than resisting simplistic genetic 
determinism by denying the relevance of genetics to contemporary conceptions of the 
traditional subject matter of portraiture, genetic portraiture presses the representational 
power of genetics to its limits as medium in order to demonstrate its potential as well as 
delimit its scope. What these artworks disclose, I contend in this section, is a distinctive 
aesthetic logic at work in the process of genetic self-fashioning, a logic that is writ large 
Gary Schneider’s portraiture. 
 
Figure 16. Hair 
 
Gary Schneider’s Genetic Self-Portrait (1997) is composed of fifty-five images 
produced using ten different techniques to image thirteen different parts of the artist’s 
body. The portrait depicts Schneider's hands, irises (figure 15), retinas, ears, teeth, a hair 
(figure 16), dried blood, sperm, a buccal mucosa cell magnified to display the nucleus 
and mitochondria, a karyotype and close ups of his Y chromosome and  11th chromosome 
(figure 17), on which a tumor suppressor gene is labeled so as to be visible under 
fluorescent light, and electrophoresis gels of a DNA sequence for the testes-determining 
gene SRY and a mitochondrial DNA sequence for the respiratory energy producing gene 
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ND1. Although rendered unfamiliar by the magnification and distortion introduced by the 
medical imaging processes used to produce them, the images of Schneider’s hands, eyes, 
ears, mouth, hair and blood have a direct affinity with conventional portrait formulae. 
Indeed, they can be read as products of an analytical approach to the representation of 
likeness, one which brings to bear the most advanced scientific imaging technologies to 
capture with the greatest accuracy those parts of the body that have so often been 
regarded as windows onto the soul, sources of expression and sites of physical and social 
distinction. Transformed but not yet rendered unrecognizable, Schneider's hands and eyes 
beckon the viewer into cellular and molecular interior of his body that remains invisible 
to unaided perception. Magnified to enormous proportions, sperm cells, cell organelles, 
chromosomes and auto-radiographs of DNA sequences are thereby presented as 
equivalents to familiar physiognomic signifiers of identity. 
 




Figure 18. Gary Schneider, John in Sixteen Parts, 1996 
Like an earlier photographic portrait of his partner, John in Sixteen Parts (figure 
18), Schneider’s Genetic Self-portrait portrays its subject as a collection of fragments. In 
The Body in Pieces: The Fragment as a Metaphor of Modernity, art historian Linda 
Nochlin  argues that modernity is typified by a cultural consciousness of a radical rupture 
with the past—a historical rupture symbolically marked and violently enacted by the 
French Revolution. In the arts, literature and philosophy, she contends, this distinctive 
mode of historical consciousness is figured visually and textually through the aesthetic 
form of the fragment. The salience of the idea of the fragment manifests itself broadly in 
a cultural obsession with the ruins of ancient sculptures, remnants of an irretrievable past; 
depictions of severed limbs and heads that celebrate the break from tyranny; and abruptly 
cropped paintings, photographs and sculptures that evoke the loss of any sense of totality, 
continuity or coherence in the modern world. These artworks find their textual 
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counterparts in the writings of the early German romantics, most emphatically the 
fragments of Friedrich Schlegel.  
Through its visual form Schneider’s self-portrait suggests how genetic self-
fashioning takes place through the assembly of fragments, in this case fragments of 
genetic materials and biological knowledge. Genetic Self-Portrait combines depictions of 
macroscopic body parts such as hands, eyes and ears with images of individual cells and 
DNA sequences that become visible only through the mediation of scientific instruments. 
This collection of close-up images, printed, with one notable exception, in black and 
white, reveals aspects of the artist’s body and his personal condition of which both 
viewers and portrait subjects typically remain unaware. Magnified to enormous 
proportion so that each print fills the field of vision, the images present an intimate view 
of an individual with whom we have not yet become familiar at a superficial level. The 
work forces the viewer to step back from the images in order to correct for the distortions 
of scale and erasure of context required to bring the texture of a single hair, the shape of 
Schneider’s jawbone and the patterns of veins in his retinas into focus. Only at a spatial 
and reflective distance can the viewer confront the challenge of assembling this set of 
images into a unified work of art and/or a coherent representation of a single person. 
 Entering the exhibition one’s view might have come to rest first upon a pair of 
images of Schneider’s hands mounted on the wall opposite the doorway to the gallery. 
(Figure 19.) Each of the large, 36 x 29” prints displays one of Schneider’s hands as 
though pressed flat against a window or a photocopier, leaving a clear imprint of the lines 
on his palms and fingertips against the dark background, while the wrists taper out of 
sight into the shadows. Like handprints found in ancient cave drawing, these images 
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seem to be capable of signifying almost anything: an invitation or a defensive gesture, to 
reveal everything or to conceal an impenetrable mystery. It is not even clear whether the 
images should be read as depictions of the hands, or as in children’s pictures, as shapes 
depicting animals or signifying other forms. These images are enlargements of 
photograms, which Schneider created by pressing his hands directly against a film 
emulsion that is sensitive to heat and sweat, and when developed, creates an image. 
Developed by Man Ray in the 1920s, the technique is not unlike that of fingerprinting, in 
which the fingers are touched to an inkpad and then to a paper. One important difference, 
however, is that the photogram creates a reproducible image from direct physical contact, 
combining the evidentiary power of the fingerprint with the reproducibility of the 
photograph and making it and especially powerful form of index. 
 
 




Within the context of this work, the handprints embody two opposing tendencies. 
The first is the striving for intimacy, as though we might read the lines in Schneider’s 
palms for clues to his character and his future, an intimacy that would seem to be 
enhanced by moving from the exterior to the interior of his body. At the same time the 
images suggest forensic techniques of identification—techniques used to identify an 
individual as a unique object, rather than to express his subjectivity. In fact, 
fingerprinting was devised by the eugenicist Francis Galton to supplement that ubiquitous 
form of portraiture known as the mug-shot. The handprints thus foreground a question 
that is at the center of the genre, namely whether genetics as an artistic medium can 
achieve the double function of photography by answering to the representational 
imperatives of both art and science.  
A common criticism of Genetic Self-portrait is that, while each of the images is 
visually compelling on its own, reflecting Schneider’s renowned sensibility for details, 
any sense of the whole is lost at this level of magnification. One reviewer notes that “[i]n 
this group of photographs the artist remains virtually indistinguishable from any other 
human.”41 Although the work resembles Schneider with great precision, the feeling of 
being in the presence of the artwork does not resemble the feeling of being in the 
presence of the person that work represents. The work, in this sense, seems to arouse and 
to exhibit a deeply felt concern about the impact of scientific identification techniques on 
our sense of self and relations to others. The images are at once intimate and alienating, 
                                                




they provide both too much and not enough information to achieve the distinctive kind of 
transparency associated with portraiture. 
Genetic portraits, and Schneider’s especially, seem to replace representation with 
evidence. Each of these images are biometric (retinal scans, an iris scan, fingerprints, 
hair, sperm, blood samples), as if the portrait were evidence from a crime scene.… This 
association suggests that we ought here to raise the question whether the emergence of 
genetics as a new medium is accompanied by something like what Walter Benjamin 
called the destruction of the aura that accrues to hand made artworks. Benjamin 
considered the evacuation of the aura in the service of evidentiary photography to hold 
the highest promise of the medium.42 And yet, for Benjamin, the evacuation of aura 
happened primarily by evacuating people from the photographic scene. Almost as though 
he were retracing Benjamin’s analysis of photography, Schneider’s work both before and 
since Genetic Self-Portrait might be read as an effort to restore to photography its auratic 
quality. He has done so by a variety of means, such as reproducing 19th century 
techniques for photographing botanical specimens and, perhaps most explicitly, 
appropriating a collection of old photographs that he discovered in suitcase for his series 
Cartes de visite (1870/1990). This act of appropriation attests to impossibility of 
practicing photography as it was practiced at a different historical moment, raising the 
question whether what Schneider does is a regressive effort to recuperate an aesthetic 
category lost to history, or whether his work might instead be read as an effort to rethink 
the relevance of these concepts within new photographic practices as the medium of 
photography itself cedes ground to new media. 
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The Carte de Visite series reflects Schneider’s fascination with the work of the 
nineteenth-century photographer Julia Margaret Cameron, whom Benjamin names among 
those who represented the prime of photography, before its industrialization in the form 
of the snapshot and positive/negative printing.43 Like Benjamin, Schneider is interested in 
the long exposure time required for early photographs, eight minutes for Cameron, during 
which time the camera registers the slightest movements of the facial muscles as a 
blurring of the image, an average of the appearance that is shown to the camera over 
time. During this time, something more is recorded than the superficial appearance of a 
person as she appears at a single instant, something of her disposition and her real 
historical existence, Benjamin thought. Indeed Benjamin’s very first articulation of the 
concept of aura is quite similar to the sense of being in the presence of a person that 
Steiner, following Collingwood, identifies as the essential feature of the relation of 
resemblance between portraits and their subjects.  
Photography, according to Benjamin, deepens this magical, conjuring effect by 
drawing the viewer into an arbitrarily bounded moment that was once inhabited with the 
greatest concentration by the carefully posed and stilled subject. Benjamin provides as an 
early definition of aura “a peculiar web of space and time: the unique manifestation of a 
distance, however near it may be.”44 It is the capacity of an image or an object to convey 
a sense of being more deeply embedded in another spatiotemporal nexus than that in 
which the viewer finds herself that he locates in early portrait photographs. The need for 
both the sitter and the viewer to linger in the extended moment in which the picture is 
                                                
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., 20. 
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taken was destroyed by the advent of the rapid exposure or snap shot, which could be 
taken and taken in at a glance. The industrial production of visiting-cards or cartes-de-
visite is symptomatic, for Benjamin, of the decline of photography and the erosion of its 
auratic quality. Indeed the portrait snapshot represents the very nadir of conservative 
nostalgia for a form of cultic value that photography itself destroys, but whose 
destruction it does not yet embrace. The politically and aesthetically promising future of 
photography lies, rather, in the emphatic evacuation of the aura and the production of a 
new kind of scientific evidence that testifies to the harsh realities of modern life.  
It is suggestive that, prior to engagements with novel methods of production of 
scientific evidence, Schneider returns precisely to this moment in the history of 
photography. Putting his work in the context of the history and theory of photography 
raises the question less of what Schneider himself intends his work with scientific 
imaging techniques to accomplish as of what precedents he provides to frame the 
interpretation of the images that constitute his Genetic Self-portrait. The work can be 
read as a reinfusion of aura into scientific evidence. Genetic Self-portrait rejects the 
scientific demand for precision; although the content of the images is biometric and even 
diagnostic, the way they are developed and the degree to which they are magnified 
obscures their information content. At the same time these scientific images display 
Schneider’s virtuosity as a professional printer. Like the scientists with whom he 
collaborated for this work, he worked to extract certain kinds of information from the 
images he developed, using aesthetic rather than scientific criteria. The aesthetic 
presentation of the scientific content serves, in this case, not to make it clear or 
intelligible (the function of the scientific illustrator or maker of diagrams) but rather to 
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make the scientific content accessible in a different register. In this respect, Schneider’s 
printing techniques extend to biological specimens the strategies devised by Cameron of 
varying the exposure times and introducing light at different points in the exposure and 
development process. Here he explores how these different printing techniques can be 
used to valorize different aspects of microscopic images, and thereby impart to them 
some of the aesthetic effects valued in early photographic portraiture.  
As Bernadette Wegenstein has explained, in the discourse regime of ‘getting 
under the skin,’ any body part can become a synecdoche for the whole.45 As Fredric 
Jameson writes, reviving Schlegel in a different context, “[w]hat happens here is that 
each former fragment of a narrative context as a whole, has now become capable of 
emitting a complete narrative in its own right. It has become autonomous… in its newly 
acquired capacity to soak up content and to project it in a kind of instant reflex.”46 
Schneider’s portrait clearly lends itself to being read through the trope of the fragment 
and the ‘body-in-pieces’—and yet, even here, the textual and spatial presentations of the 
work contests any easy choice of an image that would be representative of the work as a 
whole, or a part of the body that would be representative of Schneider himself. The 
choice of image determines which conception of the subject must be operative—the part 
indicates which conception of the whole is at work. These fragments compete for 
primacy and yet within this competition they play amongst each other. In each of its 
numerous exhibitions, the manner in which the work is installed and the path that the 
viewer traces through the exhibition or a textual space (a book, a website or a press 
                                                
45 Bernadette Wegenstein, Getting Under the Skin: Body and Media Theory (The MIT Press, 2006). 




release), opens up possibilities for the reception of the artwork and forecloses others. The 
work is visual embodiment of an ideal text in Barthes’ sense, admitting of endless 
reconfiguration and reinterpretation on the part of the viewer.47 What is particularly 
suggestive about the aesthetic logic of this work, then, is that it suggests that genetic self-
fashioning too takes places through an open-ended—rather than deterministic—process 
of incorporating and reassembling genetic information about the self. 
 
III. Marc Quinn: The Portrait Formula as Experimental Protocol 
In 2001 Britain’s National Portrait Gallery commissioned Marc Quinn to produce 
a portrait of Sir John Sulston, who, as a director of the Sanger Centre was instrumental in 
bringing Britain to collaborate on the Human Genome Project. (Figure 20.) Quinn 
produced a portrait composed of colonies of bacteria expressing fragments of Sulston’s 
DNA. The portrait appears as a slightly textured, grayish rectangle. It is displayed in a 
large frame of polished silver that reflects the viewer’s own image. Quinn described the 
work as “the most realist portrait in the Portrait Gallery since it carries the actual 
instructions that led to the creation of John. It is a portrait of his parents, and every 
ancestor he ever had back to the beginning of Life in the universe.”48 His subject was 
somewhat less convinced, although he conceded that the portrait contains ample genetic 
material to identify him.  
It is important to consider what, precisely, is meant by the claim that the portrait 
contains Sulston’s DNA; in order to do so we need to understand how the artwork was 
                                                
47 R. Barthes, “S/Z (Richard Miller, Trans.),” New York: Hill and Wang (1974): 76. 




created. First, a DNA sample was obtained from Sulston (we do not know from what 
biological material—hair, blood, cheek or sperm cells; regardless, the procedure for 
extracting the DNA from the nucleus of the cell is the same.) The DNA was fragmented 
using restriction enzymes to produce short pieces. It was then cloned into vectors and 
transformed into the bacteria. As the bacteria reproduced themselves, they reproduced the 
fragments of Sulston’s DNA that had been incorporated into their genomes. The bacterial 
colonies, as Quinn explains, were allowed to grow until they became visible on the agar 
gel, then their growth was halted. Up to this point Quinn’s technique is comparable, if not 
identical, to the technique Sulston used in his own work on the HGP. The purpose of the 
technique is to amplify the original DNA so that from a small sample a sufficient quantity 
will be produced for sequencing. In the course of conventional scientific practice, the 
next step in the process arrested by Quinn would be to extract the DNA from the bacterial 
and sequence the library. The bacterial genome is the standard; the variable is the 
exogenous DNA. When the library is sequenced, the fragments are reassembled by 
matching segments with overlapping sequences, a process that could, in principle, be 






Figure 20. Marc Quinn, Sir John Edward Sulston: A Genomic Portrait, commissioned 2001. Sample of 
sitter’s DNA in agar jelly mounted in stainless steel, 5 x 3 3/8 in. (actual size shown) © National Portrait 
Gallery, London 
 
But what is the material that is actually present in Quinn’s artwork? Copies of 
fragments of Sulston’s DNA. This is similar, but not quite the same as a relic.49 Very, 
very little of the material presented in the artwork was ever actually in or on Sulston’s 
body. The hair used to sequence Schiller’s genome is truly a relic in this sense, and we 
can compare its significance to that of a conventional portrait and to that of a DNA 
portrait. But what we have in Quinn’s work is something between a relic and a 
                                                
49 Martin Kemp, “Reliquary and Replication. A Genomic Portrait: Sir John Sulston by Marc Quinn,” 
Nature 413 (2001): 778. 
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representation. It is the material basis for the extraction of information—it is the object of 
sequencing. But if what Quinn means by saying that Sultson’s DNA is in there is that his 
whole genome is present in the work, then this would also be true if he were to have 
presented a text, a chromatogram, or any other symbolic notation of the DNA sequence. 
It is significant, then, that this work does not actually present the information it purports 
to hold in material form.  
In a review of Quinn's portrait of Sulston Ann Collins Goodyear observes that, “it 
is medium rather than likeness that represents the sitter.”50 Like its recent art historical 
antecedents, genetic portraiture presumes neither a fixed object (or conception of the 
subject) nor a standardized method of representation. The self represented by genetic 
portraiture is the object of a particular set of technical practices and scientific concepts, 
which are themselves embroiled in debates about the reliability of genetic identification 
techniques and the coherence of the gene concept in the face of growing recognition of 
the incredible heterogeneity of the structures and functions that constitute the genome.51 
Thus the ‘medium which represents the sitter’ in Quinn’s and other genetic portrait 
embeds within these artworks a set of techno-scientific and philosophical questions—
what, after all, is a gene? How, and why, are fragments of DNA conserved and expressed 
(or not)? What does a DNA sequence separated from its biological context tell us about 
its carrier? These are questions which the artworks in turn reconfigure according to the 
competing demands of aesthetic and scientific logics. With these kinds of questions in 
                                                
50 Anne Collins Goodyear, “Digitization, Genetics, and the Defacement of Portraiture,” American Art, 
Volume 23, Number 2, Summer, 2009 (28-31), 30 
51 Paul E. Griffiths and Karola Stotz, “Genes in the Postgenomic Era,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 
27 (November 29, 2006): 499–521, doi:10.1007/s11017-006-9020-y; Lenny Moss, “The Question of 
Questions: What Is a Gene? Comments on Rolston and Griffths & Stotz,” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 27 (December 1, 2006): 523–534, doi:10.1007/s11017-006-9021-x; Evelyn Fox Keller, The 
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mind, I return to Clarke’s work to consider more closely the specificity of his choice of 
DNA sequence and the history of his methods of analysis. 
 
IV. Clarke’s Materials and Methods 
In 1987 Clarke supplied a sample of his blood to a group of researchers at 
Applied Biosystems, a small biotechnology company that was working towards the 
development of automated DNA amplification and sequencing techniques. At the time, it 
was not yet possible to sequence a DNA fragment without comparing it to other, known 
sequences. Geneticists sought to replace laborious manual sequencing techniques with 
methods that would enable them to sequence large quantities of DNA rapidly, and Clarke 
sought a record of a nucleotide sequence that would identify an individual uniquely. The 
outcome of this collaboration was the development of the means of cloning a single 
strand of DNA and sequencing the targeted region with a high degree of accuracy, a 
technique later used in DNA fingerprinting and in medical applications in which exact 
nucleotide sequence data is required. At the suggestion of his scientific collaborators, 
Clarke elected to use a sequence from a particular region of the genome that is expressed 
as a protein that “distinguishes self from other,” a fragment of the genome that Clarke 
considered symbolic of his subjects’ unique identity. The new method was used to 
sequence a region of Clarke’s genome called the HLA-DQA-1 (alpha) major 
histocompatibility complex, a protein coding region that is involved in immune system 
function and routinely analyzed in order to match bone marrow transplant recipients with 
suitable donors.  
                                                                                                                                            
Century of the Gene (Harvard University Press, 2002); Raphael Falk, “Long Live the Genome! So Should 
the Gene,” History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 26, no. 1 (2004): 105–121; discussion 123–129. 
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In the 1989 Clinical Chemistry article that documents the findings of this 
research, there appears a visual and textual record of the data output of the analysis of the 
entire 120 base-pair fragment extracted from Clarke’s blood—a set of four wavy lines 
that record the detection of the fluorescent markers with which the cloned DNA 
fragments are labeled, each peak labeled with a capital letter symbolizing a nucleotide. 
(Figure 21.) The histocompatibility complex contributes to the immune system’s ability 
to distinguish self from other, allowing the body to respond to the presence of foreign 
antigens or infectious organisms. It is a response that must be circumvented in order for 
bone marrow transplants to be successful. The sequence data identifies two 
polymorphisms of the histocompatibility complex, information that would be crucial for 
matching Clarke with a donor or a recipient in a bone marrow transplant. The visual 
content and textual information presented by this figure forms a basic component of 
Clarke’s genetic portraits. In light of his subsequent work, one finds on this page of a 
scientific article a minimal portrait of the artist himself as both the commissioner and the 




Figure 21: Sequence of Kevin Clarke’s histocompatibiliy complex gene, excerpted from "Automated DNA 
Sequencing Methods Involving Polymerase Chain Reaction" (Clinical Chemistry, 1989) 
 
The same sequence of letters appear in Clark’s Self-Portrait at Ixuatio (1988), the 
first work in which he uses the format of a DNA sequence derived from his subject 
combined with a photographic image not of but associated with that person. The image he 
used for this work is of two women walking away along a darkened street, which he 
photographed at dawn after a Day of the Dead celebration in Ixuatio, Mexico. (Figure 
22.) Clarke described the moment he shot the picture as a one of catharsis, in which the 
emotional weight of a harrowing illness from which he’d recently recovered suddenly 
dissolved, an experience for which the function of this particular gene has a direct 
symbolic, if not also a biomedical relevance.52 This work is instructive in the 
interpretation of Clarke’s formal practice, because the story of its production conveys 
                                                
52 Personal conversation with the artist, July 13, 2010 
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clearly the importance that Clarke attaches to the accuracy of the genetic data as well as 
the kind of personal intimacy and evocative power that resides in the image that he 
creates.53   
 
Figure 22. Kevin Clarke, Self Portrait in Ixuatio, (1988) 
 
In his portrait of John Cage, Clarke doesn’t use DNA text, opting instead to an 
image of Cage’s chromosomes lines from the sequence data, which have a kind of 
musical feel to them (Figure 23.). Clarke includes in the image a stack of empty portrait 
frames that are rearranged in each of the series of eight panels that compose the portrait. 
The frame, which usually marks the outer limits of an artwork, here becomes its visual 
                                                
53 In his subsequent portraits of his family and friends the process of obtaining a DNA sample itself became 
for Clarke a social and emotionally charged aspect of the work. Like Schneider’s Self-Portrait, though less 
obviously so, Clarke’s portraits involve a moment of medical diagnosis. Working in the late 1980s, the 
production of a DNA sequence required whole blood samples, which were, as a matter of course in the 
laboratory procedures, screened for HIV and for Hepatitis C. The significance of drawing blood would 
have remained had he used a different section of the genome, but in this context it is particularly significant 
that the he embedded a concept of the self that was being compromised by the mechanisms of a retrovirus, 
which transforms the body’s own DNA. This context compounds the sense in which Clarke’s portraits can 
be taken to represent what Alfred Tauber has termed the immune self. See Alfred I. Tauber, The Immune 
































content. The image functions, of course, as symbolic reference to Cage’s own use of form 
in compositions such as 4:33 seconds. But by framing the frame Clarke also makes 
reference to his debt to Cage in his previous series of portraits, the Red Couch: A Portrait 
of America. For this work Clarke photographed people seated on or interacting with a 
gigantic plush red couch, often in extremely unlikely locations. Clark came call the couch 
a “parenthetical device,” which he used to introduce formal continuity into a series of 
portraits. In his portrait of Cage, the movement of the lines takes place outside of the 
frames. This leaves open the question (discussed in Chapter 2) of where the frame of the 
portrait itself begins and ends—whether the image contextualizes and gives meaning to 
the DNA sequence, or whether the DNA sequence anchors the meaning of the image.  
 
   
Figure 23. Kevin Clarke, Portrait of John Cage (1996) (Panels 1, 2 & 8 of 8) 
 
We can see, finally, that Clarke’s portrait of Schiller represents a technically and 
formally advanced development of his portrait formula. For this portrait, Clarke 
photographed the sky in several places that his subject spent time: his birthplace in 
Marbach, in Stuttgart, where Schiller spent several unhappy years as a military doctor, 
and at his later haunts in Weimar and Jena, where Schiller wrote the plays, poetry and 
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philosophical works form which he is best known. The scripted letters that appear over 
the image compose a DNA sequence that was extracted from one of Schiller’s hairs. 
Unable to meet his subject in the flesh, Clarke was forced to make his acquaintance by 
other means. When a subject is unavailable to sit for a portrait in person it is not 
uncommon for artists to refer to paintings, photographs, or verbal and textual descriptions 
of their subjects’ appearance and character. Clarke’s portrait practice, however, required 
a different form of access to Schiller’s person. This was made possible by the discovery 
of a lock of Schiller’s hair inside a locket stored in the archives of the Schiller National 
Museum in Marbach am Neckar. The lock evidently was clipped by Schiller’s son and 
kept as a memento of his father, thus serving much the same function as a portrait. Clark 
collaborated with geneticists at the Berlin-based biotechnology company Agowa AG to 
extract a DNA sample from the hair and to isolate and sequence the same fragment of the 
genome that Clarke uses in each of his portraits as the basis of the ‘genetic depiction.’  
To create the image portion of the work, Clarke layered photographic negatives to 
arrange a carefully manicured canopy of Cumulus clouds. By printing the photo collage 
on color reversal film, he transformed the deep blue shade of the sky into a unnatural 
shade of orange, while the shades of pink, orange and lavender created by sunlight cast 
on the clouds at different times of day are converted into complementary hues of green, 
blue, and yellow and purple. The feeling of optimism with which the artist associates 
Schiller's Ode to Joy is here rendered as buoyant, cartoonish clouds and the riotous hue of 
the sky, while the disconcerting coloration and conflicting directions of shading in the 
image also suggests certain ominous connotations associated with the legacy of optimism 
as a philosophical doctrine. An excerpt of Schiller’s sequenced DNA is inscribed into the 
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image, each character traced from one of Schiller's handwritten manuscripts. As it does in 
many of Clarke portraits, the legibility of the genetic component of the work is 
minimized, if it is even recognizable at all, by its incorporation into the image’s patterns 
and tonality. The genetic text of Schiller’s laboriously analyzed genome appears in his 




Clarke’s portrait of Schiller—his only portrait of a deceased subject—makes clear 
a feature that is present in all genetic portraits. One of the most distinctive features of 
molecular genetics as a medium is its radically expansive temporality. It can represent a 
subject with whom there has never been an encounter, even a caveman frozen in ice for 
thousands of years. It does not rely on memory or text or images or any other mode of 
transmitting representational content. And it also has the capacity to represent traces of 
the past in living individuals in the form of their genealogy, family medical history, etc.. 
Much as photography and film introduced new temporalities into the rhythms of life, 
molecular genetics has opened new temporal domains in the conception of self and 
biological relations. The articulation of genetic time, or the “genetic clock” is comparable 
to the discovery of geologic time in the physical and historical sciences, the consequences 
of which include the opening up of a temporal span in which the gradual change or 
evolution could be conceptualized. The genome itself thus forms an evidentiary and 
imaginative record of time to be thematized in representations of human identity. This 
capacity to capture an expansive time scale is one to which Quinn lays literal claim in his 
  
159 
erroneous, but nonetheless suggestive statement that his portrait of John Sulston “is a 
portrait of his parents, and every ancestor he ever had back to the beginning of Life in the 
universe.” It is central to Schneider’s experimentation with the duration, scale and 
resolution of his photographs. And most intriguingly, this reorganization of the 
temporality of artistic media and thematic content is captured formally in Clarke’s 
anachronistic juxtaposition of Schiller’s DNA sequence with fragments of scenes that his 
subject might have taken in over the course of his own lifetime. 
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Chapter 4. Forbidden Experiments 
 
This chapter explores what must remain liminal to experiment—not in principle, but in 
practice—because the knowledge sought and the methods required for its production are 
deemed too ethically, politically, and institutionally risky. In contrast to the artworks that 
I have discussed in the previous chapters, the performative experiment that I examine 
here is conducted at the interstices of the artworld and the real world of academic 
research. Jennifer Gradecki’s IRB# G10-02-066-01 (2010) vies for inclusion within the 
bounds of conventional science by appealing to the regulatory framework that governs 
research on human subjects. By collapsing the distance between art and scientific life, the 
work reveals how the content of knowledge is itself mediated by the institutional context 
in which research is conducted, funded, and legitimated. The artist confronts the same 
institutional standards and constraints that scientists and some humanistic scholars face in 
designing their research methods. And she justifies her research through the same 
mechanisms of literature review, appeal to institutional authorities for funds and 
permissions, and clearance by an ethics committee before the research—in this case, 
artwork itself—can be undertaken. As such, the notion of science and of experiment that 
this artwork engages is not the abstracted or idealized experiment of philosophy or the 
culturally and temporally distant object of history of science. Rather it is the particular 
institutional, economic, and interpersonal dynamics of science in the making that here 




Figure 24. Jennifer Gradecki, IRB# G10-02-066-01 (2010) (Installation View, UCLA) 
IRB# G10-02-066-01 (2010) is visually understated, indeed sterile in appearance. 
(Figure 24.) A small machine with several wires emerging from it sits on a bare metal 
cart. Within arm’s reach, two chairs are set facing one another. On the wall above the 




On an adjacent wall, a series of letters documents the artist’s efforts to gain approval 
from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA) for a study titled “Social Interaction as a Function of Voluntary Engagement 
with a Shock Machine.” The instructions, coupled with the machine itself, configure the 
set of experiential possibilities that the official correspondence aims to anticipate and to 
regulate.  
As an MFA student in UCLA’s Art Department, Gradecki could have easily 
avoided subjecting her work to IRB scrutiny. In the United States, approval from an IRB 
is required for all research involving human subjects that is conducted at federally funded 
institutions, including universities. Despite the fact that art frequently raises ethical 
concerns, however, and even poses psychic and physical hazards, the requirement to 
obtain IRB approval does not typically apply to artistic practices.1 This is so for the 
simple reason that art generally does not qualify as “research” under the rules 
implemented by the IRB. Research is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations 
Governing the Protection of Human Subjects in Research or “Common Rule” as follows: 
“Research means a systematic investigation, including research development, 
testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge. Activities which meet this definition constitute research for 
purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or supported under a 
program which is considered research for other purposes.”i 
 
While the regulations are frustratingly vague about what it means for an 
investigation to be systematic and knowledge to be generalizable, it is clear that this 
                                                
1 This is changing with the advent of programs like Symbiotica at the University of Western Australia, 
where artists obtain a Masters of Science degree, and new Ph.D. programs in “artistic research.” In such 
programs artists confront many of the same institutional constraints as scientists and other scholars; indeed, 
they avail themselves of the social and material resources of academic institutions in exchange for doing so. 
Artists such as Kathy High who work with animals and biological materials have begun exploring “creative 
ethics” guidelines for the regulation of artistic practice within the university context.  
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definition is meant to distinguish between the substantive content of a program of 
“research” and the context in which happens to be carried out. In other words, it accounts 
for the eventuality that a scientific experiment might be conducted in art department, but 
it does not admit variation in the aims and norms that might inform research in such a 
context. As such, the notion of “artistic research” presents a regulatory conundrum. In 
this context, Gradecki’s decision to apply to the ethics board for approval of an artwork 
that dons the mantle of scientific research constitutes a trespass against historical and 
institutional boundaries between academic disciplines—a provocation that is not without 
disciplinary consequences. 
Disapproval. Disapproval. Disapproval. Each letter from the university’s Office 
of Human Research Protection (OHRP) Program reminds the applicant, in bold type, that 
“the proposed experiment may not be conducted without the board’s approval.” The 
letters explain how the experiment, to which the gallery visitor is invited to subject 
herself, fails to meet prevailing norms of scientific rigor and research ethics. And it fails 
on multiple counts. No hypothesis is offered for testing and no provisions are made to 
collect data that will be likely to yield statistically significant results about participants’ 
experiences. The participants’ privacy will not be protected, as their engagements with 
the shock machine will take place in full view of anyone else who is present in the art 
gallery. And participation may well cause pain or embarrassment. Yet, the artist argues, 
these experiences themselves constitute the aim of the artwork. In dispute is the nature of 
the knowledge that may be gathered through this performative experiment and the extent 
to which the value of that knowledge justifies the risks posed to the bodily health and 
moral integrity of the research subjects.  
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In response to the IRB’s criticisms, Gradecki clarifies her rationale for the study 
and agrees to modify parts of her protocol in order to satisfy some of the concerns raised 
by the board. For example, in place of a Precision Animal Shocker, which she proposed 
to use in the original experimental protocol, she agrees to substitute a Transcutaneous 
Electrical Nerve Stimulation or TENS Unit, a device that is routinely used in physical 
therapy to alleviate pain. She refuses, however, to provide a means of preventing 
participants from coercing one another into participating in the experiment or to collect 
data for quantitative analysis, this being irrelevant to her artistic aims. In the course of 
this exchange, she draws the IRB into debates about the forms of knowledge produced 
within the sciences and the arts, and the ethical as well as the aesthetic and political value 
of that knowledge. Respect for personal autonomy is the ethical gold standard for human 
subjects research, but here the artist’s autonomy enters into consideration, along with the 
competing imperatives of aesthetic novelty, critique and, of course, shock value. 
Ultimately, she exhibits the artwork in direct violation of the rules of the institutional 
structure into which she has electively insinuated herself. The work thereby calls into 
question just what those rules mean and what sorts of experiences and experiments they 
are meant to regulate. Unlike most research programs that fail to win IRB approval and 
therefore never go forward, the work creates a space in which to answer such questions.  
This returns us to the decision faced by the gallery visitor: to shock or not to 
shock; to be shocked or not to allow oneself to be shocked. This decision is only made 
once—or each time anew. In the nexus between two intimate or newly acquainted 
participants, their respective estimations of their own threshold of tolerance for pain, 
surprise and missed opportunity; in the interval between anticipation and reflection, such 
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a decision takes on outsized significance. It becomes uncomfortably deliberate, 
conscious, meaningful—and just as quickly loses all significance, in instantaneous 
testimony to Adorno’s old complaint against the short life of the New. I will not disclose 
yet whether it hurts or not. The work discriminates by the way we subject ourselves and 
others to it, by the calculus of subjectification that we perform in the gulf between 
competing realms of value and their disciplinary oversight bodies. It is just these 
sensations, reflections and social interactions that constitute forbidden experimental 
knowledge. But what is the content of that knowledge? How does its production come to 
be restricted? What is at stake in its disclosure, and why must that disclosure take place 
through the mediation of an artwork? 
The title IRB# G10-02-066-01 suggests that we are invited to see the artwork 
through the eyes of the institution that names, or rather, numbers it. At the same time, the 
title introduces ambiguity about what exactly constitutes the artwork. Is it the 
experimental set-up—the shock machine and the instructions for using it—or the review 
process and its documentation? If it is both, then how are these two dimensions of the 
work related? The manner in which the artwork is installed does little to call attention to 
the substantive content of the letters. With their terse prose and small print, they vie 
poorly for attention with the opportunity to play with the shock machine. What 
manifestly occupies the gallery space is the apparatus and the interactions that it 
occasions. Since the letters are so visually inconspicuous that one might easily overlook 
them altogether, one wonders why they are displayed at all, and how, more importantly, 
they do or ought to influence gallery visitors’ mode of participation in the experiment 
itself. Does the lack of IRB approval make the viewer more or less inclined to use the 
  
166 
shock machine? Does this condition alter participants’ perceptions of pain, concerns 
about safety, or feelings of dignity?  
The status of the correspondence is important for two reasons: firstly, because the 
artwork’s title, the documentation of Gradecki’s exchange with the IRB, and the mode of 
display permit no clear distinctions to be drawn between content, background, and 
context. As such, IRB# G10-02-066-01 radically under-determines the standards and 
aesthetic categories that are relevant for its own interpretation. It seems to be crucial to 
the work’s meaning that it lends itself to analysis under the concepts of science and art, 
and indeed to analysis under the traditional concept of the aesthetic as the science of 
sensory perception as much as the more contemporary concept of the aesthetic as the 
theory of beauty or artistic appreciation. Secondly, the ambiguities that attend this 
artwork are indicative of comparable questions about how institutional review relates to 
and informs the substance of academic research in the normal course of affairs. Does the 
IRB approval process stand apart from the research that it regulates? And how does that 
relation manifest itself? Here Peter Medewar’s observation that “[i]t is no use looking to 
scientific 'papers' for they do not merely conceal, but actively distort the reasoning that 
goes into the work they describe” is salient.2 One does not learn from published scientific 
papers whether research questions or methods were modified to satisfy the IRB; like so 
                                                
2 Quoted in Frederic L. Holmes, “Scientific Writing and Scientific Discovery,” Isis 78, no. 2 (June 1, 
1987): 220–235. As discussed in chapter 1, the kind of reasoning involved in exploratory experimentation 
disappears from published scientific papers, along with the tacit and embodied forms of knowledge that 
required to operate scientific instruments. Given that historians of science have described the process of 
writing up scientific research as a retrospective construction, indeed fictionalized account of the 
methodologies, one wonders how closely the protocols submitted for IRB approval resemble the methods 
described in scientific papers, and moreover, how the requirements for advance planning has reconfigured 
the epistemology of experimentation. See also Frederic Lawrence Holmes, Jürgen Renn, and Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger, eds., Reworking the Bench Research Notebooks in the History of Science, Archimedes; V. 7 
(Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003). 
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much else that relevant to the epistemology of experiment, this aspect of scientific—as 
well as other kinds of research—is rendered invisible in its public presentation. IRB# 
G10-02-066-01 interests me first and foremost because it situates the IRB inside the 
virtual frame of the artwork and, in doing so, draws attention to the role of the IRB itself 
in framing scientific experiments. 
This chapter explores the epistemological and political implications of the IRB 
process by considering how this process becomes visible in the domain of the aesthetic. I 
begin by situating IRB# G10-02-066-01 in relation to its art historical precedents in the 
tradition of institutional critique. In the following section I offer a brief history of the 
institution that is the object of critique here—that of institutional review—before 
analyzing Gradecki’s IRB application and the reasons offered for its subsequent rejection. 
After considering how the work functions as a critique of institutional review, I return to 
the experiment itself. Reflecting upon the primary data of my own experiences gathered 
during four “runs” of the experiment, I explore how the artwork produces a relational 
space in which the opportunity to administer and receive electric shocks stimulates 
reflections on the limits of experimental knowledge.  
 
I. Institutional Critique 
Insofar as the work is addressed as much to the regulatory process as to the 
phenomena that the proposed experiment purports to investigate, IRB# G10-02-066-01 
belongs to the artistic tradition of institutional critique. In the work of its early 
practitioners in the 1960s and ‘70s, artists such as Hans Haacke, Daniel Buren, Michael 
Asher and Marcel Broodthaers, institutional critique was directed at exposing and 
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subverting the material, economic and ideological structures of art museums and 
galleries.3 By shifting attention from the work of art qua autonomous, self-contained 
object toward the conditions under which art is exhibited, interpreted, and valorized as 
cultural and economic capital, their work inscribed the art institution itself into a new 
discursive space in which everything from its architecture to its endowment would be laid 
bare: "Like dye in the bloodstream, the work of these artists […delineates] the circulation 
system of art, but it also operates within its terms," writes Hal Foster.4 Gradecki’s work 
becomes legible as a means of delineating the circulation system of science and its points 
of exchange with that of art when considered in relation to the tactics devised by the early 
group of institution-critical artists (Haacke, Asher, Buren and Broodthaers) and by artists 
loosely assigned to a second generation of institutional critique, including Mark Dion, 
Fred Wilson and Andrea Fraser—Gradecki’s faculty sponsor for IRB# G10-02-066-01.  
Asher’s strategies included dislocating the objects and occasions of aesthetic 
experience from their usual sites of dissemination—moving artworks outside of the 
museum or gallery and bringing other objects in. For Broodthaers, critique took the form 
of appropriating the cultural authority of the art institution itself; he became the curator of 
several ‘fictional’ museums, including the Musée d’Art Moderne: Département des 
Aigles (1968)—the subsequent sale of which “for reasons of bankruptcy” would itself 
constitute another work or act of art; Musée d’Art Moderne à vendre—pour cause de 
faillite (1970–71). Buren, meanwhile, disrupted conventions of display within the 
                                                
3 Varied in their tactics and specific aims, the work of these artists came to be regarded as paradigmatic of a 
coherent genre only in retrospect. For a genealogy of the term “institutional critique” and a reconsideration 
of the organizing logic of the works that are collected under it, see Andrea Fraser, “From the Critique of 
Institutions to an Institution of Critique,” Artforum 44, no. 1 (2005): 278–285. 
4 Hal Foster, Recodings: Art, Spectacle, Cultural Politics (New Press, The, 1998), 106. 
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physical space of the museum by hanging his striped canvases unstretched, and thus 
unsupported by the literal and metaphorical frame that grants paintings their rarefied 
aesthetic and, implicitly, political-economic value.5 The exhibition and circulation of 
these nominal paintings typify, in Buren’s words, “the ambition, not of fitting in more or 
less adequately with the game, nor even of contradicting it, but of abolishing its rules by 
playing with them, and playing another game, on another or the same ground, as a 
dissident.”6 By playing with the rules of the physical organization of the museum, its 
ideological functions would be forced into view—perhaps nowhere more explicitly than 
in Asher’s decision to remove the wall that divided the exhibition space from the sales 
office of the Claire Copley Gallery, Inc. for his 1974 installation.7 
From the late 1960s onwards, Haacke’s institutional critical work was overt in its 
presentation of the antagonism between artists and the institutions that valorize their 
work. For Haacke the white cube of the gallery became a staging ground for “fact-based 
exposes… which spotlighted art's inextricable ties to the ideologically suspect if not 
morally corrupt power elite, recast the site of art as an institutional frame in social, 
economic, and political terms, and enforced these terms as the very content of the art 
work.”8 It was Haacke’s work Sol Goldman and Alex DiLorenzo Manhattan Real Estate 
Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971), along with several other 
works, that led to the cancellation of his planned solo exhibition at the Guggenheim in 
                                                
5 Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “Conceptual Art 1962-1969: From the Aesthetic of Administration to the 
Critique of Institutions,” October 55 (December 1, 1990): 137–39. 
6 Quoted in Foster, Recodings, 221. 
7 K. Peltomäki and M. Asher, Situation Aesthetics: The Work of Michael Asher (The MIT Press, 2010). 
8 For further discussion see Miwon Kwon, “One Place After Another: Notes on Site Specificity,” October 
80 (April 1, 1997): 89.  
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1971. Rumors circulated that his investigation had revealed the shady business interests 
of the museum’s board of trustees, but the official reason given by the museum’s director 
in objection to the Manhattan Real Estate Holdings project was that the work was too 
sociological to qualify as art.9 This criticism becomes especially interesting in relation to 
Gradecki’s work, which her institution judges as not sociological enough to pass for 
science.  
Both Haacke and Buren were visited with the honor of having one of their shows 
cancelled—notorious acts of censorship that had the paradoxical effect of conferring 
upon their work the highest possible recognition of its critical force. In each case, what 
these artists sought to reveal was the physical and ideological conditions of possibility of 
artworks as such, or at least, of artworks as reservoirs of mystical value ostensibly 
outside of the sphere of capital. These practices exposed how museums frame objects for 
cultural consumption and how, in turn, the consumption of culture reproduces a social 
field. Nonetheless, over time critics came increasingly to distrust artists’ ability to 
position themselves outside and against these institutions with whom they are 
inextricably entangled. The institutions of art seem to have a bottomless capacity to 
absorb criticism and metabolize it into an aura of democratic openness. Anything radical 
enough to shock the artworld stands the chance to be re-commodified at a higher level of 
value.10 Institutional critique has itself become institutionalized, Fraser observes, the 
power and pleasure of critique falling victim of its own success.  
                                                
9 Luke Skrebowski, “All Systems Go: Recovering Hans Haacke’s Systems Art,” Grey Room 30, no. Winter 
(2008): 73. 
10 As an extreme example, any one of Damien Hirsch’s exploits can be called into service here.  
  
171 
In response to these criticisms, Fraser has argued that institutional critique—a 
genre that she claims dubious credit for naming and thus institutionalizing herself—must 
be re-conceptualized as a critique of the very concept of art and the social and discursive 
infrastructure that maintains it.11 If institutional critique was once thought to depend on 
artists’ ability to take up a position outside the buildings and bureaucracies that display 
art, buy and sell it, Fraser refigures the original intent of the genre as the reflexive 
critique of the whole conceptual apparatus of criticism, theory and history that entrenches 
art’s meaning. Thus in her own institutional critical work Fraser exploits her status as an 
artworld insider to offer disconcerting museum tours, lectures and performances that 
expose how cultural as much as economic capital is sedimented in and recycled through 
artworld discourse. Indeed, insofar as Fraser’s theoretical interventions change the terms 
for understanding the genre, they ought also to be understood as constitutive of her 
artistic practice. 
Meanwhile, the strategies of institutional critique have found renewed critical 
purchase within the discursive spaces of historical and scientific knowledge production. 
Artists such as Mark Dion and Fred Wilson and have cast their critical gaze beyond the 
institution of art and toward historical societies, university archives, and natural history 
museums.12 Here, artists enter into different sorts of relationships with the institutions 
that they engage critically. If artists cannot position themselves outside of art they can 
nonetheless take up critical positions within the institutions of science or of natural and 
social history. In these institutional worlds, their outsider status is presumed—and it is by 
                                                
11 Fraser, “From the Critique of Institutions to an Institution of Critique.” 
12 To this list also belongs Michael Oatman’s work with the archives of the University of Vermont's 
Flemming Museum to create Long Shadows: Henry Perkins and the Eugenics Survey of Vermont (Vermont 
Pure) (1995-2000). For further discussion see Chapter 5. Racializing Experiments. 
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trying to get inside through which critique proceeds. Indeed, it is their status as artists that 
permits Dion and Wilson to be welcomed into museums to critique the classificatory 
systems used to organize artifacts and produce knowledge therein. And it is precisely by 
exploiting their outsider status that artists are able to locate the liminal spaces between 
academic disciplines and its institutional formations and as such to expose their limits.13  
Dion’s work is exemplary what might be regarded as a new, trans-disciplinary 
form of institutional critique. In contrast to the work of people like Haacke, Buren and 
Asher, Dion’s relationship to Natural History and University museums has been 
described as “symbiotic and cooperative, rather than parasitic and aggressive.”14 In 2007, 
the London Museum of Natural History commissioned Dion to create an art exhibition in 
honor of the 300th birthday of Carl Linnaeus, the creator of the binomial nomenclature 
system that is now used to classify biological organisms (as discussed in the introduction 
to this dissertation). Dion was provided with access to the museum’s specimen 
collections as well as a scientific staff, with whom he worked to survey the biodiversity 
of four sites in and around London. The exhibition, titled Systema Metropolis, is a playful 
interrogation of how biological knowledge is organized by Linnaeas’ Systema Naturae.  
                                                
13 These limits are not transcendental but rather social and historical. As such, the critique of institutions 
converges in certain important respects with the sociology of knowledge. Aaron Panofsky has drawn a 
suggestive comparison between the Duchamp's artistic practice and sociology of knowledge, emphasizing 
how both turn attention towards context and conditions of possibility. Yet Panofsky’s view that critique 
depends upon self-reflexivity within a discipline leads him to the conservative position that the efficacy of 
sociology of knowledge extends only to sociological knowledge, and not to other disciplines such as 
scientific knowledge. By contrast, I contend that reflexivity can also be produced by taking an insider 
position from outside, or making oneself an outsider from within, as in Fraser’s estrangement of the 
museum context. These hybrid practices of reflexivity allow the forms of self-critique to be transported 
across disciplines. Aaron L. Panofsky, “From Epistemology to the Avant-garde,” Theory, Culture & 
Society 20, no. 1 (February 1, 2003): 61 –92. 
14 Marion Endt, “Beyond Institutional Critique: Mark Dion’s Surrealist Wunderkammer at the Manchester 
Museum,” Museum and Society 5, no. 1 (2007): 10. 
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Dion’s impostures yield an art installation within a natural history museum that 
looks almost, but not quite, like a conventional science installation. One key difference is 
that Dion’s strange specimen collections and parodic taxonomies are designed to raise 
questions rather than to reproduce conclusions arrived at long ago. By exploiting the 
space between the abstract institution of art and the concrete institution of the natural 
history museum, Dion foregrounds the natural history museum as a working institution of 
knowledge production and not merely its reproduction and display. He plays with the 
rules not so much to abolish them as to enliven dead facts and objects and imbue and 
museum visitors with a sense of curiosity. Critique may be understood as an exposure of 
conditions of possibility, and as such it can serve destructive or in the modernist, neo-
Kantian sense, corrective ends. Here, as in much of Dion’s work, the effect of critique is 
restore his subject matter from the stultifying effects of institutionalization. 
Fred Wilson’s contemporary practice of institutional critique raises the level of 
engagement with these questions to social history and further expands the idea of 
institution as such. Here, we might see the institution as any materialization of 
knowledge, qua Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things. In 1992, Wilson was invited by 
the Maryland Historical Society to curate an exhibition using the museum’s archives and 
historical staff. The resulting exhibition, Mining the Museum (1992), displays the 
Society’s own role as a site of institutional racism.15 Retrieved from the archives and 
exhibited according to the banal conventions of historical display are collections of 
objects like an ornate silver tea set and a pair iron shackles labeled “Metalwork 1723-
                                                
15 Fred Wilson and Howard Halle, “Mining the Museum,” Grand Street, no. 44 (January 1, 1993): 151–
172; Contemporary (Baltimore, Md.) and Fred Wilson, Mining the Museum - an Installation by Fred 
Wilson (Baltimore (Md.): The Contemporary, 1994); Darby English, How to See a Work of Art in Total 
Darkness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007), chap. 3 “Fantasias of the Museum.” 
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1880,” a selection of antique chairs arranged around a whipping post, examples of 
“Cabinetmaking 1820-1960,” and empty pedestals for Frederick Douglas, Harriet 
Tubman, and Benjamin Banneker—historical figures conspicuously absent from the 
society’s collection of portrait busts. Elsewhere, an oil painting shows a young black boy 
wearing a metal collar as he waits dotingly upon his master. Wilson’s curatorial decisions 
reveal a repressed history, stories that remain untold, or, once told, willfully forgotten by 
those who would prefer to admire a more flattering and comfortable image of American 
history.  
Like Dion, Wilson deploys the institution of art—which sanctions the use of 
alternative taxonomies and periodizations—to disrupt another institution’s repressive 
logics. Wilson’s work is exemplary of how institutional critique can be deployed in the 
service of what has been called agnotology or the epistemology of ignorance.16 Whereas 
the traditional aim of epistemology is to understand how knowledge produced, the 
epistemology of ignorance seeks out gaps in knowledge, aporias, sites of misinformation 
and the active spread of disinformation. It examines how and why knowledge about 
specific matters is not produced or sustained over time, why certain topics go 
uninvestigated, and why certain people remain unrecognizable as knowers. And where 
ignorance is produced and maintained systematically and strategically, agnotology 
                                                
16 Nancy Tuana first used this term in her analysis the repression of knowledge of female orgasm and 
sexual anatomy. More recently, she has written about the epistemology of ignorance in relation to race and 
racism, while others have investigated the production of doubt, or agnogenesis, about issues like climate 
change and the carcinogenic effects of cigarette smoking, while McGoey has written of the strategic value 
of ignorance a means of distributing and defusing responsibility within bureaucratic structures. Nancy 
Tuana, “Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance,” Hypatia 19, no. 1 (February 
1, 2004): 194–232; Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (SUNY 
Press, 2007); Robert Proctor and Londa Schiebinger, eds., Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of 
Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008); Linsey McGoey, “On the Will to Ignorance in Bureaucracy,” 
Economy and Society 36, no. 2 (2007): 212–235. 
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explores the ethical and political value of knowing and not knowing, of deliberate and 
feigned ignorance. Every system of knowledge necessarily produces loci of ignorance; to 
expose the limits of such a system requires that one navigate its contours with the 
familiarity of an insider and yet retain the naïvete of a stranger.  
The target of Gradecki’s critique is not the institution of science itself but rather 
one particular historical formation—namely the Institutional Review Board—that 
exercises enormous influence over the conduct of specific kinds of social scientific 
research in universities today, particularly over experimental social psychology. IRB# 
G10-02-066-01 exposes how the rules and bureaucratic structure of institutional ethics 
review regulate the production not only of knowledge but also of ignorance and, more 
importantly, calls attention to the manner in which ethics regulations tend to depoliticize 
academic research. Gradecki’s work plays at the border between insider and outsider, but 
unlike Dion and Wilson, she does so without the sanction of the institution. She was not 
invited to submit her experiment qua artwork to the IRB and, in fact, the first question 
that is raised by her decision to do so is whether or not this—or any—artwork falls within 
the board’s jurisdiction. The artists’ decision to engage with the IRB is the condition of 
possibility of the participant’s decision to engage with the shock machine, yet this 
condition becomes visible only because Gradecki treats it as elective. For a social 
psychology researcher, especially for a student, the IRB’s approval would in fact be 
necessary for the conduct of the research, or at least for the student to receive any credit 
or support for the research. For an artist performing the role of a social psychologist, the 
IRB’s approval or lack thereof becomes part of the research itself, and her decision to 
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show the work without approval renders the IRB’s decision separable from that which it 
aims to regulate.  
Art gallery visitors who choose to engage voluntarily with the shock machine do 
so in the context of this refusal of sanction from the IRB. The IRB itself is thus brought 
into the sphere of conditions that the participant may or may not take into account, along 
with those other factors that motivate the IRB’s concerns. The IRB’s decision may or 
may not become a factor in the decision of the viewer to participate in the research, but 
the board is thereby deprived of its paternal status as the institution that determines the 
conditions under which participation can be considered voluntary. In this sense, 
Gradecki’s work retrieves for the critique of scientific institutions the antagonistic 
tendency that lent critical efficacy to early examples of institutional critique that were 
focused on the artworld. I want to return to the question of voluntary engagement with 
the shock machine, but first I want to consider what is at stake for the artist in her 
voluntary engagement with the IRB—a decision that is arguably far more risky and 
ethically problematic, even, than that faced by participants in the artwork itself. 
 
II. Institutional Review 
All research involving human subjects that is conducted at federally funded 
American institutions now requires clearance from an Institutional Review Board. Since 
the inception of IRBs in the 1960s, their jurisdiction has expanded from an original focus 
on biomedical experimentation to a wide array of social scientific and humanistic 
disciplines in which people are observed, interviewed and surveyed. Although few would 
question the motivations behind the review process, in practice its specific institutional 
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incarnations have drawn criticisms on a variety of grounds. Scholars in the social 
sciences and the humanities complain that ethics guidelines designed for the biomedical 
sciences do not suit the methodologies or address the ethical challenges of their fields. 
And virtually everyone, including IRB members themselves, agree that the laws are 
vague and the bureaucracy is byzantine.  
The history of the development of IRB regulations has been thoroughly 
documented elsewhere.17 A brief summary will suffice to convey a few details of this 
complex history that are particularly relevant to the artwork under consideration here. 
The standard narrative begins with Hippocrates and jumps directly to the 1947 trial of the 
Nazi doctors at the court of Nuremburg for atrocities allegedly committed in the name of 
science.18 Although there is a long history of regulation of medical research by state and 
religious authorities and professional societies, it was only within the postwar context 
that the first steps were taken to internationalize standards for the treatment of human 
research subjects through a list of ten principles known as the Nuremburg Code. The first 
principle states that “the voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential,” 
and it offers a detailed explication of what voluntary consent entails. The following nine 
principles stipulate that experiments must be designed in such a manner as to minimize 
risk of injury or death to participants and to provide knowledge that is of humanitarian 
value adequate to justify the suffering and risks incurred by human subjects. These 
                                                
17 See Caroline H Bledsoe et al., “Regulating Creativity: Research and Survival in the IRB Iron Cage,” 
Northwestern University Law Review 101 (2007): 593; Evelyne Shuster, “Fifty Years Later: The 
Significance of the Nuremberg Code,” N Engl J Med 337, no. 20 (1997): 1436–1440; Zachary M Schrag, 
Ethical Imperialism: Institutional Review Boards and the Social Sciences, 1965-2009 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
18 For a critical revision of whig history of IRBs see Carol A. Heimer and JuLeigh Petty, “Bureaucratic 
Ethics: IRBs and the Legal Regulation of Human Subjects Research,” Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science 6, no. 1 (December 2010): 601–626. 
  
178 
principles were reaffirmed and expanded by the World Medical Assembly in 1964 in the 
Declaration of Helsinki: Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical 
Research Involving Human Subjects, which added that consent must be obtained in 
writing and research protocols must be reviewed by independent committees.  
In the American context, legislation was prompted in part by the disclosure of the 
Tuskegee story in 1972 and an ensuring firestorm of criticism about government funds 
being used to conduct dangerous and unethical research on human subjects. As part of the 
Tuskegee Syphilis Study, which ran from 1932 to 1972, hundreds of black men were left 
untreated for the disease so that its etiology could be observed, even after a cure in the 
form of penicillin had long been available. By 1966 the American National Institute of 
Health (NIH) had already developed internal standards for the protection of human 
subjects, but these rules affected only its own researchers and grantees. These standards 
were elevated to legal status in 1974 when congress passed the National Research Act, 
creating the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical 
and Behavioral Research. The Commission met from 1974-78 and ultimately produced 
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Research, which articulated the philosophical foundations of the new 
regulations in terms of the three pillars of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. 
After much debate and numerous revisions, in 1991 newly clarified regulations known as 
the “Common Rule” were accepted by fifteen federal agencies, a move that greatly 
expanded oversight of federally funded research. By this point, every agency or 
university that received federal funds was required to establish its own IRB to oversee all 
research conducted at that institution, regardless of whether particular research projects 
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were funded by federal grants. My summary reflects only the barest outline of this 
intricate bureaucratic history. At the national and international level, current ethics 
regulations reflect the sociology and politics of the bureaucracy itself as one of 
contestation, negotiation, refusal and censure.19 It may not be surprising, then, that many 
find the ethical and epistemological language of these regulations wanting in substance—
nor that the legalistic rhetoric of this process would figure prominently in Gradecki’s 
aesthetic.  
One of the most common criticisms of IRBs is that they operate according to a 
biomedical model of research, in which controlled experiments—often in the form of 
clinical trials—are the norm. The historical events that provoked the creation of the IRB 
regulatory system were indeed primarily concerned with the unethical treatment of 
human subjects in medical experiments. Nonetheless, the regulatory framework applied 
to “social and behavioral research” from its inception in 1974. The history of these 
sciences does supply several examples from the 1960s and ‘70s that aroused concern 
about not only physical but also psychological and social harms that could arise from 
research. Stanley Milgram is infamous for having deceived his subjects into thinking that 
they were participating in an experiment on how averse stimuli affects memory and 
learning when, in fact, what he was studying was their willingness to obey orders—even 
against their own better moral judgment. More disturbing than his protocol, perhaps, 
were his findings that most people were willing to administer electric shocks to another 
                                                
19 On the IRB as an embodiment of Weber’s metaphor of the “iron cage of bureaucratic rationality” see 
Bledsoe et al., “Regulating Creativity.” The American model of ethics regulations have been adopted 
internationally, however differences in the funding structures for academic research affect the scope of 
these regulations and the manner in which they are implemented. Indeed the higher prevalence of private 
universities and funding sources in the U.S. may allow (some) American researchers in the social sciences 
and the humanities to evade IRB scrutiny to a greater extent than their counterparts in countries like Canada 
and Australia, where most research is funded through centralized public granting agencies.  
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person when instructed to do so by a white-coated authority figure, even as they listened 
to screams for mercy from an actor pretending to be the recipient of the shocks. The 
Stanford Prison Experiment conducted by Philip Zimbardo disclosed a similarly 
disturbing picture of the human dispositions that would manifest themselves under 
conditions of imprisonment. In this study—which in fact passed ethics review—
participants were assigned the role of either prisoners or prison guards in a study; the 
experiment had to be terminated only six days into the planned two weeks because the 
guards had become so sadistic towards the prisoners that risk of serious harm arose.20 
Like the Milgram experiment, the Stanford Prison Study was meant to reveal human 
tendencies that could explain the atrocities of the Second World War, including those 
which motivated the creation of IRBs in the first place—tendencies that research subjects 
found distressing to recognize in themselves.  
A third example, Laud Humphreys’ study of the Tearoom Trade, presents a 
different model of an ethically problematic research methodology.21 His was not an 
experiment but a sociological study of anonymous sex between men in public restrooms, 
in which Humphreys himself was a covert participant observer. The ethical breach came 
when, in order to discover what sorts of men engaged in such behavior, Humphreys 
followed his unwitting subjects, obtained their license plate numbers, convinced his 
university’s campus police that he needed the names and addresses attached to the plates 
for purposes of “market research” and proceeded to show up at the men’s homes under 
the same pretense to conduct extensive interviews about their social and personal lives. 
                                                
20 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View, 1st ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 
1974); Philip G. Zimbardo, Stanford Prison Experiment: a Simulation Study of the Psychology of 
Imprisonment (Philip G. Zimbardo, Inc., 1972). 
21 Schrag, Ethical Imperialism, 20–23. 
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“[L]ike other next door neighbors, the participants in tearoom sex are of no one type,” he 
concluded—but this intriguing finding was overshadowed by accusations that the logic 
by which he justified his methods would have justified Nazi medical experiments.22  
These three paradigmatic cases from the social and behavioral sciences are 
interesting because they tread near the borders of acceptability of what sorts of social 
phenomena can be represented experimentally. And in each case, one cannot help but 
suspect that concerns about the ethics of the research methodology are inextricably 
connected with the content of the research and its conclusions. Both Milgram and 
Zimbardo’s experiments were meant to isolate and reproduce under controlled 
experimental conditions features of the very historical situation that international research 
ethics guidelines were designed to prohibit ever from happening again. They discovered 
that the willingness to inflict pain or even to kill under orders and to readily assume and 
abuse of a position of power were not uniquely German failings of human character, but 
rather were relatively easy to elicit experimentally.  
Humphreys found a few men willing to talk openly about their sexual behavior 
but he interviewed most of his subjects without their voluntary and informed consent. He 
defended his actions by reasoning that “I believe that preventing harm to his respondents 
should be the primary interest of the scientist. We are not, however, protecting a 
harrassed [sic] population of deviants by refusing to look at them.”23 Ethics regulations 
necessarily impose limits on investigating aspects of the social world, especially aspects 
of the world that are considered deplorable—whether for deep and abiding moral reasons 
                                                
22 Ibid., 21. 
23 Ibid., 22. 
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or because of historically contingent mores.24 There may well be good reasons why 
certain subjects should remain uninvestigated, cases in which knowledge might 
exacerbate inequities or prejudice, for example. Yet these are not the kinds of questions 
that IRBs are set up to contend with. Rather, the broader ethical and political implications 
of research tend to be sublimated into concerns about methodology—a tendency that 
IRB# G10-02-066-01 puts on exhibition. 
Given this history, it is unsurprising that concerns have mounted about the extent 
to which the requirement to obtain IRB approval influences the substantive content of the 
knowledge produced at publicly funded institutions by constraining the types of questions 
that academic researchers investigate and the specific methods that they may use to 
answer those questions. The substantial epistemological implications of IRB system have 
not been addressed in the philosophical literature on scientific experimentation. This 
omission may be because the IRB is a contingent historical circumstance of relatively 
recent provenance and because work on scientific experimentation has tended to focus on 
physics, chemistry and molecular biology rather than fields like biomedicine and social 
science, where human subjects research is performed. Although the issue has not received 
philosophical attention, the role of IRB review in driving and constraining research has 
                                                
24 When it is impossible, unethical, or simply bureaucratically prohibitive to conduct an experiment, 
researchers may locate a situation in the world that sufficiently resembles that which they would like to 
investigate and so treat it as a found experiment, (see chapter 2 of this dissertation for discussion of the 
methodology of found experiments). Because found experiments depend upon establishing a strong 
correlation (and thus a possible causal relation) between two variables and excluding other confounding 
influences, events of short duration or extreme deviation from the norm— holidays and cultural events, 
natural and industrial disasters, acts of war—lend themselves to being analyzed in these terms. Do 
contemporary ethics regulations exert a pressure on researchers that would lead them to favor the 




received enormous attention from social scientists and others whose research agendas 
have conflicted with the review process. 
The problems and merits of this regulatory apparatus are still subject to vociferous 
debate today. In their study of the impacts of IRBs on research at their home institution of 
Northwestern University, Bledsoe et al. have described the principal responses adopted 
by scholars’ terms of deterrence and consensual censorship. While many social and 
natural scientists support ethics regulations in principle, there is now a vast literature that 
describes negotiation with university IRBs as “terror,” “censorship,” “tyranny,” 
“nightmare,” and the like.25 Researchers in the social sciences and humanities have 
deplored the “ethical imperialism” of applying biomedical ethical standards to other 
fields and raised grave concerns about the chilling effects of the IRB system on 
scholarship across the university. The requirement to obtain advance approval imposes 
extensive delays on research, deters scholars from methodologies that are likely to be 
questioned—such as fieldwork, interviews, and even conversations between consenting 
adults—and ultimately constrains intellectual freedom.26  
Ethical regulations are responsive to social and cultural norms and to specific 
historical events. In some cases, particularly in the social sciences, these same events 
motivate research questions: are most people disposed to follow the orders of an authority 
figure, even against their own better judgment? Determining what kind of questions can 
be asked and how they can be answered always requires finding a balance between these 
concerns. One of the chief complaints against the IRB system is that because the rules are 
                                                
25 Ibid.  
26 Christopher Shea, “‘Don’t Talk to the Humans: The Crackdown on Social Science Research’,” Lingua 
Franca, 2000; Bledsoe et al., “Regulating Creativity”; Schrag, Ethical Imperialism. 
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based on a biomedical model they to not address specific ethical difficulties that arise 
within different academic disciplines.27 Even the duty to do no harm, a basic imperative 
of medical ethics, comes into conflict with the ethical commitments of many researchers 
in the social sciences and the humanities whose work is explicitly directed at the 
remediation of harms.28  
One of the prominent criticisms of the ethical position embodied in IRB 
regulations is that they privilege ethical obligations to individuals over those to social 
groups. The purpose is to protect against a small group of people being exploited for the 
benefit of others. But it prohibits politically engaged researchers, for example, from 
investigating Klan members or stockbrokers for the benefit of the larger society. But 
perhaps more ethically worrisome is that, in an effort to protect the subjects considered 
especially vulnerable to harm, coercion or exploitation—such as children, pregnant 
women, prisoners, disabled people—the regulations have the effect of making it difficult 
to do research on anyone who is socially disadvantaged. Researchers report being 
blocked from using gay people, undocumented immigrants, racial and religious 
minorities, poor people, HIV positive people, or members of virtually any socially 
disadvantaged group as research subjects.29 In this sense, IRB decisions have been 
                                                
27 Deborah Martin, “Bureacratizing Ethics: Institutional Review Boards and Participatory Research,” 
ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 6, no. 3 (n.d.): 319–328. 
28 Schrag, Ethical Imperialism, 16–19. 
29 Judith K. Bernhard and Julie E. E. Young, “Gaining Institutional Permission: Researching Precarious 
Legal Status in Canada,” Journal of Academic Ethics 7, no. 3 (November 2009): 175–191; “Who’s Afraid 
of Incestuous Gay Monkey Sex? | Inside Higher Ed”, n.d., 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/08/14/soc; James H. Sanders and Christine Ballengee-Morris, 
“Troubling the IRB: Institutional Review Boards’ Impact on Art Educators Conducting Social Science 
Research Involving Human Subjects,” Studies in Art Education: A Journal of Issues and Research in Art 




implicated quite directly in the making harmful social conditions unknowable. If it is 
unethical to reproduce certain conditions under experimental conditions then they remain 
unknowable within the disciplinary knowledge of social science.  
Against this background Gradecki’s decision to solicit IRB review for a project 
conducted in an Art Department can be read as an invitation to censor not only her work 
but that of her fellow students and faculty. She did so at the risk of exacerbating the well-
recognized problem of “Mission Creep” that is associated with an expansion of IRB 
bureaucracy. Like Haacke, Gradecki antagonizes the IRB and provokes its censorship. By 
taking this risk, however, she is able to draw the IRB out of its functional role and create 
a site for critical reflection on the IRB’s role in science itself. But Gradecki’s exposition 
of the institutional structure does not exhaust the content of the artwork. Rather, her work 
enables us to examine the institution and the experiment itself, allowing the decision of 
the board to be revisited by the gallery viewer. The review process is thus shifted from its 
role as a necessary condition of the experiment to a contingent adjunct to it. The work 
provokes a meta-review of the board’s initial one.  
Insofar as IRB# G10-02-066-01 isolates experimental form from artistic content, 
the work precisely embodies the notion of a performative experiment that I have been 
developing throughout this dissertation. The artwork is staged as an experiment—albeit 
an experiment missing or lacking in certain key features, namely a clearly articulated 
hypothesis, data collection and analysis, etc. Yet it is staged, from the planning phase 
through to its actual installation, so as to sufficiently resemble a scientific experiment to 
engage the attention of the institutional that bears primary responsibility for determining 
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what counts as such.30 By oscillating between indiscernibility and parody, IRB# G10-02-
066-01 exhibits the epistemological structure that a scientific experiment embody as well 
as the institutional conditions under which the epistemology of experiment is evaluated in 
practice on a day to day basis.  
 
III. IRB# G10-02-066-01: An Institutional Critique of Institutional Review  
In her first application to the IRB, Gradecki describes the aims of her research, 
outlines a methodology, and motivates her work in relation to previous research. She 
states that her aims are to “observe how people, if given the opportunity, would engage 
with an electric shock machine in a completely voluntary situation within a public 
setting” and to “to open a dialogue about the types of human relations that can be created 
when people are given access to a machine typically used as an aversive stimulus.” 
(Application p. 5) She hypothesizes that, given the opportunity to take part in such an 
experiment, most people would not participate at all, and of those who did so, most 
would choose to shock one another, and also that people would be more likely to 
participate with trusted friends than with strangers. Expecting her research would pose 
minimal risk to human subjects, she requested expedited review. 
The research methods described in the proposal differ from the experiment as I 
have described it above in several important respects. With the exception of the shock 
machine itself, the physical set-up remains for the most part unchanged. However, the 
                                                
30 The peer review process bears the second line of responsibility for establishing the credibility—within a 
discipline—of particular methodologies of knowledge production and their correct implementation. The 
fragility of this process has also been questioned through parody, most famously by Alan Sokal, a physicist 
sought to contest the use of scientific jargon in literary theory by submitting an intentionally nonsensical 
paper to Social Text in 1996. By challenging the ability of a scientific institution to assess cultural and 
aesthetic value or the ability of a cultural institution to assess scientific value these hoaxes expose the limits 
of disciplinary authority. 
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application submitted to the IRB is tailored specifically for research to be conducted on 
the UCLA campus in order to fulfill requirements for a graduate degree from the 
university. As such, the application specifies the protocol to be adhered to for the 
duration of a single performance of the experiment at UCLA’s MFA Show between 
March 4th and March 12th, 2010. It is not a script for repeat performances. As such, 
Gradecki promised to be present in her capacity as the Principle Investigator (PI) 
throughout the exhibition of the artwork and therefore available to answer questions and 
to screen prospective participants to make sure that they are over the age of 18, not 
pregnant, and are free from any health conditions that would make it unduly risky to 
participate in the experiment. She also planned to obtain participants’ consent in writing 
prior to their participation in the experiment, to limit their time with the machine to 5 
minutes, and request that her research subjects answer a brief questionnaire about their 
experiences. At no point would participants be obligated to supply their names or any 
identifying information—although the experiment would be conducted in a public space 
where they would be visible to other visitors to the gallery. The artist’s own observations 
and the questionnaires were to furnish the data for descriptive statistics to be displayed in 
the gallery setting along with the experimental set-up itself. Finally, although she 
anticipated that the risk of harm or discomfort would be minimal, she assured the Board 
that any participant who experienced adverse health consequences would be escorted to 
the nearby Ronald Reagan Medical Center.  
In response to the application’s question regarding the background and 
significance of the proposed research, Gradecki discussed the use of shock machines as 
adverse stimuli in experiments on a broad range of psychological and behavioral 
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responses, including Milgram’s controversial obedience study as well as recent research 
on aggression. She also contextualizes her work in relation to the history of art, situating 
her work in relation to Nicolas Bourriaud’s concept of relational aesthetics and to work 
by artists such as Valie Export, Adrian Piper and Carsten Höller in which the audience is 
subjected to disorienting physical stimuli and uncomfortable social situations. This 
artistic tradition has converged with the history of social psychology, she noted. Artist 
Rod Dickinson restaged Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority experiments (Re-
enactment, 2002) and artist Artur Żmijewski repeated the Stanford Prison Experiment 
conducted by Philip Zimbardo in 1973 (Repetition, 2005). Gradecki argues that, although 
there is some ambiguity about what constitutes “research” in the arts, her work counts as 
research in the sense that it makes reference and responds to these precedents in the 
history of art and the history of science. But whereas scientists are typically concerned 
with deriving results from their research, artistic research concerns the “style or form of 
execution—the way of doing something.” (ibid. p.6) 
Notably, Gradecki does not make reference to the history of institutional critique 
by way of justification for her work. Like Milgram, she deceives her interlocutors on the 
IRB into thinking she wants to conduct one experiment in order to conduct another. She 
does not warn them—as she does the chair of the art department—that she plans to 
exhibit the application process itself as the as the very content of the work of art. But of 
course, she does want to conduct the shock experiment, not in order to obtain determinate 
results but rather in order to explore how such results are obtained. In this respect her 
protocol is designed according to the aims of art and her research is directed towards 
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finding out how and why people participate in social psychology experiments in the first 
place.  
Although Gradecki’s research questions are open-ended, her experiment is 
designed to be sufficiently controlled so as to make possible the collection of qualitative 
and quantitative data as well as to meet the standard requirements for the protection of 
research subjects. One of the tasks of every IRB is to consider whether proposed research 
methods are well designed and to make suggestions for improvement in the event that the 
methods appear to be flawed from the outset. This makes IRB review a particularly 
fraught, if also valuable, process for students. Learning to plan research in advance and 
describe it in sufficient detail to obtain permission to conduct it is now part and parcel of 
scientific training. When a researcher applies to the IRB for Expedited Review the 
application is reviewed by the chair of the board or a specially appointed member. There 
are four possible outcomes to this process: approval, approval pending modifications, 
referral to the committee for full review, or a determination that the applicant is not 
engaged in human subjects research and therefore does not require IRB approval for her 
work. Review by the entire committee is required before disapproval can be issued—as it 
was in Gradecki’s case. The experiment titled “Social Interaction as a Function of 
Voluntary Engagement with as Shock Machine” was rejected on account of lack of 
scholarly or scientific merit and because the board considered it to pose a safety risk to 
subjects. A close examination of the IRB’s reasoning, however, calls into question why 
the experiment was judged to be subject to review in the first place.  
The board’s criticisms fall into three basic categories. First, the aims, hypotheses, 
and rationale for the study are vague. Second, the methods do not describe how the data 
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collected will be quantified and they do not indicate the size or composition of the sample 
population—factors that must be accounted for if one is to derive statistically significant 
results. In sum, the IRB determined that “there is no objective, a priori plan describing 
how the data will be used once they are obtained.” (letter 1) Finally, the IRB expressed 
concern that subjects might pressure or coerce others into participating in the experiment, 
that they might suffer embarrassment, pain or injury from the shocks, and that the public 
setting of experiment might compromise subjects’ ability to give voluntary consent. 
These criticisms are decisive because if the content of the knowledge that may be 
obtained through this study is indeterminate then the value of such knowledge cannot 
justify risks to the safety of research subjects. 
 The grounds upon which the IRB rejected Gradecki’s application indicate that 
they treated the question of the “scientific or scholarly merit” according to the standards 
typically used to assess scientific research. By those standards, the proposed research is 
simply a poorly designed experiment that fails to balance risks with benefits. Instead of 
redesigning her research plan as the IRB demands, however, Gradecki contests their 
decision in writing. In a letter that becomes part of the artwork itself, she insists that, 
“while this study draws heavily from the history of psychology, it is intended as a work 
of art rather than a scientific experiment.” As such, she argues, the scholarly merit of the 
work should be evaluated on the basis of artistic rather than scientific norms. The IRB’s 
demands for a clearer hypothesis and rationale and for more carefully controlled data 
collection procedures are therefore not appropriate; indeed to introduce such elements 
could compromise the artistic value of the work by foreclosing the range of possible 
outcomes and responses that it might elicit. She even goes so far as to argue that the 
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potential for coercion, the likelihood that participation will not be evenly distributed by 
age, sex, etc., and lack of privacy afforded to research subjects are all part of what makes 
the work interesting from an artistic point of view. In contrast to a controlled experiment, 
open-endedness is a virtue in an artwork. Gradecki therefore asks the board to reconsider 
whether the proposed artwork is indeed subject to review under the laws and university 
policies that regulate human subjects research.  
As noted above, research is defined in the Code of Federal Regulations Governing 
the Protection of Human Subjects in Research as follows: “Research means a systematic 
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to 
develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge. Activities which meet this definition 
constitute research for purposes of this policy, whether or not they are conducted or 
supported under a program which is considered research for other purposes.”31 The IRB’s 
response to Gradecki’s request for exemption from review is as straightforward as it is 
unsatisfying: because it to be conducted for the purposes of obtaining a graduate degree 
the proposed study is presumed to contribute to “generalizable knowledge.”32 As critics 
have frequently complained, the legal definition of research is excessively vague; the 
meanings of “systematic” and “generalizable” remain unspecified, as is the clarification 
added at the end that activities which meet this definition are considered research 
regardless of whether or not they are considered research for other purposes. The 
decision by the UCLA board seems to invert this logic: the activities in questions are 
conducted under a program that is considered research for other purposes; therefore such 
                                                
31 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005). 
32 James McGough, “Letter 2: UCLA IRB to Jennifer Gradecki”, June 25, 2010. 
  
192 
activities are considered research in this case—despite the fact that the IRB seems to 
doubt the systematicity and generalizability of Gradecki’s experiment and/or of artwork 
in general. As in so many cases, the decision reached here seems to have little bearing on 
substantive epistemological or ethical issues, much less aesthetic ones. Rather, what 
Gradecki’s application for IRB approval for an artwork dramatizes is the pressure that 
this regulatory system exerts on both the production and the characterization of scholarly 
work across disciplines.  
The crucial assumption on which both Gradecki and the IRB concur is the 
definition of art as a form of research. What is interesting about this exchange is that it 
recapitulates and puts on display the kinds of interactions that numerous researchers 
report: research is assessed on the model of a medical experiments and researchers are 
faced with the choice between modifying their methodologies and explaining why their 
work does not contribute to generalizable knowledge. Under the pressure of this 
definition, oral historians have found it necessary to insist that history is the description 
of an irreducibly particular past and is therefore not generalizable—a claim that 
philosophy of history would complicate.33 To put the matter in Kantian terms, how, for 
example, ought we to use this criterion to distinguish between objectivity and the 
subjective universality of a pure judgment of taste? Generalizable knowledge is 
something that both science and art lay claim to – although in quite different ways.  
                                                
33 To confound matters further, Zachary Schrag invokes Aristotle’s Poetics to justify history’s exemption 
from IRB oversight: “Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for poetry 
tends to express the universal, history the particular.” Bledsoe et al., “Regulating Creativity,” 611. See also: 
(http://www.institutionalreviewblog.com/2011/08/aristotle-history-is-not-generalizable.html, Accessed 
November 12, 2011) But by this logic it seems that poetry and the arts should require oversight, at least 
insofar artistic production involves activities that may be considered research on human subjects, activities 
such as observation, interviews, reading private correspondence, etc.  
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What I wish to argue is that artwork, in performing such secondary reflection, 
serves as a tool for the study of how knowledge is produced, or not produced, under the 
auspices of the IRB. Art is a tool for investigating agnotology, and it is a particularly 
effective tool because it is a mode of investigation that has as its particular excellence the 
detection of oversights, gaps, sites of ignorance, and background assumptions. In this 
case, art reveals how the IRB circumscribes knowledge production by putting on display, 
as the focus and foregrounded content, precisely the knowledge that is forbidden to be 
produced. Secondly, by calling into question the definition of “research,” Gradecki 
rehearses within the representational space of the artwork negotiations that scholars are 
routinely engaged in through their interactions with IRBs. One aspect of knowledge 
production that is missing from these histories and critiques of the IRB, indeed one that 
art seems almost especially equipped to supply, is the lost correspondence and the failed 
directions both given to and received from the IRBs themselves. One of the things that 
IRBs create is a certain silence around the process of correspondence and negotiation 
with the very IRBs that approve the experiments. It’s not simply that they have come to 
regulate the experimental set-up—and they have—but without access to the material 
denied and the reasons for its rejection, scholars interested in the production of scientific 
knowledge are deprived of a crucial archival resource. And it is here that I want to return 
to consider how the discursive infrastructure of Gradecki’s work mediates the 






IV. Results from a Forbidden Experiment 
Through Gradecki’s work it becomes possible to view the scientific experiment as 
a relational aesthetic space in precisely Bourriaud’s sense.34 According to Bourriaud the 
form of a relational work of art consists in the social relations and modes of interaction 
that are occasions the physical and conceptual infrastructure of the work. In Gradecki’s 
case, the work generates two distinct relational spaces: an inwardly directed space of 
interpersonal- and object relations, as gallery visitors engage with one another and with 
the machine, and another, outwardly directed space in which the artists’ exchanges with 
the IRB and the ‘institution’ of art itself are made visible as a background condition for 
the former. Considering the work as an exercise in relational aesthetics enables us to 
recognize these two elements as a doubling of the work, rather than a division into work 
and documentation. Indeed they become separable, almost as two distinct artworks, each 
of which depends upon the other to intensify its meaning and significance. For the 
background activities carry on in a different temporal register; even when the shock 
machine itself isn’t being exhibited and made available for triangulated human-machine 
interactions, the artist’s interactions with the institutions that grant it reason and 
permission for existence carry on. Indeed, they begin before the work can be exhibited, 
and carry on afterwards to determine its reception and its future.  
This doubling of the relational spaces of the artwork marks out the multiple 
spaces of experimental science itself. The experiment that takes place in the laboratory, 
the field, or the test tube, represents the culmination of a process of negotiation between 
investigators and their institutional contexts, their theoretical paradigms and their 
                                                
34 Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics. 
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research instruments and materials. Whereas Bourriaud recognizes the potential aesthetic 
and political significance of the relations brought into being by artworks, in this case the 
artwork points to the multiple relational spaces that bear epistemological significance for 
the conduct of scientific work.  
The decision to engage voluntarily is what the artist’s practice shares with those 
who participate in her work. Typically, when an experiment or a research protocol is 
rejected by the IRB the research does not go forward. Therefore we never learn whether 
the ethical problems anticipated by the IRB arise, and we don’t find out what the value is 
of the knowledge that never gets produced. Gradecki’s decision to exhibit the work 
without IRB approval gives us the chance to re-evaluate her application and the decision 
reached by the board. We might wonder whether, if they knew how the experiment had 
actually turned out, they would have approved it or worked harder to prevent its 
exhibition – for example, by threatening the art department with loss of funding. What 
interests me about this work is that in its double capacity as a work of institutional 
critique and an exercise in relational aesthetics, we are provided with the opportunity to 
scrutinize the results of a forbidden experiment. But what is it that we are not supposed to 
know? 
In response to question 5.C.2. of the IRB application, “What are the potential 
benefits to society?” Gradecki gives the following answer: “Shock machines have been 
used in numerous experiments, but the subjective experience of being shocked is never 
studied in-and-of-itself. Moreover, no research has been done about whether or not 
people would choose to use a shock machine if given the choice to do so in a non-
experimental setting with no recruitment and no incentives (e.g., payment, extra credit). It 
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may be beneficial to see the human relations, thoughts and emotions that a shock 
machine may represent, produce or prompt in a gallery setting.” In a sense, then, the onus 
is on the experiment itself to yield content that is interesting enough to justify the 
institutional critique as something more than a provocation. It is precisely this claim that I 
want to evaluate by reflecting on my own experiences with the work.  
Primary Data 
My first visit to the piece was fraught with anxiety and excitement. I was nervous 
about meeting Gradecki for the first time. After exchanging emails for several months, I 
was hopeful that we would live up to each other’s expectations of philosophical and 
artistic ingenuity. I dressed self-consciously in blazer and a skirt with tall boots. After her 
gallery talk, I volunteered to try out the shock machine, but I needed partner. A friendly 
enough seeming young man volunteered. With a full audience, we sat down and I placed 
the electrodes on my thighs, just above my knees. He affixed them to his hands, and we 
agreed that we would shock each other, at the same time. After a few false starts and 
nervous apologies, I felt my legs electrified in a sudden, ticklish instant and pressed hard 
on the red button, sending my partner leaping out of his chair. Three or four zaps were 
exchanged in quick succession before we collapsed in a fit of uncontrollable laughter—
that rare kind of involuntary, cathartic laughter that takes over any the whole body and 
lasts beyond the point that there seems to be anything left to laugh about—a powerful 
release of pent of anxiety. I didn’t really talk with him afterwards. We went our separate 




 I returned to the gallery with a friend who is a psychiatrist as well as a fellow 
philosophy Ph.D. student in my department, where she was studying psychoanalysis and 
philosophy of mind. She was eager to use the machine to investigate her own hypotheses 
about the latent sadomasochistic tendencies in everyone—and to indulge her own. To my 
dismay, I realized that I was wearing pants that day, so I would have to put the electrodes 
on my arms or hands. Nonetheless, I decided to let her shock me, and she decided 
likewise. We were frustrated by mechanical difficulties, however. We couldn’t get the 
machine to work at all and spent a while checking to see if it was plugged in correctly, 
whether we had hooked up the electrodes right, without crossing the wires; we tried to 
make sure that when we pressed the button we would shock the other person rather than 
ourselves. We exchanged electrodes and tried moistening them. We moved them from 
our arms to our now sweaty palms. While fiddling with the instrument we realized that 
one side was turned up much higher than the other, something I hadn’t even noticed on 
the first visit. Finally, we considered very seriously the possibility that the experiment 
was designed simply to generate the social interaction of sharing anxiety about an 
impending shock, scrutinizing one another’s motives and subjective responses.  
But having been shocked once, I insisted that we try again to get the machine 
working, and with the help of the gallery director, we replaced the pads and administered 
several shocks to each other. These were much more uncomfortable than the previous 
time, and only then did I realized that I must have felt the shock much more mildly with 
the electrodes attached to my legs than my first partner probably did with them on his 
hands. After each shock we tried to figure out whether we were feeling the same level of 
stimulation and discomfort. My enthusiasm for repeating the experiment was starting to 
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dwindle. My friend, on the other hand, was eager to return with someone she’d just 
started dating.  
Perhaps, with her being a psychiatrist, it was especially clear to me on this 
occasion that the work enables us to take up the positions not only as human research 
subjects, but also of experimenters. The experimental set-up could be appropriated for a 
variety of ends: to test our theories (hers about psychology, mine about the philosophy of 
science and aesthetics); to test out and manipulate our interpersonal relations—for 
example, to dominate or equalize—and to reflect on how our sensory perceptions are 
mediated by the context in which we experience them. I, for one, began to feel more 
averse to the shocks as I began to put them in the service of my own research agenda. 
The work thus can be read as marking out in experiential and social space the subject 
positions that are available within scientific experiments themselves, an intervention that 
enables us, in Bourriaud’s terms, to think of scientific experiments and the institutional 
arrangements that review them as relational spaces.  
On my third visit, I was accompanied by another fellow philosophy graduate 
student, this one an aesthetic theorist. With our shared interest in putting theory to work, 
she renewed my excitement for actually participating in the piece and we quickly agreed 
to shock each other. With less time to anticipate and prepare, the shocks were less 
uncomfortable, an entirely reasonable level of discomfort to endure for the sake of having 
an interesting conversation about it afterwards. It was the juxtaposition of the anti-
aesthetic character of this work with the seductive beauty of another work exhibited in 
the same show that captured our attention. The physical experience of the shock itself—
the real discomfort, the way it condensed and intensified time and broke up reflective 
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thought—served as a way of interrupting the aesthetic revelry occasioned by the other 
work. In this sense the IRB piece began to assume, for me, a political significance.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 In an era in which, it has been argued, we are constantly bombarded with 
shocking images, stories, and physical stimuli, it has become impossible to produce a 
shock that sustains reflection. Susan Buck-Morss, in an intriguing reading of Walter 
Benjamin’s essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” suggests 
that Benjamin conceives of art as an antidote to the desensitizing effects of 
overstimulation as a quintessential condition of modern life.35 Connecting aesthetics with 
rise of anesthetizing agents in the 19th century, drugs both medical and recreational, she 
argues that “under conditions of modern shock -the daily shocks of the modern world -
response to stimuli without thinking has become necessary for survival.”36 If we take the 
form of the work to be the configurations of “Social Interaction as a Function of 
Voluntary Engagement with a Shock Machine” we can read the content of those 
interactions as a series of performances in which the nature of voluntary participation in 
the shocking conditions of contemporary life are renegotiated in a manner that aims to 
recover the possibility of thinking. Indeed, as I read it, the work poses the question as to 
what extent those profoundly ethically troubling conditions may become knowable at all 
under the constraints imposed upon humanistic and social scientific knowledge 
production.  
                                                
35 Susan Buck-Morss, “Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered,” 
October 62, no. Autumn (1992): 3–41. 
36 Ibid., 16. 
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IRB# G10-02-066-01 shows how art, in being subjected to, and indeed subjecting 
itself to the conditions of knowledge production, enables those conditions to become 
visible. It is precisely the rigidity of the experimental protocol and the vast institutional 
structure that maintains its stability that enables the variability of viewpoints produced by 
the work to be accumulated as a form of knowledge. The work does what the artist 
promised the IRB board it would and what it reveals about the subjective experience of 
being shocked is indeed interesting. But the subjective experiences of being shocked that 
it makes possible but does not record or collect do not in themselves yield anything that 
should obviously count as generalizable knowledge in the sense required for an endeavor 
quality as “research.” But what the work as whole does produce is a knowledge of the 
limits of those criteria. For if the work never counted as “research” in the first place, then 
the question of IRB review would never have been relevant – the piece would have been 
outside of the Board’s jurisdiction and thus not subject to review. What has become clear, 
instead, is that by seeking to qualify the artwork as research, the artist has revealed the 
limits of the IRB’s jurisdiction as the limits of generalizable knowledge. And this is a 
very narrow limit to place on knowledge, an epistemologically arbitrary and ethically 
empty stricture. What is pointed out here is how the legitimation of knowledge depends 
upon bureaucracies and implicit systems of validation. The IRB is simply the mediating 





"Our encounters with art... enable us to see things differently. They call into question 
complacent assumptions, introduce new ways of ordering a domain and provide evidence 
of the value of new world orders. They provide conceptual and perceptual resources that 
allow us to recognize features and patterns we would otherwise overlook."37 
Catherine Elgin, Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary (1997) 
 
 When Eduardo Kac exhibited GPF Bunny in the year 2000, the artwork generated 
a firestorm of criticism and debate. The French scientists who created the transgenic 
rabbit for Kac later claimed that the creature was not only identical to their other 
laboratory animals, but was in fact one of them, and therefore not an artwork at all. Like 
Andy Warholl’s Brillo Box some 30 years earlier, Alba the (allegedly) glow-in-the-dark 
bunny called into question what counts as art—and what counts as science—in the age of 
biotechnology. As I discussed in Chapter 2, Brillo Box provoked Arthur Danto to give a 
new answer to this perennial question: “To see something as art requires something that 
the eye cannot decry—an atmosphere of theory, knowledge of the history of art: an 
artworld.”38 Contemporary works at the intersection of art, science and technology 
require for their intelligibility not only an artworld, but also an atmosphere of theory and 
a knowledge of the history and philosophy of science—a familiarity with the world of 
science, its materials and methods, its epistemological commitments and its institutions. 
Against the background of an artworld, the conceptual and aesthetic logic of such strange 
items as commodities and blank squares become intelligible as self-reflexive critiques of 
the history of art, interventions into long running conversations about what art is and 
                                                
37 Elgin, Between the Absolute and the Arbitrary, 12. 
38 Danto, “The Artworld,” 580. 
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what it should do. In this dissertation I have worked to elucidate the theoretical, historical 
and social context in which contemporary artworks can be understood as interventions 
into our philosophical understanding of science. What I hope to have demonstrated is that 
performative experiments offer a new archive of exemplary objects and experiences for 
the philosophy of science and technology. Through the experiments in criticism that I 
have performed upon these artworks, I have strived to show, most of all, how my own 
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